

THE
GRAMMATICAL READER:
A
CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM
ON THE
Old Theory of English Grammar,
AND ON THE
WRITINGS OF ITS COMPILERS.
IN TWO VOLUMES.

DESIGNED FOR
PRIVATE READERS, ADVANCED SCHOOLS, AND COLLEGES.

BY JAMES BROWN.

THE AUTHOR OF "THE ALPHASCOPE," "THE FIRST ROUND IN THE LADDER OF
EDUCATION," "THE HAND-NOMASCOPE," "THE SECOND ROUND IN THE
LADDER OF EDUCATION," "THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH
GRAMMAR IN THREE BOOKS," "AN EXERCISE OF COMPOSITIONS,
SAYD TO BE OF DIFFICULT SOLUTION," AND
"A SYSTEM OF ANALYZING FORMS."

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
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REMARKS:

THE author of this work has long been satisfied that our schools need a *Class Book* of Criticism on English Grammar. Youth may acquire the art of *parsing*, as it is called, without employing any faculty except the *memory*. But they can never become *masters* of the genius of our language without a generous exercise of the *judgment*. Some means, therefore, which will set aside the mere memorizing process, and bring the *judgment* into action, must be employed, or youth must remain ignorant of their own language, or acquire a knowledge of it after they shall have left school!

The old standard, too, by which a person is judged to be competent to *teach* English Grammar, must give place to one which implies more knowledge; a mere ability to *parse*, neither proves, nor confers a capacity to *write* the English Language with accuracy.

The interest which one feels in any subject, depends much upon the circumstances under which his attention may be called to it. The interest which is excited by an *attack* upon some *custom*, *practice*, or *law*, is far greater than that which is raised from a mere attempt to learn the common application of this custom, or law, in the affairs of life. This work assails the present popular English Grammars; and, in it, the principles which youth desire to learn, are more thoroughly discussed, than in the theory which it attempts to overthrow. Here the pupil is not only relieved of the drudgery of *memorizing*, but is delighted, and instructed by a vivid debate which not only exposes the *unsoundness* of the *old* theory, but illustrates, and establishes the *principles* of the new system. He would recommend this work, therefore, as a *READING BOOK* for the sake of that *philological* strength, that *grammatical* skill, in the English Language, which nothing but a critical reading of works like this, can give to the human mind.

The *Class Book* of Criticism sets aside the old Grammars—exposes their defects, demonstrates the little use of attending to them, and presents to the teacher, the unerring, and only way to the grammar of the English language. It undeceives the *most accomplished grammarian*, and instructs the *most profound philologist*; and it is in a variety of ways, and cases, the clergyman's guide in scriptural exposition, the lawyer's interpreter in judicial discussion, and the magistrate's confirmation in legal decision.

PREFACE.

THE English bids fair to be a living Language through time itself. Hence no change, in the *means* by which its principles are taught, calculated to redound to the honour of the present, and to the good of future generations, should be discouraged by the plea of a probable want of longevity in the language itself.

It is composed of materials derived from various sources; and although these sources are rich even to philological luxuries, the English Language is strong even to that persuasion to which reason itself often becomes a sacrifice. Hence considering the tender age of the English Language, perhaps it may be said to surpass every other!

As the English Language is still in its youth, it is yet in a progressive state. In general, men have three distinct objects in their instruments, means, and institutions. And as these are not simultaneous, but successive in their existence, every human means, system, and institution must remain a long time in a state of progression.

In building, a man's *first* object is a house which will provide for his *necessities*.—His second, is a house which will provide for his *convenience*—and his third object is one that will not only provide for his comfort, but which will comport with his *wealth*.

Now, it is with a nation as it is with an individual; and it is with languages, systems, and institutions as it is with a house. Every thing that relates to man, is matter of progression. Listen to Cowper, singing the *simple stool* into the splendid sofa upon the notes of progressive improvement.

And, if you turn to the stove, you will find that construction designed to answer the demands of necessity, thrown aside by the hands of genius, which has provided for *necessity, convenience, and taste* in the same thing.

And, as you turn from the stove to *language*, you will find the same hand abridging in some parts, augmenting in others, and adjusting all for *convenience, strength, perspicuity, despatch, and euphony*.

Mark, the *orthography* of the italic words.

“ *Have more then* thou showest,
Speak less *then* thou knowest,
Lend less *then* thou owest,

Ride more *then* thou goest,

Learne more *then* thou *trowest*. '—LEAR, p. 288.

Have is now *have*—*then* is now *than*—and *learne* is now *learn*.

"Where shall we *sojourne* till our coronation ?

"Where it *thinks* best unto your *royall selfe*.

Richard 3d page 186.

Sojourne, is now *sojourn*—*royall* is now *royal*—*selfe* is now *self*.

"Men's eyes be obedient unto the *creatour* that they may see on *think*, and yet not another."—Bishop Hooper.

Creatour is now *Creator*—*on* is now *one*—and *think* is now *thing*.

"The woman's *synne* was *lesse greuous* than Adam's *synne*, and *lesse hurtful* to *mankynde*."

Dieus and *Pauper*, 6th conn. chap. 10.

"Nor make *warre* upon me *nyght*, nor *day*."

Squires Tales, fol. 5, page 2, col. 1.

Warre is now *war*—*nyght* is now *night*.

"Our hope in him is dead : let us *returne*,

And use what other *meanes* is left unto us," &c.

Timon of Athens, page 67.

Returne is now *return*—and *meanes* is now *means*.

It is here seen that language is an instrument which is continually changed the better to answer the purpose of those for whose use it is intended. And, pray, why, should it not be so ? Has not the traveller a right to *trim*, and *smooth* his walking stick ? shall he not be permitted to cut it down to a size suitable to his convenience, and strength ; and eventually, to insert a sword fit for his defence, and to give the whole a polish congenial to his wish, and taste ?

Those who have attended to the English language no farther than to learn, and use it as it *now* is, may think that it has already attained to its highest degree of excellence. From such, however, the author of this work very widely differs. Nor is he alone in this opinion.—For, in an ORATION pronounced at Cambridge, August 26, 1824, before the PHI BETA KAPPA Society, by Edward Everett, it is said by this finished scholar that—

"There is little doubt that the instrument of communication, will receive great improvements ; that the written, and spoken language will acquire new force, and power ; possibly that forms of address, wholly new, will be struck out to meet the universal demand for new energy."

The author of the Rational System of English Grammar proposes no change in the language itself. He proposes a revolution in the means by which a knowledge of its *laws* is *acquired*.

But it may be said by many, that the old theory has so long enjoyed the approbation of the learned, that it must be a complete, and accurate expression of the grammatical genius of the English

language. To those who deduce the perfection of the old theory, from the duration of its existence, it may be replied that the arts, and sciences have ever been *slow* in their progress, and been brought to their present condition by the accumulated efforts of different countries, and successive generations. Even the common mechanic arts, upon which the concurrent experience of all men in every nation, has been constantly acting, have attained to *comparative* excellence only. Great, therefore, as have been the successive efforts of the British grammarians; and much as they deserve approbation for what they have accomplished, the history of the arts, and sciences, in general, and the difficulties of *grammatical* investigation, in particular, forbid the belief that the old theory of English Grammar, has yet attained to those powers of development, necessary to a *full, true, and clear* expression of the grammatical principles of our language.

Nor, while the author of this CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM has uniformly rendered that respect to the British English grammarians, to which they are so justly entitled from all, has he been surprised to find their whole theory *groaning* under the disease of *error*. This disease has been too *general* to excite any sudden emotion from *novelty*—it has always been the prevailing *epidemic* among *new* theories, plans, and institutions—and, while a few have escaped its attack, the majority has fallen victims to its rage, and been cut down, as by a quick, or slow consumption. In confirmation of this, see theory after theory falling like men in battle—mark the means employed to save them from the state of protracted sleep.—The *dignity* of their *origin* is pleaded—the few services they have rendered, are urged—the *inconvenience* of *change*, is exaggerated—*error* is attempted to be *beautified*—*innovation* is belied, and presented in all the terrors of disorder, dilaceration, and ruin—and the *innovator himself* is held up as a pest to society—an enemy to truth, as some *refractory* spirit seeking distinction in the ruin of those noble fabrics which have been finished by genius, adorned with learning, tried by time, and long admired by the world. But history shows that all these life-saving resorts are vain.—The existence of error cannot be protracted beyond the discovery of *truth*! Whenever *error* can be clearly exposed, and truth fairly made out, the sea of life, which rocks under the jarring interests, and views of men, will rise in anger, and will swallow up that compass, be it constructed by whom it may, which has been *unfaithful* to the mariner, in his voyage for *science, art, or fame*.

The present popular theory of English Grammar is a compilation by Mr. L. Murray.

Mr. Murray was an American—he was born, and educated in the UNITED STATES. His work, however, is a collection of the writ-

ten opinions, and views of the English literati. The author compiled his Grammar after he became a member of the English community—he designed it as a system of Definitions, Rules and Remarks, for the presentation of the structure of the English language—the work therefore, is, in every sense of the word, an English production. But is it the worse for its *national* character? No! Nor is it considered so in the present attack upon it. England is our mother—and, although while in her family, and under her protection, we received nothing from her hands but persecution in all its forms; yet while we would receive her literary gifts with the affection of children; we would treat them with the minds of *men*.

The ties between England, and America, are amity, and affection. These national ligatures can never be strengthened by oblations upon the altar of science, for the sins of the parent upon the heads of the *children*. FREEDOM is the source whence these cords have sprung; and INDEPENDENCE is the power which must continue their tension. Political independence hath given us wings—and literary freedom must enable us to soar to fame. Does England say that this work is an attack upon her? the author *denies* the *charge*; it is an attack upon her erroneous opinions with an application to her best judgment to renounce them. Nor is the attack intended *for* her any farther than she is disposed to render it subservient to her interest. If *she* thinks proper to approve, well. But, if she undertakes to repel *this* attack, she is arrayed against TRUTH which is no sooner known, than it finds advocates in every land, and clime! TRUTH has never suffered for a want of *advocates*. It sometimes lies long concealed under *methodical*, and *pampered error*. But, as this loathsome garb is torn off, and truth exhibited in its native beauty, and form, it is led forth by its numerous friends, and made to strengthen the mind, to adorn art, and science, and to beautify nature herself.

Nor does TRUTH ever become so degraded by the comparative value of the system, art, or science in which it may be found, that it falls below the favorable notice, and ready patronage of the wisest, and best man. True, *individuals* may be found, who say, “O, the old theory answers all *practical* purposes—and farther than this, we are *indifferent*.”

But this is *not* the general sentiment of the human race. The erroneous theory of astronomy was sufficient to answer all “*practical purposes*”—yet because this theory shut out the TRUTH, it was exploded, and the *true* one adopted. It was a *love of truth*, which induced men to reject the old astronomical theory, and to receive the new, and *true* one. For surely, those master spirits who arrayed themselves against error, neither expected, by the introduction of the true system, to enrich the soil of the earth,

nor to bring more brilliant, and lasting light from the heavens. No—it was the *lustre* of *truth*, which attracted their attention—it was the *brilliancy* of this *diamond*, which enlisted these soldiers of science in the war of *innovation*. And it was not until the termination of this war, that the splendour of creation was known, or the greatness of its Maker seen.

Man is so constituted that *truth* renders him happy, while *error* makes him miserable. Truth has an effect upon the mind as much as fire upon the flesh, or food upon the palate. The criminal is made happy, or miserable, by *truth*. If *truth* fixes the crime, the culprit is condemned, though *acquitted*; but, if *falsehood* fixes it, he is acquitted, although *condemned*.

If a theory is founded in *truth*, no higher recommendation is necessary—indeed it would be an insult upon the nature, and dignity of man, to attempt any *stronger*, or *higher* encomium.

If a man rejects *truth* upon the ground that *error* may answer all *practical purposes*, he forms an *exception*—he falls below the dignity of his species. The man who says that *error* will answer as well as *truth*, might also say that *vice* will answer as well as *virtue*, that a *falsehood* is as commendable as the *truth*; in short, that *sin* is as worthy as *holiness itself*.

Truth even in the abstract, has claims upon man for his approbation—and man from his very nature, rejoices in paying the demand.

The author has proceeded thus far upon the ground that an *erroneous* theory will answer all *practical purposes*. But he now denies the correctness of the position; and he pities them who have the weakness to take it. Was this position reversed, they who take it would appear more gracious—for Essays may answer in theory, which are by no means competent in *practice*. The British theory of English Grammar, may answer all the purposes of theory—but, it cannot answer even half of the purposes of *practice*. The purposes of a grammar in practice, are the just solution, and proper use of the language whose grammar it professes to teach. These purposes are not answered by the old English Grammar, which in the course of this work, will be clearly demonstrated. And it is upon this firm ground that the present petition is made to the AMERICAN PEOPLE to abandon that theory for one, conceived in *truth*, born of the English language, dressed in simplicity, skilful, and strong even to all the pretended *eccentricities*, *anomalies*, and *idioms* with which our language is *said* to abound.

But the petitioner does not even hope to escape opposition—he craves investigation—he trembles not under the dread of defeat—*truth* against *error*, is *omnipotent*.

The author of the Rational System of English Grammar, is not insensible that even the American people will listen to his peti-

tion with a jealous diffidence. They will revert with logical caution to the numerous attempts to improve the voluminous compilations of the worthy Mr. Murray, upon this science. The stubborn animosity of those who have been disappointed in Goold Brown: the virulence of them that have not realized their high expectations in Bullions; and the execrations of the many, who say Murray is the very acme of grammatical excellence, will entrench themselves against the prosperity of this undertaking. Nor will the opposing force stop here; some of the many who have devoted so much time to the study of this science, by the old plan, will, from *mere pride* of opinion, exert their influence to retard the march of this improvement. The last class of anti-improvers, may be known by the argument which they adopt. They tell the community that it is not possible that so learned a man as Mr. Murray, should so far overlook the genius of our language, that he can form an erroneous system for the development of its principles. They even convert the worth, and elevated standing of the man into a kind of arch which they throw over his works to defend them from the *pressure* of criticism. This arch I greatly admire; and I would even plead the dignity of its materials as a superinducement for my attack upon its tenets. When a country so idolizes its great men that it trembles at an appeal from their *erroneous* decisions, the avenues to improvement are closed,—national reputation sickens,—the *expiring* rattle is heard in the larynx of genius,—and the cold sweat of death covers the public body.

A REPUBLIC must advance, or it must retrograde. This is emphatically true with the *American* community. The rapid increase of its population, brings along with it new views, new interests, new jealousies, and new *ambition*. Politics have become the highway to fame, and the *broad road to destruction*. The crowds that enter, seem resolved on distinction, and power. Every act which seems important to self-aggrandizement, must be *pushed* into being; and every chief magistrate whose reign appears hurtful to the opposite party, must be hurled from his seat by the *constitution* of the Union.

All the leading politicians have fixed their eyes upon some exalted posts—and to attain to these, they rely upon the various views which may be taken of this glorious instrument—an instrument which would be sufficient to guide a WASHINGTON; but which is altogether incompetent to control one bent upon power,—and dominion.

This Republic is not to be saved from the attacks of ambition, by a *Junius* brandishing the crimson steel. The guardian power of America, must be sought for in her *constitution*. This is the *ark* in which her liberties,—her rights,—her very *vitals* are deposited.

The defects in the construction of this ark, have already served the purposes of political partizans who will always be dangerous to American liberty in proportion to the philological defectiveness of that sacred depository in which it has been placed by those whose lives were devoted to procure it, and whose spirits are invoked to preserve it.

Too little attention is paid to the means employed in teaching children. Youth is the progressive state of both mind and body ; and, if either is neglected here, it never attains to that height in excellence to which our species is capable of ascending. The proper nourishment for both, while in this state, is *logical*, and *liberal* action,—and, in exact proportion to the use of this, will be the strength of the body, and the capability of the soul.

The subject of *truth*, and *definition* is generally kept out of our Seminaries of learning—hence it is, that lax phraseology, unmeaning description, and obscure expression pervade, and deform the works of our great men.

A knowledge of the *science* of *thought*, is the only information which can render a man fully competent to discharge the various duties which devolve upon him in the journey of life. As astronomy does not respect the relation of ideas in general, a knowledge of this science cannot render the mind skilful in other things. A man's knowledge of the relations of the celestial bodies which roll in the firmament upon *God's will* as their *axle*, does not give so much capability to acquire other sciences, as does his knowledge of the *more celestial* bodies which revolve in constellations in the mind, round God as their centre !

As language is the great medium through which the student gains access to art, and science, he should endeavour to make himself perfectly acquainted with this medium as soon as his age will enable him to study it. And, as language is nothing but *thought* embodied in tabernacles of sound, and literal characters, the student must here study the science of thought, or remain ignorant of language. Language is the only thing in which thought is presented as a *science*. And, although it is said again, and again, that the pupil may attain to the *philosophy* of language after he shall have acquired the *grammar* of it, yet it is a truth which cannot be controverted, that the *philosophy*, and the *grammar* of a language, are the same thing.

I do not intend to say that the jargon which is presented by Murray, Gould Brown, Bullions, &c. &c. as *English grammar* is the *philosophy* of the English language. But I mean to say that *English grammar* is the *constructive philosophy* of the English language.

No, no,—I should not like to impose upon myself the task of showing that the silly rules, ridiculous notes, and *nickname* defi-

nitions which disgrace their authors, and harm their students, are the *philosophy* of the English language!

The following definition of *person* is given by a recent *mender* of Murray—

“Person, in grammar, is the *relation* of a noun or pronoun to what is said in discourse.”

“There are three persons, *first*, *second*, and *third*. The first *person* denotes the *speaker*, or *writer*;—as *I Paul* have written it. The second *person* denotes the person addressed;—as *Thou, God*, seest me;—the third *person* denotes the person or thing spoken of; as, *Truth* is mighty.”—*P. Bullion's English Grammar*.

Now, as *person* is *relation*, the *first person* is the *first relation*. The *second person* is the *second relation*—and the *third person* is the *third relation*!! The practical philosophy of the thing, then, is this—

The *first relation* denotes the *speaker*, or *writer*; as *I Paul* have written it! Is the speaker denoted here by a *relation*? Is he not denoted by the word *Paul*? Is this proper noun a *relation*?

The second *relation* denotes the person addressed; as, “*Thou, God*, seest me!”

The third *relation* denotes the person, or thing spoken of; as, *Truth* is mighty!

Is it not remarkably singular that a man who defines *person* to be a *relation*, and thus compels himself to say in the application of this false doctrine, that the speaker is denoted by a *relation*, should know anything of *truth*? “*Truth* is mighty.”

But it is mighty in the hands of those only, who love it. The man who can employ the word, *truth*, in illustration of the gross error which precedes, would be likely to treat *truth* as *hag-born*!

But *truth* is *mighty* in every thing in which it is found—and, upon every thing to which it is applied. *Truth* in science acts as compost upon the mind of the student—*truth* in science draws out the affections of the student for the study of the science—*truth* in science falls upon the mind of the student like the dew-drop upon the grass. But that theory from which liquid error is constantly drizzling into the mind of the student, renders the brain dropsical, and consequently, the whole mind feeble.

Youth is the season allotted by nature to the exercise, and expansion of the soul—but man, *lazy* man has contradicted this, and thus brought himself to a state so feeble that he can hardly protect his rights, hardly enjoy his freedom. Even the *Constitution* of the *United States*, although drawn up by the *united talents* of profound men, cannot be understood by any two impartial statesmen in the *same way*. The SENATE cannot ascertain by this instrument, whether the Vice-President should control the senatorial body, or whether this body should control him! Thou-

sands have already been expended to determine this point from the language of the constitution, without the least success.

As great a scholar, and as profound a statesman as has ever presided over this nation, understands the constitution of the Union to give the President power to send certain ministers, and other officers, from this, to foreign countries, without the consent of the Senate. But a Senate in no respect inferior to any which has ever adorned this Republic, understands this same instrument to require him to consult the Senate upon the subject of *all* foreign missions. Thus the same instrument is made to sustain conflicting measures whenever it pleases the contending parties to sanction deeds which are favourable to themselves.

In the United States, the people are divided into two parties upon the constitutionality of a national bank. Yes, ever since the government of these States has had an existence, one party has averred that the constitution sanctions a national bank, while the other has as long averred that it interdicts every thing of the kind. Thus, while the affirmative party has been erecting a national bank with this instrument, the negative one has been demolishing it with the same means!

The author of this CLASS BOOK has ever been disposed to ascribe these individual, and national misfortunes to a want of *skill* in language. These sparrings which tax a nation's wealth, these concussions in the political elements, which carry *horror in their vibrations*, these *eddies* which sometimes whirl in amazement, nation after nation, these adverse winds which give being, and energy to faction, are the storms which ambition directs by riding upon the clouds of the *constitution*. It is in these clouds that ambition lurks—it is from these that the thunder of eloquence will burst—it is from these, that the lightning of genius will play, first to the consternation, then to the *destruction* of our political EDEN.

He that has attended with common observation to what passes daily in society in general, has found that most of the difficulties which distract neighbourhoods, and array even brother against brother, and carry both before a *judge*, and *jury*, arise from a want of *clearly* defining the conditions of their contracts. It becomes every man, therefore, to understand the language of his own country—he should consider it as an instrument employed in the transaction of business—as a means used for the preservation of peace,—as a high qualification in social hours,—and an invaluable blessing through life.

Is it too late to begin a *reform*? If not, let it be commenced in our *primary* schools—let our language be understood by the teacher, and by him let it be taught to the pupil—let the *absurd*, *parrot-like* mode of teaching it be ridiculed out of use, and out

of being—let children learn to *think*—and let parents employ the teachers who will *enable* their children to think.

Let the institutions in which our youth complete their education, give attention to our *own* language—too much time is devoted to the *dead* languages.

American statesmen must be acquainted with their *own* language, or this Republic is of short duration.

This Republic came into being by political revolution—and it must attain to its destined rank, and sway by *literary innovation*.

The greatest freedom to which a nation can aspire is complete emancipation from literary thralldom—few nations, however, arrive at this commanding eminence. Rome once possessed it; and she was the glory, and admiration of the world.

In times of innovation, however, every caution should be enlivened with fear—yet attempered with reason. The enraged genius of one individual has sometimes drawn whole nations from the bosom of their laws, and from the inmost recesses of their salutary habits. But injury has rarely resulted from the feats of genius directed to the improvement of art, or science. Even where the primary object is not accomplished, good often results from the exertions of the disappointed. Was the philosopher's stone discovered—was the elixir of life procured? No, but the search after them, prepared the way for discoveries of great importance to the human race. And, although the great minds that pursued these objects, did enlarge the circle of science, they were severely punished with sneers, ridicule, and persecution!

Attempts to improve the arts, and sciences rarely escape the consequences inflicted by virulence, prejudice, and ambition. The race of genius has generally been converted into detestable war, and the ground of improvement turned into a field of battle. And while the bones of some have remained bleaching as a memento to the folly, and cruelty of man, the fate of others has been long, and dismal incarceration. But in modern days, few are immured within the gloomy walls of the *criminal's* prison: *innovators, inventors, and improvers, the distinguished benefactors of the human race*, are now subjected to torture on the *rack* of the public press!

And a thousand minor means are always employed to aid in the chastisement of the greatly useful men, as well as in the *misrepresentation* of the most salutary measures. He whose reflections have never been sufficient to *undeceive* his *own* mind, has not unfrequently *prated* to the *temporary* detriment of real improvement. The FOP in literature, and the COXCOMB in science, have misled the credulous, and ignorant; who, for a while, have withheld their support from important discoveries. And the ENVIOUS, who

*pin*es under the success of another, has too often convened all his *MALIGN* passions, held a *caucus* with himself to devise means for defeat, and disgrace.

When did *ENVY* emit her infuriated flame, and wrap the invaluable Linnæus in a fiery sheet of slander? It was when reason, as though endowed with religion, was patient—it was when the genius, and industry of Linnæus produced that botanical system which adorns the present age—it was when the former theories upon this science were converted into fortifications to save their votaries, and defeat the march of truth.

Where are those who *ridiculed* a Newton for years? *Disappointment* is their historian; and shame is the theme of his pen. And, while the services of our own Clinton, couple him with the great of other times, the connection has been confirmed by the sanction of similar persecutions. The tongues, of prejudice, which his *CANAL ENTERPRISE* raised, hold a numeral competition with the particles of earth, thrown out in the excavation. But while the *shame* of thousands is seen *blushing* through the waters of the Western canal, the praise of its projector is heard rippling under its boats.—And as long as the note of merit is sweet to any, *America* will be charmed by the music of the voice which utters the name of CLINTON.

The Rational System of English Grammar presents a new scene to the minds of men; and the grand problem is, whether it deserves their fostering care, or their frowns, and reprehensions.

Perhaps there is no middle point upon which men can place this undertaking—they can hardly justify a neutral ground. And it comes to this nation with increased claim to attention, as *America* is *now* the great theatre of glorious enterprise, and useful discovery.

What it may be inquired is this Rational system? It is a plan of instruction calculated to rouse the mind of the pupil, and to employ his perceptive powers. It is a system of grammar calculated to shorten the distance from youth to manhood by accelerating the progress of the mind. The Rational Grammar is a system of teaching, which smooths the rugged road to knowledge, over which the *old* vehicle has for ages rumbled. It is a system obviously differing from all others: it is a species of *INNOVATION* which must meet, and withstand the *usual* opposition. The work of innovation is a *Herculean* task: it is an enterprise, opposed by the pride of some, the virulence of others, and the habits of *all*. Few, however, are so bewildered by pride of opinion, that, sooner or later, they do not yield their assent to the introduction of real improvement. But there always will be some, who, led captive, by prejudice, will exert their utmost strength to oppose the tide of improvement. In the variegated machinery of human compacts,

however, these are by no means, useless—yet, while the author of the CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM considers them important in the race of improvement, he pities their condition, and rejoices that it is not his *own*.

The Americans, as a people, though various in descent, are *one* in purpose. And it is by this *unique* character, that the influence of a difference in pedigree, is met, and subdued. It is not *birth*; nor is it *residence*, but coincidence in *views*, and *purpose*, which makes one an AMERICAN. And *he*, and *he alone*, is an American, born *here*, or *elsewhere*, whether of Irish, or German descent, whose conduct accords with the spirit of *American* laws, whose eye is upon *our* constitution, as the ARK in which his *liberty* is deposited,—and who couples, with his *own* promotion, the advancement of the nation. And it is to the Americans that the enterprize of introducing this system is addressed. It is to a people, liberal, according to their means, beyond any other; it is to a people, willing, beyond any other, to try all things, and hold *fast* that which is *good*—it is to a people needy, from the nature of their government, beyond any other, of *general*, *early*, and *correct* information. In a country like this, where equal rights are the life of the government, and general intelligence the lungs through which she respires, the means of education rise in importance above almost every other topic of national, or individual reflection. Let America, then, not tremble at innovation—let her continue to use the burnisher of genius till the *glitter* of the spires, ascending from her *Temples* of science shall throw their light into the universities of even her mother.

ADVERTISEMENT.

NOTHING so effectually prevents improvement as a belief of present perfection. It is observed by Mr. Murray, that little improvement in English grammar can be expected at so *late* a period. This gentleman may have exhausted the source whence he has derived his extensive compilations; but it does not follow that he has exhausted the *principles* of this science. Mr. Murray's Grammar is neither in accordance with sound sense, nor with the principles of our language—and to sustain this position, the author of the Rational Grammar, has published the Class Book of Criticism, which makes a full exposure of the *defects, errors and contradictions*, which pervade not only Mr. Murray's, but every other system that is founded upon the British principles of English grammar.

Years since, the author of this work began those investigations in English Philology, which have resulted in the Rational System. He commenced by forming a *new nomenclature*, which, in his opinion, is not absolutely necessary to a clear, and satisfactory development of the *Grammar* of our language. About this time he printed his first work, which makes but two parts of speech: namely, PRIMARY, and SECONDARY.

1. The *Primary* is a word which is *constructively independent*; as, *man, book*.

2. The *Secondary* is a word which is *constructively dependent*; as, “*a good man walks uprightly in all his ways*.”

Since the time of the author's first publication, he has printed several works upon this science: these have been robbed by the *herd of simplifiers*, and made the foundation of those *overgrown pretensions* which have disgusted the people, and disgraced their *modest authors*. It is unnecessary to enumerate the names of the whole family of these *plagiarists*; yet, out of compliment to those who have *recommended* the author's works by a *liberal and free* use of their principles, it seems a duty to mention a *Greenleaf*, an *Ingersoll*, a *Cardell*, a *Kirkham*, and a *Gould Brown*! That these writers are *dishonest authors*, the different works published by the author of the Rational Grammar, most clearly demonstrate; and that they are unsuccessful ones, *time*, which must give a faithful account of their *fate*, will, not far hence, place beyond *dispute*.

It is generally thought by those who have merely heard of the

philological works of JOHN HORNE TOOKE, that this distinguished politician has given in his "*Diversions of Purley*," a system of English Grammar ; and that this system makes but *two* parts of speech. But he has attempted to form no System of Grammar—nor does he there say how many parts of speech there are in any language ! He does assert, however, that all the Conjunctions, Prepositions, &c., in our language, have been derived from *nouns*, or *verbs*. But he does not even intimate that the words derived from this source, should now be considered, and called *nouns*, and *verbs* ! Perhaps no one but Mr. Cardell has ever attempted to class, and name words according to their source of derivation—a principle which would include *detract*, and *detract*-*tion* in the same class ; thus making *detract*-*ion* a verb !

The Rational System is so far from a departure from the principles upon which the author's first attempts were made, that it is a very close conformity to them. Of the works which the author's inceptive stages of investigation produced, the gentlemen whose names are here presented, spake in quite flattering terms—and, although the author does not rest the introduction of the Rational System upon the authority of great names ; yet, as philosophers and moralists, theologians, and politicians have resorted to the opinions, and concurrent testimony of distinguished individuals to obtain a sanction for their doctrines, and systems, he deems it proper to present to the public the opinions which eminent scholars and teachers have expressed of his work :

His Excellency, De Witt Clinton ; E. Nott, President of Union College ; Rev. John Findlay, A. M., Baltimore ; Rev. Samuel Blatchford, Lansingburg ; Prof. Yates, Union College ; Rev. John Chester, Albany ; Rev. C. G. Somers, New York ; W. A. Tweed Dale, Principal of the Lancasterian School, Albany ; Rev. D. H. Barnes, Classical Teacher, New York ; C. Schæffer, Pastor of Christ Church, New York ; Rev. Solomon Brown, Principal of the Classical and Belles Lettres Academy, New York ; Rev. D. Parker, A. M., Principal of Broad Street Academy, New York ; Caroline M. Thayer, Preceptress of Philomethan Academy, N. York ; Charles Spaulding, Principal of Union Academy, New Brunswick, N. J. ; L. S. Lownsbury, Principal of Village Academy, N. York ; C. K. Gardner, A. M., Washington City ; Richard R. Fenner, teacher, James Gould, teacher, Mr. Stewart, teacher, Baltimore ; Rev. Thomas Wheat, Principal of the Academy appended to St. Paul's Church, Alexandria ; Benjamin Hallowell, Principal of the Alexandria Classical, and Mathematical Boarding School ; John R. Pierpont, Mechanic's Hall Academy, Alexandria ; Mr. Allison, A. M., Classical Teacher, Alexandria ; Samuel Douglas, Esq., Harrisburg ; Dr. A. T. Dean, Harrisburg ; Roberts Vaux, C. J. Ingersoll, W. M. Meredith, D. P. Brown, Dr.

A. Comstock, Thomas A. Taylor, Mr. Slack, Mr. Goodfellow, David Maclure, Thomas M. Raser, E. Fouse, S. H. Wilson, Philadelphia; John M'Allison, Alexandria; Thomas J. Harris, Chambersburg; N. R. Smith, John N. M'Nivins, Pittsburg; S. I. Anderson, Lieut. U. S. Army, Benjamin F. Reeve, Minerva, Kentucky; James H. Holton, Germantown, Kentucky; John Erhart, Newport, Rhode Island.

N. B. The opinions of these gentlemen *may* be found at the close of the work.

The following are the names of those who recommend the Rational System at the present time:

Reverend Jacob H. Nickels, Philadelphia; Wm. Roberts, Principal of the Ringgold Grammar School; Wm. D. Young, G. Gerard, Professor of Languages, Philadelphia; J. Wilson Wallace, Philadelphia; C. J. Ingersoll, Philadelphia; John Ludlow, L.L.D. President of the University, Philadelphia; B. F. Manire, Smithville, Miss.; P. A. Browne, L.L.D., Philadelphia; Dr. A. T. W. Wright, Principal of the *Philadelphia Normal School*; G. W. Biddle, Philadelphia; Thomas S. Smith, Philadelphia; John D. Blight, Philadelphia; Nicholas H. Maguire, Principal of the Coates' Street Grammar School; L. Bedford, Principal of the *Female* Harrison Grammar School; John Joyce, Principal of the Reed Street Grammar School; A. B. Ivins, Principal of the North West Grammar School; James B. Beers, Philadelphia; John M. Coleman, former Principal of the NEW MARKET Grammar School; P. A. Cregar, Principal of the South East Grammar School; Mrs. M. Whiteside, Philadelphia; Godey's Lady's Book, Philadelphia; Reverend W. E. G. Agnew, Principal of the Young Ladies' Boarding School, Seventh near Arch street; Reverend Otis A. Skinner, Chairman of the Committee on the Franklin Grammar School, Boston; Professor James P. Espy, Washington City; S. W. Crawford, L.L.D., Principal of the Academy connected with the Pennsylvania University; J. B. Burleigh, L.L.D., Baltimore; John Sanderson, late Professor of Languages in the Philadelphia High School; Reverend John Findlay, Baltimore; Henry M'Cullough, Tenn.; Benjamin M'Connell, Tenn.; E. Bennett, Principal of the Academy in the basement story of the Third Presbyterian Church, North Eutaw Street, Baltimore; Hon. George Sharswood, Philadelphia; A. C. Roy, Principal of the New Market FEMALE Grammar School, Philadelphia.

The following are the names of ten of the Professors in Mount St. Mary's Seminary, Emmettsburg, who recommend the Rational System—James Lynch, J. Butler, John H. M'Caffery, James Carny, Matthew Taylor, Barnard O. Cavanagh, John M'Clasky, Edward Sourin, Edward Collins, Thomas Butler.

The Proceedings of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, in reference to the Rational Grammar, being in the form of a recommendation, it may not be amiss to insert them in this place.

The fact is beyond doubt, that the subject of English Grammar has been in an unsettled state, from its commencement to the *present* period. And one of the many injurious results is that, schools are almost daily disturbed by the introduction of *new* Grammars. The people of the United States, feeling the bad effects of this course, must perceive that it proceeds from the great defects of the British system of English Grammar; and they must also be satisfied that nothing can arrest the progress of this evil, but the use of the *true* system! The citizens of HARRISBURG, feeling the inconvenience, and expense of this perpetual change in Grammars, and believing that it tends to retard the progress of youth in the study of this science, sent a petition to the Legislature of Pennsylvania, praying that body to investigate this subject; and to recommend a System of Grammar for the use of Schools. This petition, of course, was referred to the Committee on EDUCATION, who, after a deliberate investigation, recommended "THE RATIONAL GRAMMAR."

The following is the report of the Committee, as published in the "HARRISBURG CHRONICLE:"

"The Committee on Education, to whom was referred the petition of the citizens of Harrisburg, respecting the "RATIONAL GRAMMAR,"—Report:—

"That they have had the subject under consideration, and after mature deliberation they are satisfied that the *Rational Grammar* is a work every way entitled to the patronage of an intelligent legislature.

"The English is a language which has been derived from various sources—hence it was long believed, among the learned, that it contained too many *irregularities* in structure, to admit a system of rules, and definitions. This general impression prevented, for a long time, any attempts at the formation of a Grammar for our language. At length, however, an attempt was made, and resulted in a mere translation of a Latin Grammar. This, of course, was found inapplicable to the true organization of the English language. Hence many attempts have been made to render the system, thus formed, more suitable to the singular structure of our vernacular tongue. But all these attempts have failed in a *great* degree, so that even at the present day the old theory but partially succeeds in reducing the grammar of the English language to a set of perfect rules, and definitions. But the Rational System does, in the opinion of the Committee, accomplish this object.

"The Committee offer the following resolution:—

"*Resolved*, By the Senate and House of Representatives, &c.,

That the Secretary of the Commonwealth be, and he is hereby authorized and required to subscribe, on the part of the Commonwealth, for so many copies of Brown's Grammar, as shall not exceed the amount of one thousand dollars!"

The Rational Grammar, then, is recommended by this committee, as a system *perfectly* suited to the genius of our language—and so well were they satisfied of the importance of having it become the prevailing Grammar in their own State, that they subjoined to the recommendation of the work, a resolution authorizing the Secretary of State to purchase copies to the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS for the encouragement of this system.

The work has since been much improved; it is in this form presented to Teachers, and it is confidently believed that they will find it to settle the subject of English Grammar, both as to manner, and matter.

The following, taken from the CARLISLE HERALD, will show the spirit of the proceedings of the Pennsylvania Legislature in relation to "THE RATIONAL GRAMMAR."

The editor of that paper begins thus:—"Visit to Harrisburg.—*"The editor was at Harrisburg part of the last two days of the session of the Legislature, and witnessed the last proceedings of that body."* "There was a subject that excited considerable interest. Our readers will recollect that the Committee on Education reported a resolution in favor of 'Brown's Rational English Grammar,' requiring the Secretary of the Commonwealth to purchase \$1000 worth of this work. This resolution was taken up on the evening of the 23d. A great degree of interest evidently existed in favour of Mr. Brown. And so bent on expressing their approbation of Mr. Brown's labours, were many in the house, that after the recess which the Legislature had, the following resolution was offered:

"*Resolved*, That the Speaker be directed to draw his order on the State Treasurer for one hundred dollars, in favour of Mr. Brown, author of THE RATIONAL ENGLISH GRAMMAR, as a token of the estimation in which his services are held by this House.'"

The following letters of commendation show the present state of the work:

Philadelphia, January 10, 1854.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have examined with great care both the First and Second Parts of your Rational Grammar. It is a subject to which I do not profess to have paid much attention. Your system appears to me, however, to be founded on philosophical principles. It exercises the mind of the pupil, not merely his memory. It teaches him the construction of a sentence as you would teach a child the construction of a machine, by taking it into parts,

and showing him how they are put together. The old rules of English Grammar are not calculated to give a clear understanding of the subject—in fact, they are derived, in a great measure, from languages abounding in inflections. In the process of its advancement our tongue has thrown off those inflections, as has been the case with many other modern languages—and, whatever has been lost in harmony and fullness, much has been gained in simplicity. There is no reason, it seems to me, why we should still cling to cases and rules of concord, and government, which are no longer necessary—and, indeed, only tend to confound. I am glad to find that your First Book has been received in the Public Schools, and I hope that the Second will also. You have devoted yourself for so long a time, and with such a hearty enthusiasm to the subject, that I hope you may be rewarded by seeing your works at last in general use. Your's very truly,

GEO. SHARSWOOD.

James Brown, Esq.

From S. W. CRAWFORD, D. D., Principal of the Academy connected with the University of Pennsylvania.

PHILADELPHIA, JANUARY 6, 1854.

I have examined the SECOND BOOK of Mr. BROWN'S RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, and agree in opinion, respecting the work, with P. A. BROWNE, P. A. CREGAR, JOHN JOYCE, A. B. IVINS, NICHOLAS H. MAGUIRE, THOMAS S. SMITH, GEORGE W. BIDDLE, MISS BEDFORD, MISS ROY, GEO. SHARSWOOD, and JAMES P. ESPY.

S. W. CRAWFORD


Philadelphia, 1854.

I have given James Brown's English Grammar in Three Books, a careful examination; and I consider it a work of great merit. The *soundness* of its principles, the *clearness* of its methods, and the *accuracy* of its definitions, and Rules, must recommend the system to every school in which English grammar is taught.

As a means for the analysis of our language, I consider the system *invaluable*; and, as an auxiliary in maturing the mind, it is not equalled by *any* thing of which I have a knowledge. Indeed, the three books constitute a *new* system that gives to grammar the charms of *philosophy*, and to the pupil, a *love* for its study

A. B. IVINS,

Principal of the North Western Grammar School, Philadelphia

 *More letters at the end of the book.*

PHILADELPHIA, Jan. 19, 1854.

SIR,—As I am a teacher, I embrace all the opportunities which my avocation permits me to improve, to acquire a knowledge of every thing new in the ministry of education. And, although this practice places in my hands, many novelties that contain no improvement on the old means of instruction, it puts into them a few new things which are far superior to the old. For instance—the English Grammar in Three Books, by James Brown, has an excellence which should secure the attention of all who are interested in the advancement of this science.

Although Book I. treats of a part of grammatical science on which Mr. Murray, and his simplifiers are perfectly silent, the principles which it inculcates, seem to me, to be the very basis of English grammar. The teacher, however, who introduces this part of the new system, must use a new vocabulary. The new nomenclature seems absolutely necessary; for, as the principles which this book teaches, are new, its novel technicals cannot be avoided by the use of the common terms. But as the technicals of Book I. are few, and expressive; and, as they are actually necessary to the acquisition of a knowledge which is an indispensable prerequisite to a thorough acquaintance with the grammar of the English language, no teacher who wishes to impart, and no pupil who desires to acquire, a critical knowledge of English grammar, will allow a few new technicals to prevent the gratification of their desires.

Although Book II. is designed as a substitute for the theory now in use, it differs nearly as much from it as does Book I., which does not even attempt to inculcate any of the principles found in the old theory. In general, Book II. employs the old technicals; yet, in principles, definitions, rules, and methods, it bears no analogy to that theory. But much as the principles of Book II. differ from those of the old theory, I am perfectly satisfied that they are in exact accordance with the constructive philosophy of the English language.

Book III. like Book I. is original,—both occupy new ground. While Book I., however, is an important help in the analysis of words, Book III. is a powerful auxiliary in the analysis of thoughts. And, as the *three books* constitute a system of English Grammar, infinitely better calculated to make youth masters of *words* and *thoughts* than the old theory, I trust that all who wish to advance the cause of education will do something for the immediate introduction of this system into our schools.

P. A. CREGAR,

Principal of S. E. Grammar School.

PHILADELPHIA, Jan. 8, 1854.

SIR,—I have examined the English Grammar in Three Books, by James Brown; and, although I think the new nomenclature which he used in a former production on the same subject, expressive, and appropriate, I am much pleased to find that in this work he has restored the old technicals to their accustomed places.

Although Book I. does not seem to be a substitute for any part of the old theory, it appears to me to be almost a *sine qua non* in the study of English grammar. The mere division of a sentence into monos, renders important aid in analyzing, punctuating, reading, and understanding it. True, the book has a few new terms; but as they are all expressive of clearly defined principles, the child can soon master them. The volume is small, and appears highly important in the acquirement of a correct knowledge of the constructive principles of the language.

I cannot here enumerate all the excellent things in this little book; but, as the principles which it teaches, are all addressed to the judgment of the learner, he has nothing to memorize.

In my opinion, there is no way by which a child can be made so thoroughly acquainted with the constructive philosophy of the English language as by the use of Brown's First Book.

Book II. is designed as a substitute for the old theory of English Grammar, but it is not a presentation of the same principles which the old system teaches.

The author retains all the essential technicals of the old Grammars; but he rejects all the definitions, and all the principles in these works as absurd, contradictory, and irrelevant. The book is replete with practical principles, and excellent rules, highly important to all who use the English language.

And in the words of the learned Dr. Wylie, late Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, I give it as my conviction, that Brown's System forms a new epoch in the history of English grammar, as important in our language as the steamboat in our waters; that his system, duly appreciated, and introduced into our schools, would soon disenthral the grammar of our language from the shackles fixed upon it by the most celebrated grammarians, from the earliest period down to the present time.

I also agree in opinion with the same gentleman, that Mr. Brown deserves public patronage as a public benefactor; and for the good of youth, I sincerely hope that he will receive it.

The Third Book is not a substitute for the old theory; it is made up of principles on which neither Murray, nor any of his amplifiers, have written. The work is profound; and, as it sheds much light upon the philological character of the prepositions, it is of great value to all who wish to become familiar with this character.

JOHN JOYCE,

Principal of the Reed Street Public Grammar School.

[*From Prof. C. D. Cleveland, formerly Professor of the Latin and the Greek Language in the Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa., and of the Latin Language and Literature in the University of the city of New York, and at present, Principal of a Young Ladies School in Philadelphia.*]

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 22d, 1849.

MY DEAR SIR:—You ask me my opinion of two books recently published by yourself, namely, Brown's "First" and his "Second Round in the Ladder of Education."

I have examined these books with some care, and feeling, I trust, the responsibility of recommending any book which is to be put into the hands of the young, to shape their education, and, it may be, to influence their whole future life, I do not hesitate to give these books my cordial commendation; for I believe that children carefully and faithfully instructed in them will gain clearer ideas, more distinct perceptions, and much more knowledge of the first principles of our language, than by the study of any other elementary books with which I am acquainted.

Yours for every improvement in the means of education,

C. D. CLEVELAND.

[*The Opinion of the Rev. W. G. E. Agnew, Principal of the Young Ladies Boarding School, Seventh, near Arch street.*]

I have examined the FIRST, and the SECOND ROUND in the LADDER OF EDUCATION, in connection with the Hand-Nomascop and Alphascop, and pronounce the works decidedly the very best which I have ever seen for producing effect on the mind of the child.

W. G. E. AGNEW.

Philadelphia, Sept. 6th, 1849.

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 8th, 1849.

I have carefully examined Brown's First Round in the Ladder of Education, with the Alphascop and Hand-Nomascop, and I feel compelled to say, with the Rev. Mr. Agnew, that the work is decidedly the very best which I have ever seen for producing effect on the mind of the child.

JOHN JOYCE,

Principal of the Reed street Public Grammar School

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 8th, 1849.

I have examined with care Brown's Second Round in the Ladder of Education, and I am fully satisfied that it is in every respect infinitely superior to any other Spelling Book; that it "should be studied by all adults who are deficient in the meaning of words, and that both Rounds should be used in all schools and families in which primary books are required."

JOHN JOYCE,

Principal of the Reed Street Public Grammar School.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOOK SECOND.

Although I have not examined the second Book of Mr. Brown's *Rational* system of English Grammar as thoroughly as I have the *First*, I am satisfied that Mr. Smith's opinion of it is just, and am perfectly willing to say that I concur in opinion with him, respecting the work. And in imitation of his course, I would ask whether we have not styled words which represent *cats*, *dogs*, and even *inanimate* objects, *personal* pronouns long enough—whether we have not sufficiently long denominated the speech, the diction itself, a mere *mode* of the verb—whether we have not too long paid for teaching our children that there are *three* cases when in *truth* and simplicity there is not even one.

I would ask also whether the hens possess the eggs, the boys possess the hats, the baker, the bread, and whether the brewer actually possesses the yeast mentioned in the sentences—John carried Stephen's *hens'* eggs to market—John has *boys'* hats for sale, *brewer's* yeast is used in *baker's* bread !!

I would ask likewise whether we have not already used the word case, in English long enough, whether we have not too long parsed the thing for the *name* of the thing—whether we have not too long called words which have no relation to *verbs*, *adverbs*—and whether we are still to be compelled by the use of the old theory to have our children taught that the verb which represents a *perfectly finished* event, is of the *Imperfect* tense? I would ask too whether there is any propriety in continuing to learn that a verb is a word which signifies *being*, *action* or *suffering*; as, John *ought* to return, He *resembles* her, The timber *wants* strength and solidity, He *can* go, John *has* land in Ohio—whether there is any propriety in teaching that a *noun* is the *name* of any person, *place* or thing while the preposition, *behind*, is as much the name of a *place* as is any other word in the Language and while the adjective, *red*, is as much the name of something as is any other word, in short, whether there is a propriety in learning a definition of a noun which makes all words nouns.

May I not venture to suggest that the enlightened gentlemen appointed directors of our schools should no longer pay instructors for teaching our children a definition of the third person, which makes no difference between the *third* person, and a *subject*, finally may I not hope that they will introduce a *Rational* system of English Grammar into our Public schools which under their control have become the ornament, and attraction of PENNSYLVANIA.

GEORGE W. BIDDLE

Philadelphia, January 6, 1854.

I have not only read the *second Book* of Mr. Brown's *Rational system of English Grammar*, but I have taught from it; and I feel confident that he substitutes simplicity for complexity, truth for error, and consistency for absurdity wherever he innovates upon the *old* theory.

NICHOLAS H. MAGUIRE.

Philadelphia, January 7, 1854.

We are satisfied, that the Second Book, of Mr. Brown's *Rational System of English Grammar*, removes all the obscurities, absurdities and contradictions which pervade the common theory.

LOUISA BEDFORD.
A. CLAUDINE ROY.

I have examined the second Book of James Brown's rational system of English Grammar, and entertain the same opinion of it, that I do of the first.

Those who acquire a knowledge of the popular theory, meet with many difficulties, when they endeavor to explain the construction of the most common sentences. These difficulties are felt by most scholars, if not by all. The conclusion seems to be inevitable that this theory is not merely imperfect but radically wrong. If it did what it professes to do, these difficulties, would not arise. There would be no necessity for improved Grammars, to explain, and teach what Murray supposed he had clearly explained and taught. Yet volume has been added to volume, and explanation to explanation, without making one scholar a better grammarian than he would have been from the study of Murray alone. Indeed, those who have derived their grammatical knowledge from Murray, are generally better informed on the subject than the students of his successors.

The difficulties referred to are sometimes, charged to the imperfection of the language; but it seems to me, that in these cases, the imperfection belongs to the understanding that makes the charge. The authors who have followed Murray attribute them, not to the falsity of the old theory, but to the defective Grammars, written to teach it; and they have composed new ones, in a vain effort to build up an efficient system upon a foundation of error. The result is that the subject is as much embarrassed as ever. But, in the confidence of vanity, some of these authors have presumed, not only that they could improve the radically erroneous Grammars of the language, but the language itself. They have introduced forms of speech, which distort the frame, and weaken the energy of our noble English. In terms which violate its simplicity, ignorance and affectation tell us, that a house is being built when there is no truth in the assertion, when the house, instead of being built, is only building. A proper knowledge of the language, and of its native modes of expression, would have saved it from the deformity of this and other modern innovations.

Errors long continued become inveterate, and encourage the increase of abuses. The earliest moment for correcting them is the best. To procrastinate is to decide that a future, and not the present generation, shall be benefitted by the truth. We have called fire, tongs, and shovels, *persons* long enough. We have long enough been taught that transitive verbs, and prepositions, govern *nouns* in the objective case; as Joshua stopped the *sun*,—that of two or more things equally *related*, but *one* is the object of the relation; as John stands by Robert,—that the actor is in the *Nominative* case, and that the object of the action, is in the *objective* case, which are strikingly illustrated in the *nominative* noun, *house*, and in the *objective* noun, *Peter*, in the sentence—the *house* was built by *Peter*.

The theory of Mr. Brown's Grammar is calculated to correct the errors which have hitherto composed an inexplicable system—it is founded on the true constructive principles of our language—its adoption will lead to a better knowledge of those principles, and tend to prevent the corruptions to which the language is subjected.

THOS. S. SMITH.

Covington, Sep. 12, 1852.

Mr. Brown,

DEAR SIR.—I hope these few lines will find you in good health, and spirits, and encouraged by a bright prospect of a wide circulation of your valuable books.

According to promise, I did all in my power, in the distribution of your circulars. I left one at each of the principal book stores in Baltimore, and Pittsburgh, the only places of note, at which I had time, and an opportunity to comply partially with your request. I say partially, because, as it was the time of vacation, I had no chance to see the teachers of the Public schools, but left a dozen circulars at the High school, Baltimore, for circulation. I had no opportunity to leave circulars at Cincinnati, nor Madison; but I disposed of some for circulation, equally advantageously, by sending them to Lexington, Kentucky, and to the central part of Ohio; and the balance, a few, I intend to circulate, as thoroughly as I can, in the principal places in the West.

I became acquainted on the boat, with a fine, well-meaning, and talented young man by the name of Mr. Samuel Tarver, with whom I spent many pleasant, and profitable hours. He resides at Denmark, Tennessee—has a fund of common sense, remarkable colloquial powers, speaks fluently, and with all the aptness, and precision, characteristic of a well-versed old school grammarian; and, all in all, he is nearly “a man as is a man,” and what is termed, without speaking ironically, “a nice young man.”

I spoke of your grammatical works, and loaned them to him to read. He gave them a cursory perusal, and seemed to appreciate, as by intuition, the soundness of your principles, and reasoning, and to see, at a glance, the sheer absurdity of the old theory. So pleased was he with the manner in which you treat the subject of grammar, that he offered me, as an inducement to sell, double price for each of your works: but my value of them was equal to his; and I refused to dispose of them, saying that I would send to Philadelphia, and get a copy of each for him. He said he must have them, and that, as his father was acquainted with Lippincott, & Co., he would write to that firm to send them to him. I advised him to write to you; but told him that, if he wished, I supposed Lippincott could get them for him.

I know it is one thing to have an idea, and another thing to put what we desire, into practical operation; still there is no harm to suggest it; and it is this: As there are many persons who do not like to purchase books until they can examine

them, I think it would be a good plan to leave a copy, or two of each of your works, at one, or two of the principal book-stores in each important place, in each State, or in those places in those States which you think best, advertising in the principal papers of each of the said places of said States, requesting all to give your works a satisfactory examination, before they purchase. By thus doing, as far, at least, as your means will justify, (and, by a gradual circulation, and sale, you might eventually get the means to accomplish the whole object,) I think you could facilitate the introduction of your works, with less expense, and trouble, and give them a more extensive circulation in a few months, than could otherwise, perhaps, be given to them in as many years. I may be too sanguine in my conjectures, but judge ye.

I shall not go to Greencastle this fall, but stay at home, and review what I learned, and write down the notes I collected while under your tuition, that I may do justice to myself, and be prepared to speak critically, and fearlessly in defence of, and clear up, as far as I can, all objections to your new system of grammar. It is a shame that so useful a theory should lie buried in oblivion, for the want of voices to sound its well-deserved praise.

I have done all I could ; and I will do all I can ; and if there is anything more that I can do for you, please write ; and I will do it with pleasure, for I feel that I have not half compensated you for the pains, and patience which you manifested, and the knowledge I received while under your instruction.

As I have not yet reviewed what I learned, I am sure you will find many *blunders* in this composition ; but I hope to be able, some time in the future, to show by my writing, the superiority of the *Rational system* over the *old* theory, and do my share for its honour, and salvation.

I bid you for the present, a kind farewell : and I desire you to put confidence in my word when I say that I believe that your work wants only to be *known* to be *admired*.

Yours respectfully,

WM. D. YOUNG.

NOTICE.

SEVERAL years ago, I constructed a new system of English Grammar, which is published in three Books, under the title of an *English Syntithology*. Many who stand high both as teachers, and scholars, admit the excellence of the work by using it in their schools. While these approve of the system as it is, others do not feel warranted in using the *new* technicals in which the principles of the system, are expressed. These careful gentlemen seem to concede the *legitimacy*, *appropriateness*, and even *advantages*, of the new words employed in the work. But they say that the use of these new technicals, would keep their pupils ignorant of the usual medium through which men speak upon the subject of grammar.

The work in which I have attempted to form a *consistent* English Grammar with the *retention* of the *old* names, is also, in three Books.

After a careful examination of the old theory, I felt sure that teachers would be *glad* to substitute the *true* system for it. But on proposing this system for adoption, I found them as loath to leave their *prison* house of *error* as was the old inmate of the Bastile, his cell of darkness. Hence, although the old structure is utterly demolished, and its fragments strewed from the commencement to the end of my CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM, thousands still sing peans in honour of MURRAY! But, while I regret a want of success in my attempt to persuade the world to allow the old theory of English Grammar to decay, and drop out of the memory of men, I rejoice in the hope that I may yet persuade the people to accept of a substitute which, though slightly marred by the use of *noun*, *verb*, &c., is formed upon the *true grammatical* principles of the ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

While BOOK II. retains the common nomenclature in general, it rejects the old *principles*, and the old *definitions*, in *full*. In a work entitled, "A CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM, I have undertaken to demonstrate that the old theory of English Grammar, is entirely wrong in *principle*, and utterly incompetent in *technicals*. But, as the world does not yet seem ready to give these old *technical* servants a *final* discharge, I have retained them in BOOK II. I have not, however, been willing to keep any of the old *principles*. Indeed, the people appear ready *now*, to reject these with the definitions founded upon them.

That the old school grammarians will fully comprehend the definitions given in BOOK II., is a point which I will not undertake to decide. The mere capacity to call words *nouns*, *pronouns*, *articles*, *conjunctions* &c., is not *ability* to understand a proposition in the form of a *definition*. Language has two distinct, yet *relative*, characters; and, unless an individual understands both well, he cannot comprehend either aright. In construction, a sentence is a mere *table*, a mere *chair*; it is two, or more words so *packed*, that they form a complete bridge over which one mind can cross to another. But, in *import*, a sentence is an engine for transmitting *thought*; and, the better one understands its beautiful *mechanism*, the more *distinctly*, *easily*, and *forcibly* he can transfer this mental fluid to others; and the more *clearly*, and *readily*, can he see it as they pass it to him.

That the *rational* system is better calculated to produce skill in the *structure* of speech, and in the *chemistry* of thought, than is the old theory of *absurdities*, which it attempts to displace, is the case that a jury of my country, is now empaneled to try—and may their verdict do *justice* to all without *harm* to any.

INTRODUCTION.

As no stream can rise higher than its source, so no writer upon the subject of grammar can avoid showing, in the very *construction* of his periods, a qualification, or *want* of qualification, to form a Grammar for the language in which he writes his book.

If he who attempts to form a guide to a certain science, *violates* the principles of the science in the construction of his guide, what confidence can be placed in his rule? If they who have undertaken to improve the old British theory of English Grammar, as presented by *L. Murray*, have violated the very principles of English grammar, in almost every sentence which they have formed, what confidence can be placed in their overgrown pretensions?

And, as the author of a Grammar evinces, in the very *construction* of his sentences, ability, or want of ability, to form a Grammar, so he who recommends the book, shows, in the *construction* of his periods, a qualification, or a want of qualification, to judge of its merits.

Recommendations, as means for securing the sale, and adoption of a work, have lost much of their former efficacy. Whether the people have become better qualified to judge for themselves; or whether they have been jaded out by constant eulogy upon the same subject, may be decided by the pertinacity with which grammar *menders* have pursued them for almost thirty years. That a desire for Grammar making has long been rampant in this country, is obvious from the countless number of books on the subject of Grammar *mending*.

For years it has been pretended by the many who wish to figure upon *title pages*, that Murray is in *rags*! He has been almost the only subject of their *compassion* for a long time! Grammar *menders* surround him in shoals. Some have *darned* his stockings,—some have *new-heeled* them,—others, *new-toed* them! They have continued in this way forty years,—indeed, till they have made Murray a perfect show!! Every stitch which is taken in coat, or vest, hose, or pants, is submitted to all distinguished seamsters, far, and near. And in due time, and *form*, these come forward in praise of the masterly manner in which Murray has *been mended*!! He has been mended up so neatly, and thoroughly, by Mr. *Greenleaf*, by Mr. *Kirkham* by Mr. *Ingersoll*,

by Mr. *Comly*, or by the *Rev. Dr. Somebody*, that he is not only tidy enough to go into our common schools, and academies, but even into our *colleges* ! Thus Murray, in his *patched* habiliments, has been hawked from place to place, for years, under the various names of the numerous *menders* of his wardrobe ! In some instances, he is called *Greenleaf*, in some *Kirkham*, in some *Goold Brown*, and, within a few months, this learned, and meek old *Quaker* has appeared under the titular cognomen of the *Reverend Doctor Bullions* !

Conscious of an unwillingness in the people to give any more encouragement to Grammar *mending*, Mr. Bullions attempts to beguile them, in a few *sweet-toned periods*, to smile upon his book. And, was it not for the numerous interruptions produced by his grammatical obliquities, his warbling would equal that of the glades themselves. His *manner*, as exhibited in his Preface, is admirably well calculated to produce an assuagement of irritated feelings. Ulysses, and Orpheus did escape the music of the Sirens.—But there has been no *Circe* to forewarn our literati—hence, I believe, not one has passed the fatal coast alive ! But I feel it my duty to do to the unlettered, what *Circe* did to Ulysses. I shall attempt to caution them, not only against the bewitching notes of the author himself, but against all the sweet harmony which is made by the large *choir* that chants the merits of his patch-work.

The following is the first sentence of the Preface :

“ A *knowledge* of English Grammar is very properly considered an indispensable part of an English education ; and is now taught, as such, in all our Academies and Common Schools.”

I shall speak of but one of the several errors which mar this sentence.

1. What is very properly considered an indispensable part of an English education ?

Knowledge. Very well.

2. What is now taught, “ as such,” in all our Academies, and Common Schools ?

Knowledge !

3. But knowledge is taught, as what ?

Knowledge is taught as an indispensable *part* of an English education !

4. John, do you attend school now ?

“ Yes, sir.”

5. What are you studying ?

“ The English branches.”

6. Are you more fond of one branch than another ?

“ I think *knowledge* is a very interesting branch !”

The *Murray mender* who speaks of *teaching knowledge*, deserves a *patch*, or two himself!

The learned author's sentence comprises thirty words. But the following, which expresses all that he intends, contains but nineteen words!

English grammar is now taught in all our Academies, and Common Schools, as an indispensable branch of an English education.

This sentence promises little support to the high reputation which the author's admirers have endeavoured to give *him*, and his work. But, although these gentlemen speak in an unusual strain of panegyric; yet their own periods are so often, and badly marred by gross solecisms, that their opinions will not only not induce the people to think highly of the Doctor, and his book, but will compel them to think less highly of his friends!

I cannot believe that Dr. Bullions is capable of using the English language with propriety—much less do I believe that he is capable of writing an English Grammar having the rare merits which these gentlemen have ascribed to his book.

Mr. Bullions would be considered *culpably* ignorant of the English language even did he make no pretensions to skill in grammar.

I find the following sentence in his English Grammar:

"These terms are generally derived from the Greek, or Latin, probably because *these languages* being now dead, and their words consequently not liable to change, are considered, *for this reason*, a better source than any other, *for words* of this description." (Page 202.)

The section, *for this reason*, is nothing but a repetition of the long clause, "*because these languages being now dead, and their words consequently, not liable to change.*"

Where does Mr. Bullions find authority for the use of, "*these languages!*?"

What languages are "*these languages?*"

Why, the Latin, or the Greek!!! I saw Stephen or John when *they* were returning from school!!!

Nor is this all.

"Are considered a better source *for words.*"

Should we say source *for*, or source *of*?

I understand the source *for* this mischief! Is this English?

This sentence is replete with errors—but I shall not attempt to expose any more of them.

The sentence which stands in juxtaposition with this, reads as follows—

"The convenience and utility of such terms, are universally acknowledged, and they are preferred to other equivalent terms

in common use in the language, because having no other meaning *nor* use *than* what belongs to them as technical terms, whenever they are used, every person who understands the science knows precisely what is meant."

I do not intend to exhaust the subject of error in this sentence. This is not the place for me to dilate upon the obliquities of those who are endeavouring to heal the external sores which are the legitimate result of *carious* bones, and *vitiating* blood. Although I do not intend to do any thing with the spungy thought, and the rugged surface of this sentence; yet I may be allowed to ask whence the authority for the use of *nor*, and *than*! I saw no other man *than* John!

Does not every school-boy know that where *than* is properly used, it is placed after some word of the *comparative* degree?

1. "I who am *less than* the least of all saints."
2. Is one man *better* by nature *than* another?
3. Bullion's Grammar is *worse than* Gould Brown's.

"Because having no other meaning *nor* use *than* what belongs to them as technicals!"

Because having *neither* meaning, *nor* use *except* what belongs to them as technicals.

Under page 114, Mr. Bullions has made a Rule to justify the use of *than* after *other*!

"RULE XXII. The comparative degree and the pronoun *other* require *than* after them; as, Greater *than* I; No other *than* he."

The part of this rule, which relates to *than*, has no basis in the genius of the *English* language. The instance, given by Mr. Bullions, in exemplification of this part of the rule, is *not English*.

Grammar, says Mr. Bullions, is both a science and an art.

"As an art, grammar teaches the right method of applying these principles to a particular language, so as *thereby* to express our thoughts in a *correct*, and *proper*, manner, *according* to established usage."

This sentence is certainly a curiosity. Short as it is, it comprises *seventeen redundant* words. The sentence has *thirty-three* words—and every idea which is expressed by the thirty-three, is expressed by the following sixteen:

"As an art, it (*grammar*) teaches the *right* method of applying these principles to a particular language."

"So as *thereby* to express our thoughts in a *correct*, and *proper* manner, *according* to established usage!"

The *verbal* combination, the *right method* of applying these principles to language, exhausts the subject of accuracy.

"So as *thereby* to express our thoughts in a *correct* and *proper* manner."

What is gained by the use of *proper*? Do not *correct*, and,

proper mean the same thing! ? And as *grammar* is *established usage* with reference to language, what good results from the use of the *verbal* combination, "*according to established usage*?"

The sentence is substantially this—

As an art, *grammar* teaches the *right* method of applying the principles of *grammar* to a particular language, so as thereby to express our thoughts in a *correct* and *proper* manner, *according to the established principles of grammar*!!

I will now repeat the sentence, upon parts of which, I have already made a few reflections :

"The convenience and utility of *such* terms are universally acknowledged, and they are preferred to other equivalent terms in common use in the language, because having no other meaning *nor* use *than* what belongs to them as technical terms, *whenever they are used*, every person who understands the science, knows precisely what is meant." (Fifty-four words.)

Ten of the words which belong to this sentence, express ideas that have a direct connection with the first period in this chapter. The chapter is commenced with the following sentence.

"GRAMMATICAL NOMENCLATURE."

"Every science, and every art has its particular nomenclature, or vocabulary of technical terms, which are employed for the purpose of expressing technically *its* leading materials, facts, principles, divisions, &c." (Twenty-nine words.)

The legitimate commencement of this sentence, is made the inceptive part of the third period in the chapter :

The convenience and utility of technical terms, are universally acknowledged : every science and every art has its particular nomenclature which is employed in expressing its leading materials, facts, principles, divisions, &c. (Twenty-nine words.)

Having incorporated the ten words which have no connection with the third sentence, with the author's first period, it may be well to give his second sentence :

2. "These terms are generally derived from the Greek or Latin, probably, because *these languages* being now dead, and their words consequently not liable to change, are considered, *for this reason*, a better source than any other *for* words of this description." (Forty-one words.)

"These terms are generally derived from the Greek or Latin ; probably because the words of a dead language are less liable to change than those of a living one." (Twenty-nine words.)

3. "And they are preferred to equivalent terms in common use, because, being *purely technical* in meaning, every person who understands the science, understands them." (Twenty-four words—instead of Fifty-four.)

Mr. Bullions says that technical terms are generally derived from the Greek, or Latin, because *these languages* are dead!

I cannot conceive that the *death* of a language, would induce any nation to make it the source of technical terms. Nor can I understand in what way the *death* of a language, can exert any influence over the *mutability*, or *immutability* of technicals.

Under page 203, Mr. Bullions gives a fair specimen of his reasoning powers.

“They (certain authors) are actually urging us to abandon such terms in grammar, as *noun*, *pronoun*, *adjective*, *verb*, &c., and to use in their stead, such words as *name*, *substitute*, *describer*, *asserter*, and the like, because, as is alleged, they possess more of the character of English words,—that is, they propose to abandon the peculiar and appropriate technical terms of the science, and to employ words in a great measure disqualified for this purpose, by the very fact of their being already used for other purposes.”

Is *substitute* a more common word than *subject*? Yet Mr. Bullions uses the word, *subject*, as a technical in grammar! Under page 86, he says—

“The *subject* is the thing chiefly spoken of. In English it is always the nominative to the verb.”

“The *subject* or nominative, the verb, and the object, may each be attended by other words, called *adjuncts*.”

And is not *object* a word in very common use? Is *adjunct* even generally employed as a *technical*!?

Is *article* a word which is restricted to a technical use!? Is there a word in the English language that is less *technical* than *article*?

Yet, under page 7, Mr. Bullions employs this as a *technical* word, which (to use his own language) is in a great measure disqualified for this purpose, by the very fact of its *being already used for other purposes*!!

Have not the words, *present*, *perfect*, *imperfect*, *future*, *indicative*, *potential*, *conjunction*, &c. &c., been disqualified by the very fact that they are used for other purposes!?

John is *present*. Is is a verb of the *present* tense! Indeed, *present* cannot be applied to the tense of *is*, because it may be applied to John!

Yet under page 30, I find the following—

“The *Present* tense has three distinct forms.”

Under the same page, I find the word, *auxiliary*, used *technically*.

Still as *auxiliary* is a word which is generally applied *untechnically*, it is not a fit technical term—hence Mr. Bullions has done wrong to use it as such!!

Under the same page, I find Mr. Bullions uses the word, *simple*, as a technical!!

If the *untechnical* application of a word, disqualifies it for a technical term, why does Mr. Bullions use the words *first*, *second*, *third*, and even *person*, as technicals!?

“John, give me the first book.”

1. *John*, a noun of the *second person*!

2. *Me*, a pronoun of the *first person*!

3. *Book*, a noun of the *third person*!

By the by, is not a *book* a *singular person*?

Does not Mr. Bullions use the word, *singular*, and the word, *number* too, technically!? This book on grammar, which is chanted as No. 1, by so many of the learned of our country, is indeed a *singular book*!!

Under page 203, I find the following—

“When we use the word *noun* every one knows that we speak of a *class* of words so denominated in grammar.”

Ah! Is the word, *noun*, the name of a *class* of words!? Why, under page 9, the word, *noun*, is defined to be the *name* of a *thing*! Is a *thing* a class of words!?

A noun, the name of a *class* of words! yet the following is presented as its definition:

“A *noun* is the name of a *thing*; as, *John*, *London*.”

John is neither a thing, nor a *class* of words—and if *London* is a thing, it is a singular thing that this *great city*, should be presented as a *class of words*!!

The old theory has no *class* names for words—in this respect it is destructively defective.

A noun is a class of words. *John* is a *noun*—hence *John* is a *class* of words! Mr. Bullions! Mr. Bullions! Mr. Bullions!

Why Mr. Bullions has attempted to advocate the use of terms in grammar, that are *purely technical*, I do not know. From all that I am able to learn, however, he wishes to put certain writers upon grammar out of his way! But as the old nomenclature is any thing but *technical*, Mr. Bullions has shown little wisdom in objecting to the terms which other writers wish to introduce, upon the ground that they are without *technical character*.

I agree, however, with Mr. Bullions that nomenclatures should be *purely technical*. Still I use the old terms which are not at all *technical*.

Under page 16, I find the following—

II “OF THE CASE OF NOUNS.”

“CASE is the state or condition of a noun with respect to the other words in a sentence.”

As *case* is a very common word, why does Mr. Bullions use it as a *technical* term in grammar?

“Nouns have three cases, viz. the *Nominative*, *Possessive*, and *Objective*.”

“The nominative case expresses that of which something is said or declared ;” as, Go thou to *school*, John.

The word, *school*, which Mr. Bullions himself parses in the *objective* case, is the only word in this sentence, which illustrates this definition of the *nominative* case!!

The *nominative* case expresses that of which something is said, or declared!

John is spoken *to*, not *of*! Hence *John* cannot be in the *nominative* case by virtue of Mr. Bullions’ definition of this case! Nothing is said *of* the person denoted by *thou*. Hence this pronoun is not in the *nominative* case!! Nothing is said *to* the school. But something is said *of* it—the school is spoken *of*. Hence the word, *school*, is in the *nominative* case—and, I presume, governed by the preposition *to*!! Mr. Bullions himself says that the *school* is spoken *of*. And as the school is spoken of, something must be said of it—it is impossible to speak of a thing without saying something of it!

But it may be inquired, How I know that Mr. Bullions says that the school is *spoken of*?

Under page 9, he says—

“The *third* person denotes the person or thing spoken of.”

Mr. Bullions parses *school* as a noun of the *third* person. And in this he declares that the school is spoken *of*.

Case, says Mr. Bullions, is *state*, or *condition*. The nominative case of a noun, then, is the nominative *condition* of it! Hence it follows that it is not the noun which expresses that of which something is said; but it is the nominative *condition* which expresses it!

“The nominative case (*condition*) expresses that of which something is said; as, the *sun* shines.”

Does the word, *sun*, express what is spoken of, here? I understand it so. And, if I am right, the word, *sun*, according to Mr. Bullions, is the very *case* of the word *sun*!

What! What patching!

The word, *sun*, then, is the *state*, or *condition*, of the word, *sun*, “in respect to the other words in the sentence!!”

I regret to find the names of gentlemen of whom I have hitherto thought well, appended to these books which are called by their authors, *improvements on Murray*.

In the preceding sentence, *I* is in the nominative case to *regret* only. But Mr. Bullions says that *I* is in the nominative case to every word in the sentence except *I*!!

Case, says he, is the state or condition of a noun in respect to the other words in a sentence!!

But how is *I* in the *nominative* case? Does *I* denote “that of which something is said?” Certainly. *I*, then, denotes that which is spoken of! Hence *I* is of the *third* person!!

“The nominative case expresses that *of* which something is said or declared.”

The *third* person is the person *of* which something is said!! Something is said of the person expressed by *I*—hence *I* is of the *third* person!!

2. The Possessive Case.

“The possessive case denotes that to which something belongs;” as,

John has a book!

∴ This is the book of *John*!

John in both instances, denotes the person to whom the book belongs—hence *John* is in the *possessive* case!!!

3. The Objective Case.

“The objective case denotes the object of some action or relation;” as,

1. The *rock* was smitten by Moses!

2. The *apple* was picked by him!

3. *John* is by the *table*!!

Does not *rock* denote that on which the action terminated?

Does not *apple* denote that which was acted upon? And is not that which is acted upon, the object of an action? And is not *John* as near to the table as the *table* is to *John*? Is not *John*, then, as much the object of this local relation as is the table!?

Let me now ask—

Has Mr. Bullions accomplished the object which induced him to come forth? Hear, hear! His object was to CORRECT what is ERRONEOUS, to *retrench* what is *superfluous*, to *compress* what is *prolix*, to ELUCIDATE what is OBSCURE, to DETERMINE what is left DOUBTFUL, to SUPPLY what is DEFECTIVE in *Murray's Grammar*!!

Alas! Would Mr. Bullions accomplish his object, let him compare his own book with that of Mr. Murray. As the *foibles* of one man become *virtues* when compared with the *crimes* of another, so the *faults* in Murray will become perfections when compared with the gross obliquities of Bullions.

Children who are taken from Murray to *Bullions*, will find a sorrow rising up in their hearts, deadening their *primary* hopes. They will look upon this other Murray as did the Jews of old upon the *second temple*—as nothing at all in *comparison with the first*!

They who wish to learn the extent of Mr. Bullions' qualifications to *mend* Mr. Murray's Grammar, are referred to the CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM, in which I attempt to do justice to Murray, and to his unfeeling, and unskilful *patchers*!

Before I close these reflections, I deem it a duty to notice a work compiled by Mr. *Goold Brown*, formerly a teacher in the city of New York. As I have discussed the merits of his *compilation* in the CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM, I shall say but little of them in

this place. And I regret that what little I do say here, *must* be against his work. I feel confident, however, that all who give a moment's attention to the closing paragraph of his long preface, will come to the conclusion that little *can* be said in favour of his "FINISHED LABOURS!" The sentence reads as follows :

"Having undertaken and prosecuted this work with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language, and thus promoting the improvement of the young, the author now presents his finished labours to the candour and discernment of those to whom is committed the important business of instruction."

The author says that he presents his finished labours *now* because he undertook, and prosecuted this work with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language!! Why does the author present his finished labours *at this particular time*? Let *him* answer the question: "*Because I undertook and prosecuted the work with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language!*"

Had not the author "*finished his labours,*" I would suggest the following amendment:

Having completed the work which the author undertook, and prosecuted with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language, he *now* presents it to the candour and discernment of those to whom is committed the important business of instruction.

Although I cannot give my sanction to this sentence as a paragon of *grammatical* excellence, I freely admit that it abounds in *rare* things! For instance,—the period separates the means, or instrument from the process in which it is employed:

"Having undertaken, and prosecuted this work with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language, and thus promoting the improvement of the young."

The *improvement* of the young is the thing which the compiler wishes to accomplish; and the *facilitating* the study of the English language is the *means* by which he is to accomplish this object. Yet in the arrangement of the parts of this interesting sentence, the *means* is mentioned before the object in whose accomplishment the means is employed!! After this the object to be accomplished by the means, is most beautifully *dragged* into connection with the means through the agency of the adverb, *thus*! Perhaps the idea which I wish to express will be better understood by repeating the clause:

"Having undertaken, and prosecuted this work *with a hope* of facilitating the study of the English language, and *thus* promoting the improvement of the young."

A man who makes no pretensions to any thing extraordinary in the form of grammatical knowledge, would probably arrange the parts of this clause as follows:

Having undertaken, and prosecuted this work with a hope of *promoting the improvement of the young by facilitating the study of the English language.*

In the concluding part of the period, the compiler speaks of presenting his books to *candour*.

“The author now presents his *finished* labours to the *candour* and *discernment* of those to whom is committed the important business of instruction.”

Is it possible that in a country where almost every man reads nearly every thing, individuals can be found, who speak of presenting *books* to *candour*!!!

If we can present books to a man's *candour*, why can we not present them to his *honesty*?

Sir,—I present this book to your *honesty*!!

Having exposed a few of the *warts, corns, and cancers* which pervade this verbal body, by taking off a *part* of the *full Rhetorical* dress in which this *queen* of sentences is so tastefully attired, I will beg the pardon of her *learned* parent for raising this riot in her *royal* palace! And to do all I can to appease him, I will place his *last-born* in juxtaposition with my last innovations upon a few of its limbs:

“Having undertaken and prosecuted this work with a hope of facilitating the study of the English language, and *thus* promoting the improvement of the young, the author now presents his *finished* labours to the *candour*, and *discernment* of those to whom is committed the important business of instruction.”—(46 words.)

Having *completed* the work which the author undertook with the hope of *promoting the improvement of the young by facilitating* the study of English grammar, he now presents it to the *candid* and *discerning* teacher.—(36 words.)

I have not made this sentence the subject of comment to expose *all* of its various errors in grammar. I have introduced it to show a *want* of *logical* skill, a destitution of *sound* reason, which renders its author totally incompetent to make a *useful* book on any subject.

Under another page of the preface, he says:

“Amidst this rage for speculation on a subject purely practical, various attempts have been made to overthrow that system of instruction, which long use has rendered venerable, and which long experience has shown to be useful.”

“Such attempts have generally met the reception they deserved.” “Their history will give no encouragement to future *innovators*.”

If the *fate* of present innovators on *false* theories, has a tendency to discourage future lovers of truth, how must that of the present *compilers* of these theories, dissuade future *aspirants* to

authorship, from extending the labour of their instruction beyond the *school room*!

I hope that my innovation upon the old theory of English grammar, will not give my namesake so much offence that he will attempt to avenge himself by producing a cessation in the public patronage of my labours. Should it provoke him to take such a course, my system might be as badly off as were the Grecian ships which, by a calm in the wind, ordered by the *miffed Diana*, were immovably fixed while bound for Troy!

“Amidst this *rage for* speculation on a subject purely practical, various attempts have been made to overthrow that system of instruction, which *long use* has rendered *venerable*, and which *long experience* has shown to be *useful*.”

Should Mr. *Goold Brown*'s knowledge of English grammar, as exhibited in this sentence, be taken as the standard by which to judge of the usefulness of the old “*system of instruction*,” he would find little to sustain him in the position which he here takes.

“*Rage for* speculation,” is neither sense, nor English. Pope says—

“The *rage of* thirst, the *rage of* hunger, the *rage of* pain, the *rage of* a fever.”

Cowley says—

“The *rage of* a tempest.”

Webster says—

“The *rage for* money.”

That is, a *rage to procure* money.

But does Mr. *Goold Brown* intend to say that these innovators were in a *rage to procure* speculation! ? What! is speculation an article of traffic that it may be *purchased*, and *sold* like *knives*, and *forks*? Where is speculation to be had—at whose store, shop, or stand, may this article be procured! ?

The word, *rage*, as used by my namesake, is intended to show the quality of the act of speculation. This learned compiler meant to say that they conducted their speculations with extreme *eagerness*. This, he would have said, had he used *in* instead of *for* :

Amidst this *rage in* speculation.

But, in place of *in*, the *compiler* employs *for*—hence instead of presenting these *detestable* innovators in the *act* of speculation, he gives them a strong wish to *procure* speculation! !

1. Amidst this *rage for* money. (To *procure* money.)

2. Amidst this *rage for* speculation.

3. Amidst this *rage in* speculation.

The *rage* felt by these men, was carried into their speculation—hence the *rage* was *in* the speculations.

It should not be forgotten that Mr. Goold Brown has grown gray in teaching by the very theory which enables him to use *for* *in* !

“Amidst this rage *for* speculation on a *subject* purely *practical*.”

Practical is an adjective belonging to the noun, *subject*. That Mr. Goold Brown can parse this word as well as Mr. James Brown, is admitted without hesitation. But, that a capacity to say that *practical* is an *adjective*, belonging to *subject*, does not show a capacity to use *practical* with propriety, is obvious from the *erroneous* application which Mr. Goold Brown has here made of this word. A *subject*, as *such*, has not the property which is denoted by the word, *practical*. Can it be said with propriety, this *subject* will be applied to *practice*? Has any one ever heard the expression,—the subject of the present *discussion*, has been applied to *practice*! ? When a thing is said to be *practical*, it cannot be taken in the *character* of a *subject* of discussion. It must be taken in another character, and by another *name*. Thus it may be predicted of knowledge, as *such*, that it is *practical*. But because knowledge, as knowledge, may be said to be *practical*, does it follow that knowledge, as a *subject* of discussion, can be said to be *practical*! ?

Was it not for subjecting myself to the charge, that I am *pragmatical*, I would propose to this Murray *mender*, who says that he has taken the liberty to *think* for himself, the substitution of *system* for *subject* !

Amidst this rage *in* speculation on a *system* purely *practical*.

I have been somewhat amused with the reason which Mr. Goold Brown says, induced him to write an English Grammar. He gives it in the following words :

“For as Lord Bacon observes: ‘The number of ill-written books is not to be diminished by ceasing to write, but by writing others which, like Aaron’s serpent, shall swallow up the spurious.’”

Now, I have no hesitation in saying that, from the countless number of gross errors in the *principles*, *style*, and *methods* of Mr. Goold Brown’s book, it has swallowed *down* all the spurious Grammars which preceded it.

It is said by many that the serpent, to use Lord Bacon’s appellation, by Dr. Bullions, is an offspring from the *Finished Labours* of Goold Brown. And, although the manner of this derivation may be enveloped in a little mystery, Mr. G. B.’s serpent does seem to bear a *parental* relation to Dr. Bullions’! If Mr. G. B.’s serpent is *viviparous*, and the source of Dr. Bullions’, which Mr. G. B. himself alleges, the *Doctor* is not so culpable as the numerous gross errors in his book seem to indicate. But if Mr. G. B.’s serpent is *oviparous*, and the origin of Dr. Bullions’ Mr. G. B. should have the credit of *laying* the eggs, and Dr. R. the

praise of *hutching* them. Be this as it may, however, I frequently *open* these animals in the progress of this book. And, if the pupil wishes to behold their frantic throes, to see the deadly poison which they have in their horny cells for *him*, and to witness the *pus* of error, generated in the ulcers which these two *Murray menders* have added to Murray's sores, he will read this work with interest.

AN APPEAL FROM ERROR TO TRUTH.

CHAPTER I.—TRUTH, AND KNOWLEDGE.












1. What is *truth*? 2. What is *knowledge*?

Truth is a conformity of the thing signified to the sign used ; and *knowledge* is the apprehension of this conformity.

Illustration : *Three marks*, l l l.

The phrase, "*three marks*," is the sign used. The three marks are the things signified. The numeral agreement of the marks with the sign used, is that conformity which constitutes *truth* ; and the apprehension of this conformity, is *knowledge*. Unless there is this conformity of the thing pointed out, to the sign employed, there is no *truth* ; and, as *knowledge* is the *apprehension of truth* ; and, as there can be no truth in the *absence* of this conformity for the mind to apprehend, it follows that there is no knowledge in the mind where there is a want of this conformity of the thing denoted, to the sign used. This may be illustrated in the following scheme : *Six marks*, l l l l l.

Here the sign used is "*Six marks*." But, as there are not six marks in the group denoted, there is no apprehension of truth in the case ; for that very conformity which constitutes *truth*, is *wanting* ! Now, there is *truth* in any art, or science in which there is a correspondence, a conformity, an agreement between the *terms, definitions, rules, and remarks*, and the *principles* of the art, or science : and the student who apprehends this conformity, has *knowledge* ; for the *apprehension of truth* is *knowledge*.

TRUTH.	ERROR.	ERROR.
1. <i>Circle</i> :	1. <i>Circle</i> :	1. <i>Circle</i> :
		
2. <i>Square</i> :	2. <i>Square</i> :	2. <i>Square</i> :
		
3. <i>Triangle</i> :	3. <i>Triangle</i> :	3. <i>Triangle</i> :
		
		

It is seen, then, that *truth* is a conformity of the *prototype* to the simple, or complex sign which is used ; and that error is a

want of a conformity of the prototype to the simple, or complex sign used. Now, the science of English grammar is a *complex prototype*; and the book designed for the expression of this complex prototype, is the *complex sign* used. And in exact proportion to the conformity of this complex prototype to the complex sign employed for its expression, the old theory of English grammar is *true*; and in exact proportion to a *want* of this conformity, is this theory erroneous. To ascertain, then, to what extent this theory is *true*, or *false*, it will be necessary to examine the *doctrines*, the principles of the *complex prototype*, and the significancy of the complex sign which is used for the expression of these doctrines, these principles. Into this examination I shall now enter with some degree of minuteness. And, if I do not conduct the discussion with the candour of a Christian, and with the skill of a logician, it is because these invaluable attributes are beyond my power of attainment.

Having taken what may be denominated the first step in this discussion, I will pass on to the second; and this I intend to take with great care.

A DEFINITION.

There is always *something* which *makes* the thing *what* it is: and this something is here called the *characteristic* of the thing. The *characteristic* of a thing is that certain part which makes the thing *what* it is. The *characteristic* is the *sine qua non* part. That is, the *characteristic* is that part without which the thing could not be what it is; as, the *spring* of a watch, or the *weights* of a clock. And a DEFINITION is that proposition which distinguishes, which points out the thing by its *characteristic*; as,

1. A *watch* is a time-piece which goes by a *spring*.
2. A *clock* is a time-piece which goes by *weights*.
1. That which is the *characteristic* of one thing, may not be the *characteristic* of another; hence it does not follow because a spring is the *characteristic* of a *watch*, that it is the *characteristic* of a book. (Some books are bound with *springs* in their backs.) A time-piece without a spring, is not a *watch*: but a volume is a book without a *spring*.
2. No thing has *more* than one *characteristic*.
3. Every member of the same class must have the *same characteristic*.
4. All the things which have the *same characteristic*, must belong to the *same class*.
5. No things which have not the *same characteristic*, can belong to the *same class*.
1. It is the province of a *definition* to point out one *class* from

another. Hence we may give a definition of *man*; but not of a man.

2. It is the province of a *description* to point out one thing, or individual from another. Hence we *describe* a man; but define *man*. A definition considers things as *classes*—but a description considers things as *individuals*.

3. A definition can have no *exception*—a *rule* can have an exception.

CHAPTER II.—LANGUAGE.

A language is a set of *names, words, or signs*, from which *sentences* are constructed.

REMARK I.

The word, *language*, is derived from *lingua*, the *Latin* name of the tongue—and from the importance of this organ in the formation of this instrument, the instrument itself is called language.

Printing and writing, properly speaking, are the notes of language, and bear the same vicarious relation to this instrument, which the notes in music bear to the real music. But as printing, and writing communicate our ideas, they in function identify themselves with the great *Lingua instrument*—therefore these representatives have come to be called by the name of the thing represented—Hence we have the phrases, “*written language, printed language, and spoken language.*” But language in the true, confined sense, is that significant material which is formed out of voice by a marvellous play of wonderful organs upon sounds which are first produced by the actions of the windpipe upon the air that proceeds from the lungs.

Let us see whether the following propositions are a *definition of language*.

1. A *Language, or Tongue* is a set of words made use of by any nation, or people, to *communicate their thoughts* to one another.—J. NEWBERRY.

LANGUAGE is the *instrument, or means of communicating* ideas. WEBSTER'S GRAMMAR.

Language is a *principal vehicle of thought*.—G. BROWN.

Language, in its most extensive sense, comprehends all *significant* signs by which animals communicate intelligence from one to another.—J. JONES.

It appears to me that grammarians have not been very happy in their attempts at defining a *Language*. They tell us in substance, that a *Language* is the medium through which men communicate their thoughts to each other. But it seems, from what *appears* to be a proper view of the subject, that a language is the

mere material out of which the medium for communicating thought is formed. It appears to me, that a *sentence* is the only medium through which men express their thoughts. If a man wishes to communicate to me the fact, or the complex thought that, *he is sick*, he does not sieze a *Language*, as a huntsman does a *gun*, as the means by which to accomplish his object. He makes a draft of three, or four words upon some language which we both understand, and forms these words into a *sentence*: and, through the *medium* of this *sentence*, he communicates the complex thought,

“*I am sick.*”

Now, is the English language the medium through which this thought is communicated, or is the sentence, “*I am sick*,” this medium? If this thought is communicated to me through the medium of the English language, then, the sentence, “*I am sick*,” is the English language! And, if this *sentence* is the *English language*, the *English language* has not quite so many words as Dr. Webster has enumerated! The word, *language*, is not synonymous with the word, *speech*. In the phrase, “*a language*,” the word, *language*, does not contemplate words in a combined state, but in an isolated, detached one. The word, *speech*, however, contemplates words in a combined, a syntaxed condition.

1. A language is the words from which any community, people, or nation forms that *sentential* medium through which they communicate their thoughts. A language is the *material*; and a *sentence* is the *medium* which is constructed from this material. The bricks, before employed by the mason, are as much the *house itself*, as are the isolated words the *medium* of communicating thought!

The following propositions are submitted as substitutes for the old definition of language:

1. A language is a set of words out of which a nation, a people, or a community constructs *sentences* for the communication of their ideas.

2. A language is the *significant material* out of which a community of people, constructs *sentences* for the expression of their thoughts.

The characteristic of a language lies in the fact that it is the *material* out of which the *vehicle* of thought is constructed. That is, it is this *relation* of *material* to a *sentence*, the true vehicle of thought, which makes a set of verbal signs a *language*. The great principle is this,—whatever is employed as the material out of which *sentences* are formed, is a *language*. Hence, if sentences are constructed from *pins*, and *needles*; *pins*, and *needles* are a language.

What the materials of a carriage are to this vehicle of pleasure, language is to *the vehicle of thought*. And, if the materials out

of which a carriage *can* be made, can be denominated a *carriage*, then indeed can the *unsyntaxed* words, yes, *precisely* as they stand in the columns of the SPELLING BOOK, or the DICTIONARY, be called the *vehicle* for the communication of thought! Our grammarians, then, have committed the singular error of applying the name of the thing formed, to the materials out of which it is formed! Nay, more, for they have ascribed, through the medium of this error, the very function, the very instrumentality of the thing formed, to the materials out of which it is formed! *They* say that *language* is the *medium* of communicating ideas; *I* say that language is the mere *material* from which this medium is constructed! In other words: *they* affirm that *rags* are the *paper* on which we *write*, and *print*: *I* say that *rags* are the *materials* out of which this paper is made!

CHAPTER III.—DEFINITION OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

1. "ENGLISH GRAMMAR is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."—MURRAY.

2. "English grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."—LENNIE.

3. "English grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."—COMLY.

4. "English grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language correctly."—GOOLD BROWN.

5. "English grammar teaches us to speak, and write the English language correctly."—ROSWELL C. SMITH.

6. "English grammar is the art of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."—FRENCH.

The first remark which may be made upon the above definitions, is that each obviously violates a plain principle of the very science which they all attempt in vain to define. That they should fail of defining grammar, is nothing strange: nor is it any thing singular, that they should all be found faulty in *construction*. But, that they should all be marred with the *same* impropriety, is not only singular, but somewhat surprising. The use of the *three* words, *speaking*, and *writing*, for the word, *using*, is a *pleonasm* which is not so singular in itself as in its *multiplications*. In correcting Mr. Murray, I shall of course, correct those whom he has led into error in *construction*, and *doctrine*:

English grammar is the art of *using* the English language with propriety.

The objection to the *doctrine* of this definition of grammar, is that it embraces *philology*, the whole science of words. The definition embraces *philology* which is taught by a *Dictionary*, and *Rhetoric* which is taught by a *Rhetoric*. (BOOK II.)

That the above definitions of grammar have led to erroneous views upon the true boundary line of this science, is obvious from the following definitions of it :

1. "Grammar is the *science* of language. The object of grammar is to investigate the principles of speech, and to teach the right use of words."—J. JONES.

2. "Grammar is the science of language."—SAMUEL KIRKHAM.

3. "Grammar is the *science* of language."—JOHN S. HART.

These three definitions have obviously sprung from the lax phraseology of Murray's attempt to define this science. He says that,

"English grammar is *the art* of speaking, and writing the English language with propriety."

Whereas upon a very little investigation, it will be seen that English grammar is but a mere *part* of the art of *speaking*, and *writing* the English language with propriety. The *science* of language respects *all* the principles of speech. To learn, or to teach *the art*, or *science* of using any language with *propriety*, as many as three books are necessary; namely, a Grammar, a Dictionary, and a Rhetoric.

1. A GRAMMAR teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the *formation*, the *modification*, and the *arrangement* of words.

2. A DICTIONARY teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the *literal* import, or meaning of words.

3. A RHETORIC teaches that part of the art of using a language with propriety, which consists of the exact *adaptation* of the words to the *nature* of the occasion, and to the *figurative* character of the ideas intended to be expressed by the writer, or speaker.—

Mr. Murray has divided the whole of this art "into four parts, viz., ORTHOGRAPHY, ETYMOLOGY, SYNTAX, and PROSODY."

Now, in defining these four parts, the author loses more than *half* of what is included in his *definition* of English grammar!

1. "ORTHOGRAPHY teaches the nature, and powers of letters, and the just method of spelling words."

2. "ETYMOLOGY is the second part of grammar, which treats of the different sorts of words, their various modifications, and their derivation."

3. "SYNTAX is the third part of grammar, which treats of the agreement, and construction of words in a sentence."

4. "PROSODY is the fourth part of grammar, which teaches the true *pronunciation* of words, comprising *accent*, *quantity*, *emphasis*, *pause*, and *tone*, and the laws of *versification*."

These four parts, as here set out, do not comprise even half as much as the entire definition as given by MURRAY, and his fol-

lowers. But the parts ought to be equal to the *whole*! The *definition* embraces all that can be said of language; but the parts into which this definition is divided, omit *perspicuity* of expression, *purity* of style, *propriety* of language, *precision* of words, and phrases, *clearness* of sentences, *unity* of sentences, strength of sentences, *figures* of speech, and *punctuation*!! Mr. Murray himself enumerates these branches, and warmly recommends all to attend to them as soon as they shall have acquired a knowledge — of *what*? Why, a knowledge of *English grammar*!! That is, after the student shall have acquired the *art* of speaking, and writing the English language with *propriety*, he ought to attend to these parts that he may be able to use it with *accuracy*!!

“English grammar is the *art* of speaking, and writing the English language with *propriety*.”

This definition includes too much; or the works which present it, do not include enough. The definition says that English grammar is the *whole art* of using the English language with propriety; and yet the very books, the very English Grammars which give this definition, make no attempt to teach the *Dictionary* meaning of words! If the old definition of English grammar is sound, there should be added to the works which are called *English Grammars*, a full *DICTIONARY*, and a complete *RHETORIC*: the *literal* meaning of words can not be learned without a *DICTIONARY*; and the *figurative* meaning of them can not be acquired without a *RHETORIC*.

Let us see what Dr. Webster says of *grammar*.

6. “Grammar, as a science, treats of the *natural* connexion between *ideas* and *words* which are the signs of ideas, and develops the principles of all languages!”

The above is a better account of *philology* than of grammar! *Philology* is the science which treats of the (not *natural*) connexion of *words* with *ideas*, and develops the *significant* principles of all languages.

Dr. Webster proceeds:

“These principles, (*principles of language*) are not *arbitrary*, nor subject to *change*, but *fixed*, and *permanent*, being founded on *facts*, and distinctions which are fixed by *nature*! Thus the distinction between the *sexes*, between *things*, and their *qualities*, between the *names* of substances, and (the *names*) of their actions, or *motions*; between *unity*, and *plurality*; between *present*, and *future*, time and some other distinctions, are founded in *nature*, and give rise to different *species* of words, and to various inflections in all languages.”

Nothing is more unsound than the doctrine that the principles of language are not subject to *change*. Mr. Webster has confounded the subject of language with that of *nature*. And I pre-

sume that when he declares that *language* is not *arbitrary*, he intends to say that *nature* is not *arbitrary*, but fixed, and *permanent*! That is, the sexes are not the arbitrary conventional productions of men, not the *changeable* creatures of human communities, but the fixed, *permanent* gifts, or distinctions of *nature herself*! Or, in other words, the fact that *John* is a *man*, and not a *woman*, and that *Sarah* is a *woman*, and not a *man*, is not the result of any *conventional agreement* among men, but of nature, and of her alone. If, however, this distinguished grammarian means to tell us that the fact, that the word, *John*, represents a *male*, and not a *female*, and the fact, that the word, *Sarah*, is the name of a *female*, and not of a *male*, is not *arbitrary*, is not *changeable*, but is fixed, and *permanent*, in short, is the *result* of *nature*, I must dissent. Indeed there would be much difficulty in persuading me, even by all the means that can be brought to bear upon the subject, that *nature* has any agency in fixing the application of the word, *John*, to a male, and the word, *Sarah*, to a female. Nothing could convince me that this is the fact, but ocular demonstration, of the *attachment*, the *appendage*, of these words to their respective sexes at the very time of their birth. I must see that *nature* has fixed *John* to a male, and *Sarah* to a female by her own *type* before I can agree with this great scholar in ascribing to *nature* an uncontrollable sway over the science of speech! If words are *produced*, *inflected*, *modified*, and *applied* by *nature*, how does it happen that the same word has so many significations as this learned author has given to the word *philology*? Is *nature* as *various* in character as he has made "*philology*," in meaning! ? How does it happen too, if words are under the control of nature, that the same word is applied both to *males*, and *females*; as, *person*, *servant*, *teacher*, *who*, *which*, *bird*, *child*, *friend*, &c.? Do we find nature thus duplicating the functions of her acknowledged works? Does she require the eye to *see*, and *hear* too? Will it be said that the being who is called a person, has no sex, and, consequently, the word, *person*, is under no control from any *natural* gender? This can not be urged.

But, if *nature* is the *basis* of the structure of speech, how is it that not only words become *obsolete*, but inflections also? What has caused the inflection, *den*, in the word, *stride*, to fall into decay—stridden? What rude hand has so far assailed *nature*, the basis of speech, as to wrench the *den* inflection of *ride* from its *natural* place—ridden? What, too, has arrested the deflection, *writ*, on its way through life? Nature still lives, and should afford succour to all her children! "*Writ*," was once the flourishing, blooming form into which *write* threw itself to mark past time! If this past-tense form of *write*, was the work of *nature*,

and nature has not sustained it, who will predict the *perpetuity* of *write* itself!

It seems that *nature*, or *men*, once proposed the word, *dis-opinion*, to be used in the sense of *difference* of opinion. Now, did nature put *her* veto upon the passage of this proposition; or did man's frigid look of disapprobation so benumb this verbal bantling that it had no power to creep into manhood? And what is it which rejected the following verbal deformity, *bescumber*? *B. Jonson* proposed it—and did *man*, or did *nature* or did both flee from it? Think you, if the community of England had taken this *novus verbum* into their literary service, that nature, under a *Quo Warranto*, would have proceeded to inquire of that distinguished people, by what *warrant*, by what *authority*, by what *right* they had made it a part of the diction of that far-famed island?

A proposition has been made also to make *bese* a word! This alphabetic concretion, however, has not become a part of our language. The proposition was made by WICKLIFFE. But did he make the proposition to *nature*? No, no. He made it to the community of which he was a member—he made the proposition to the human family to adopt this alphabetic terror as a part of their speech. He made the proposition by *using* this alphabetic convention and his race rejected his proposition by *not using* it.

CHAPTER IV.—A SENTENCE.

A SENTENCE is a very peculiar assemblage of words, and it should be well understood by him who attempts to acquire a knowledge of *grammar*. The definition of a sentence is a very unsuccessful attempt, as may be seen from an examination of the following reflections:

1. "A sentence is an assemblage of words forming a complete sense."
2. "A verb, and a noun united form a sentence."
3. "A sentence is an assemblage of words making complete sense, and always contains an agent and a verb."
4. "In philosophical language, a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, connected by an affirmation."
5. "A sentence is an expression of connected thought."

To understand the first of the above definitions, one should be able to say what its author intends by the phrase, "*a complete sense*." The word "*complete*," means finished, ended, *full*! The word "*sense*," as used in this definition, must mean perception, or apprehension of the mind. It seems, then, that a *sentence* is an

assemblage of words, forming a *finished*, an *ended*, or a full perception, or apprehension ; as, *John, new book, old wine*.

In calling to an individual by the instrumentality of the word, *John*, the perception produced, is *complete* ; for he has a full, and distinct apprehension that he is addressed : hence, this noun is indeed the *assemblage* of words, which forms a sentence !! But it may be said that although the individual thus addressed, may have a *complete* apprehension that he is addressed ; yet, as this salutation is a mere preparation for some proposition, it is evident that the *sense* is not ended, not finished, consequently, not complete. By parity of reasoning, then, the assertion, "*John is*," is not a sentence ; for, as in the case of the address something more may be looked for, so in the instance of this assertion, something more must be expected. To the first we may affix this : *John, come here*. To the second we may subjoin this : *John is sick unto death*.

Upon this principle, the assertion, *I saw those red*, is not a sentence, because I do not say those red *what* ! But the subjunction of the things seen, renders this assertion a sentence ; as, *I saw those red apples* !

So too the affirmation, "*June was punished*," is not a sentence, because the writer does not subjoin by *whom* she was punished !

2. "A verb and a noun form a sentence." Or,

"Any finite verb with its nominative case forms a sentence ;" as, *John is*.

This definition does not tell *what* a sentence *is* ; it specifies what *parts of speech* compose one ! To mention the material of which a table may be made, is not telling what a table is !

"Any finite verb with its nominative case forms a sentence ;" as, *If he is there*.

He, and *is* are the materials out of which Mr. Murray makes a sentence—yet as the sense is not *complete*, the following definition by Mr. Kirkham, seems strongly to question Mr. Murray's ability to form a sentence out of so few materials :

"A sentence is an assemblage of words, forming a *complete* sense !"

That is, to form a sentence, you must add word to word, subjoin phrase to phrase, and annex clause to clause till all the *connected*, or *relative* parts of the same topic, are crowded into one undivided mass of words ! !

3. "A sentence is an assemblage of words making complete sense, and *always* containing an *agent* and a verb ;" as, *I have been punished* !

As Mr. Davenport has given no example in illustration of this definition, I have taken the liberty of supplying this very obvious *deficiency*. But I fear that the one which I have given him is not

so well adapted to his views as he may wish. And I must admit that as the assemblage of words, which I have employed contains no *agent*, it seems not a very happy choice!

The next definition which I shall repeat, is from the pen of Noah Webster—

“In philosophical language, a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, connected by an *affirmation*. Thus, God is omnipotent.”

According to this definition, every sentence comprises an *affirmation*! Therefore, the following syllabanes are not sentences:

1. Is God omnipotent?
2. Did Saul persecute the Christians?
3. John, put your book on the table.
4. Joseph, will you bring some water?
5. Is your family all well?
6. “Have mercy on us.”
7. “*Forgive our sins.*”

“How the rule vanishes before the test!”—WEBSTER.

8. “A sentence is the expression of connected thought.”

Although this definition is laughable, it is as sound as any of the old ones. “*Ripe Apples*,” is a phrase which expresses *connected*, and *regularly connected* thought; yet this phrase, except by the authority of *Mr. Kirkham*, is not a sentence!

Hitherto insuperable difficulties have been found in attempting to define a sentence. These, it is apprehended, have arisen from not ascertaining the sentence characteristic which distinguishes a sentence from every other verbal combination. I believe that I have ascertained the true characteristic of a sentence.

The characteristic is the capacity of the verbal combination to *stand alone*. But the word, *sentence*, is not expressive of this *characteristic* capacity of the verbal assemblage—hence I might use the word, *Monologue* with the word, *sentence*. [*Monos*, alone, and *Logos*, *Speech*.]

A SENTENCE is a combination of two, or more words, which is so far cut off from every other verbal assemblage in *sense*, and *construction*, that it can stand *alone*; as, *Master, I have brought my son unto thee*.

2. *She said, no man, Lord.*
3. *In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God.*
4. *I am.* [BOOK I. p. 16.]

CHAPTER V.—THE DIVISION OF A SENTENCE INTO SECTIONS.

THEY who can divide a sentence into sections, and construe each section fully, and readily, have nearly accomplished the work of learning English Grammar. But they that have not acquired the capacity to do this, *must* acquire it, or remain ignorant of this science.

If any one presumes that a *mere capacity* to parse words as *nouns*, and *verbs*, *pronouns*, and *prepositions*, *adjectives*, *conjunctions*, and *adverbs*, constitutes him a *grammarian*, I can inform him that his presumption is *fallacious*. Nothing but a thorough knowledge of BOOK I., OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM will enable a person to learn English grammar.

The incompetency of the British theory of English Grammar to enable one to parse certain words which are found in properly constructed sentences, is the *want* of the *part* of the *Rational* system, which is denominated *Construing*. (BOOK I. p. 34.)

All who have written English Grammars have found words in accurately formed sentences, which they have not been able to parse according to any principles laid down in their books. They have denominated these words *anomalies*, and *idioms*. Whether these words are thus degraded to shield the Grammars, or to teach the philosophy of the words themselves, is quite unimportant.

But as an anomaly is an *irregularity*, or a *deviation* from *fixed* principles, it may turn out that the *grammars themselves*, are *anomalies* ! That they are *irregularities*, and deviations from the *fixed* principles of the English language, is a truth which no one who examines the subject, can doubt for a moment. These Grammars, however, are not idioms, for an idiom is something *peculiar* to a language ; but these works are not peculiar to any language, nor common to all : they are inconsistent with the constructive genius of *language*.

Mr. Kirkham remarks, in his Pittsburg edition, in relation to these words, as follows :

“ Thus I have taken a slight glance at the different views of Grammarians, in relation to these words and phrases—and, since I am not disposed to agree with any of them, perhaps it may be demanded in what manner I would parse these examples myself. An answer is at hand. I would not parse them at all ! ”

Now, this is a very candid confession of an *inability* to parse them. Thus they *parse* the language by *passing* it by as *idioms*, *eccentricities*, and *anomalies* !

The reasoning employed by Mr. Murray for introducing the *objective* case, applies in this instance with great force :

“ The business of parsing, and showing the connexion and

dependence of words will be most conveniently accomplished by the adoption of an *objective case*; and the irregularity of having our nouns sometimes placed in a situation, in which they cannot be said to be in any case at all, will be obviated."

Mr. Murray seems to have considered it a kind of disgrace that nouns should be found in the English language, which could not be said to be in some case—and, to remove this stigma, he ventures to introduce, contrary to the genius of the language, the *objective case*.

Nor has Mr. Murray, in my opinion, acted with any kind of impropriety in making this important provision. As those nouns for which Mr. Murray's objective case provides, were left without solution, so *phrases*, *idioms*, and *anomalies* are now passed by without notice. And every thing which a teacher cannot parse, is *disgraced* by the epithet, *anomaly*, and banished from the process of solution!

But all the words and phrases which are denominated *anomalies*, do no more transcend the principles of *grammar* solution than the plainest constructed sentence which has ever been framed by the clearest, and purest writer in the English language.

To bring them, however, within the reach of teachers, it is necessary to use some means to present their true constructive bearing in the frame-work of the sentence.

The means by which this can be accomplished is that part of the *Rational System*, which is called

CONSTRUING.

In English, Construing is the analysis of *Sections* as the *trunks*, and *branches* of *Sentences*.

A section is a *trunk* word, or a *combination* of *trunk*, and *branch* words, giving an *entire* part of the *complex* thought expressed by the sentence; as, (*Ah*) (*John*,) [*have you come again?*]

(*Master*,) [*I have brought my son*] (*unto thee*) (*who hath a dumb spirit.*"')

All sections have ORDER, DICTION, NOTATION, and STATE.

I. ORDER.

The ORDER of a Section, respects its *constructive* standing as, a *distinct part* of a *Sentence*.

Sections have two orders, *Trunk*, and *Branch*.

I. THE TRUNK ORDER.

The TRUNK ORDER of a Section, respects its high *constructive* standing, its *trunk-like* independence of all other sections; as, (*Master*,) [*I have brought my son*] (*unto thee*,) (*who hath a dumb spirit.*)

II. THE BRANCH ORDER.

The BRANCH ORDER of a Section, respects its subordinate *constructive* standing, its *branch-like* dependence upon another section of the same sentence; as, (*Master*) [I have brought my son] (*unto thee.*)

A specimen of Sectionizing by Figures

N.B. All the words which have the *same* figure, belong to the same section. (Book I., page 56.)

FIRST SENTENCE.

1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
On the margin of the Connecticut river which runs near to the
4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 7
college, stood many majestic forest trees *which were* nourished by
7 7 7
a rich soil

SECOND SENTENCE.

1 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 3
When the bell rings, look , out for the cars.

THIRD SENTENCE.

1 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 3 3
Look ye out for the cars when the bell rings.

FOURTH SENTENCE.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Those, beautiful, young, fine, green, straight trees grew in
2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
that field which you see on the left hand side.

FIFTH SENTENCE.

1 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 4 4 4
An a ed beggar who with trembling knees, stood at the gate
5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8
of a portico from which he had been thrust by the insolent
8 9 9 9 1 1 1 1
domestic who guarded it, struck the prisoner's attention.

SIXTH SENTENCE.

1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5
A certain emperor of China, on his accession to the throne of

5 5 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 7
 his ancestors, commanded a general release of all those , who
 7 7 8 8 9 9
 were confined in prison, for debt.

SEVENTH SENTENCE.

1 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2
 Sweet was the sound when oft, at evening's close,
 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
 Up yonder hill the village murmur rose.

EIGHTH SENTENCE.

1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4
 An old clock that had stood for fifty years in a farmer's
 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8
 kitchen, without *the* giving to its owner, *of* any cause of complaint,
 1 9 9 9 9 1 10 10 10 10
 early *on* one summer's morning, before the family was stirring,
 1 1
 suddenly stopped

I will now invite the reader to parse *together* in the following sentence :

“They rode for two days *together*.”

I do not wish him, however, to inform me what this word *means* ! I desire him to *parse* it.

Does the reader call *together* an adverb? But to what *verb*, *participle*, *adjective*, or *adverb* does *together* belong?

“*Together, togethër, together*, means successively.”

But, reader, no one has asked you what this word *means*—all must know the *meaning* of this simple word, *surely* ! Well—“they rode for two days *together*.” That is, *they were in company*. This sentence means, then, that they were not apart when they rode !

Why, even a novice in grammar, would know what this sentence means. But the meaning is one thing—the connection of *together* with some super word in the sentence, is another thing ! Indeed, however, you have not even told the meaning of the sentence. The idea is not that the *persons* were in company, but that the days were in company. To give the sentence your import, it should read :

They rode *together* for two days.

But, as *together* is the last word in the other construction, the meaning is very different.

“They rode for two days *together*”

“Together ! Oh, now I understand it !” Understand what “Why, how to parse *together*. *Together* is an adverb, qualifying the verb, *rode* !” What, sir, if you drop one of the agents :

“*He rode for two days together.*”

“Ah ! *He rode, he rode, he rode*—that means”—*means*—indeed it is all means ! “*Together* is an *anomaly* ! !” Will you tell me by what *rule* ? Perplexed sir, will you permit me to prepare this sentence for parsing ?

[“They rode] (for two days) (, , *together.*”]

This sentence comprises just three sections—and observe this ; each section must be parsed by itself. You cannot carry *for* out of its own section—nor can you carry “*together*” out of *its* own section. You must now ask what parts of speech an adverb can qualify.

“An *adverb* may qualify a whole sentence ;” yes, it may change, or vary the general import of a sentence ; and so also may an *adjective* ; as, “No man may put off the law of God.”

“Here the whole *negative* import arises from the adjective, *no*. And, if the adverb, *not*, is used, it is the same thing.”

In this, reader, you are perfectly *correct*. Hence, I will express my ideas with a little more *care*, and *precision*. You must ask, then, with what parts of speech, adverbs may have a *mechanical* connexion. As to qualifying—*adverbs*, and adjectives also qualify, not so much the words to which they may be joined, as the whole sentence in which they are used.

Adverbs may have a *constructive* relation with *verbs*, *participles*, *adjectives*, and other *adverbs*.

Is there a *verb*, *participle*, an *adjective*, or another *adverb* in the section to which *together* belongs ? No. Then, you must supply one.

“But why not carry the word, ‘*together*,’ into some other section ?” Because the other sections are now *full* : they cannot receive it without *injury* to the *sense* of the whole period.

[“They rode] (for two days) (, , *together.*”]

[“They rode] (for two days) (*which came together.*”)]

“*Together*” is an adverb, relating to *came*, understood.

The first step is to throw the sentence off into sections—this reduces the most complex period down to perfect simplicity.

The next step is to see what parts of speech are in your implem-
nary sections ; for this will tell you what parts must be supplied in order to parse those which are *expressed*. That is, if you have an adverb, and no *verb* in your implem-
nary section, you will know that some *verb* must be supplied ; and the *sense* will tell what

particular verb must be selected. If your *impenary* section has nothing but an adverb, the *implied* part of speech, which is necessary, is a verb—because it is the mechanical genius of the English language, that, when adverbs relate to adjectives, or to other adverbs, these adjectives or other adverbs are always *expressed*.

You must first divide the sentence into proper sections—for, unless this is done, you will not know whether your section is *plenary*, or *impenary*.

“Cannot one tell from the sense?” No—for there may be a *mechanical* ellipsis when the mind has attained the *full* sense of the period; as, “He rode for two days *together*.”

None can misunderstand this—none can be incompetent to parse any word upon the ground of not having the *full* sense of the entire period. The *ellipses* is in the *mechanical*, not in the *significant* character. Hence it is, that no one can discover the *mechanical* ellipsis without throwing the period into its proper *mechanical* sections.

I presume that no one can read this sentence, and not understand all its import,

“In order to be a grammarian, I must be taught.”

Yet, although the *sense* is full, the mechanism is *impenary*: for, the word, “*grammarian*,” cannot be parsed in this *impenary* state of the section. The division of the period into sections, will clearly show how many parts of the machine, are gone, and to what classes these absent parts belong; and the *sense* will then determine what particular individuals of these classes must be supplied.

(In order) (, , to be a grammarian) [I must be taught]

The whole sentence comprises three sections—two of which are *plenary*. From one, there are two parts, or pieces gone—and these of course, are they which will aid in parsing the *expressed* parts which cannot now be parsed. “*Grammarian*” is an objective noun; hence the part, or parts which are absent, must belong to the class of transitive verbs, or to the class of prepositions. The *sense*, however, shows at once, that no verb can be introduced. Therefore, the part which is understood, must belong to the class of prepositions. And it now devolves upon the *sense* to determine what individual of this class will supply the mechanical vacancy. Try *with*—

(In order) (*with* to be a grammarian) [I must be taught.]

But there is another part gone which should be supplied.

(In order) (*with me* to be a grammarian) [I must be taught.]

Though *with* supplies the mechanical vacancy in the machine ; it does not seem to be the word which the *import* of the sentence will admit. For instance, the sentence seems to be a *chair*, requiring a *leg*. Whereas, *with* appears to be a part of a very different machine. Insert *for*—

(In order) (*for me* to be a grammarian) [I must be taught.]

Or,

(In order) (*for me* a Grammarian to be) [I must be taught.]

The word, "*grammarian*," then, is an objective noun, put by apposition with *me*, understood.

But, it may be said, that some other mode of parsing the noun, "*grammarian*," may be found. O, yes, *surely*. But is this some other mode the *true* one? Those to whom I have spoken on the subject, have generally parsed this noun, in the first place, in the nominative case after *be*. The authority which has been cited is the remark, made by Mr. Murray :

1. "The verb to *be*, through all its variations, has the same case after, as that which next precedes it."

2. "Neuter verbs have the same case after them as before them."

But *this* neuter verb happens to be in the *infinitive* mood, and it can have *no nominative* case, not even one *after* it :

"In order to *be* a Grammarian, I must be taught."

In the second place, they have given the sentence this form :

In order to *become* a Grammarian, I must be taught.

Hence, those to whom I have given it, have found little, or no trouble in parsing the noun under consideration. They have all, even to a man, said that,

"*Grammarian*" is a noun in the objective case, governed by the verb, *become* ! But, as "*become*," does not mean to *beautify*, or *adorn*, in this place, it is a neutral verb, and it can have *no objective* case. Thus, individuals *twist*, and *turn*, to *appear* to know what they do not know, to *appear* to do what they cannot perform.

Recommend them to pay attention to *English* grammar—and I hear the following reply :

Why—why, indeed, I have been *teaching* grammar for five years, for ten years, &c. I study the English language ? Why—I have studied the *Latin* ; and I teach it every day of my life.

Plerique preceptores mera deliramenta pueris inculcant, tamen Dii boni, quem non illi Pilæmonem, quem non Donatum præ se contemnunt ? idque nescio quibus præstigiis mire efficiunt, *ut stultis materculis et idiotis patribus tales videantur quales ipsi se faciunt.*

Erasmus.

TRANSLATION.

The greater part of preceptors teach mere fooleries to their boys; yet, good God! what Palæmon, what Donatus, do they not despise in comparison with themselves? And I know not how they do it, but they make themselves appear to foolish mothers, and to idiot fathers, just such as they represent themselves!

There is but one thing which throws the grammatical character of words beyond the reach of all grammarians. This one thing is the *absence* of the parts with which the *expressed* words stand connected. To *parse* is to tell the *connection* of words—but how can the connection of a certain word be told, unless the words with which it stands connected, can be *found*? The first thing, then, in parsing these *anomalies*, as they are called, is to find the *other words*. This can never be done without the aid of CONSTRUING.

I would not be understood, however, to say that a *theoretical* knowledge of CONSTRUING, will give a clear view of the structure of a sentence. I mean to say that CONSTRUING is the means, and the *only means*, by which this view can be acquired. The principles of CONSTRUING may be understood with much ease, and in a short time; but the mechanical principles of the language cannot be learned without a close, and constant application of CONSTRUING to its *mechanical structure*.

Words, for various reasons, are frequently omitted—and it is sometimes the case that whole sections are left out of the sentence; as,

[I have some recollection] (of his father's being) (, ,
 ,) (, a judge.)

Here, in order to fill the last section, the absent one must be found. The reader cannot supply the absent section—hence, he cannot fill up the one in which “*judge*” is found—and as he cannot fill this section, he cannot parse the noun, “*judge*.”

I shall now make a few observations which, I trust, may enable all who read them, to manage such ellipses as I have exhibited in the above sentence. *Brevity* is the primary cause of almost every ellipsis with which we meet in the expression of thought. A desire for brevity, is so strong in man, that even the necessity of *perspicuity*, is *sometimes* hardly able to control it. Men, consequently, seize every occasion for the *omission* of words—and to speak of a few of these occasions, may shed a little light upon this important part of the subject of grammar. To embrace nearly all the instances in one remark, I will observe that,

These occasions occur where the full, and correct sense may be perceived without a plenary state of the sentence. It now, however, remains to be shown where this may happen.

It may happen in instances like this :

1. [He drank] (, last evening.)

No individual can suppose that he drank the *evening itself*—hence, *on* may be omitted.

2. (,) [Give , (, me) some wine.]

It is supposed that the person addressed, is *present* ; hence his name may be left out. Therefore *John*, or some other name, is omitted. It is unnecessary also to employ *thou*, after *give*—since “*thou*” would be merely the second call, or modification, which, in the first instance, is made, or given by a mere *look* from the speaker. *To* is omitted before *me* ; since the person addressed, is not supposed to be in much danger of putting the speaker into a wine glass, and thus treating him to *himself* instead of to *wine* !! The sentence filled up,

(James.) [give *thou* (to me) some wine.]

(,) [give , (, me) some wine.

3. [He rode] (to town) (, last week.)

On is here omitted—for the sentence is as easily understood without, as with it.

4. [He eat] (, yesterday) (with his brother.)

On is here omitted—since few would be liable to understand this sentence, even without this preposition, as meaning that *yesterday* was the food *eaten* !

O, says the reader, these instances of ellipses are all clear ; I have learned them even from Mr. Murray's Grammar ! Yes, you truly have learned these instances there—but have you learned the *principles* upon which these ellipses are permitted, *there* ? If you have learned the *principles* there or elsewhere, you can fill up any of the following ellipses :

1. I have some recollection of my father's being (, , ,) (, a judge.)

2. [More , paid ,] (than , ,) (, could get seats.)

3. [They rode] (for two days) (, , together.)

2. (In order) (, , to become a grammarian)
[I must study ;] (with diligence.)

5. [He boasts] (of being) (, , , ,) (, a friend) (to his country.)

[They had an opportunity] (of viewing the scene) (tor ,
,) (, , (above an hour.)

[He was handed] (, a drink.)

[They were taught] (, grammar.)

[They were willed] (, a farm.)

[They were denied] (, their seats.)

[I was told] (, the truth.)

["He was given] (, a thousand pistoles.")

[They were refused] (, their seats.)

[He was offered] (, six dollars) (for his hat.)

[He was asked] (, a question.)

["I have a book] (, to read.)

[What , have you] (, to do) (with me?)

N. B. *Read*, and *do* are both *transitive* verbs, and must have objects *somewhere*.

Now, can you fill the above ellipses? If you cannot, you must see that you are not a Grammarian.

You may think that they who can parse the majority of sentences, found in English, are entitled to be ranked as grammarians. But, unless they can go *much farther* than this, they are no more *grammarians* than any other persons that can read equally well with themselves, who have never attended to the process of *parsing* for one *moment*. Therefore, D. may have taught grammar for years, without having any more *real* knowledge of this art than any one who has never learned it farther than what he has acquired from *spelling, reading, writing, conversing, and observing*. Be sure, D. has more *grammar names* than the other person—but as *names* are nothing without *ideas*, one has just as much *real* knowledge as the other. D. can tell the *connection* of the words in the majority of sentences—and nothing more. So can the other—and in reading understandingly, he does connect the words of his sentences as accurately as D. It is by *connecting* the words that the true ideas are acquired; and all who read understandingly, perform the operation in their *minds*. What great advantage, then, has D. over the other? Why, simply this—D. can say that *virtuous* is an *adjective*, connected with *woman*, whereas, the other can perform it in this way only

Virtuous is a word connected with *woman*.

"He writes very correctly."

D's. mode of parsing is this :

He, is a pronoun—*writes* is a verb belonging to *he*—*very* is an *adverb*, belonging to *writes*.

The other's mode is this :

He, is a word—*writes* is a word, making sense with *he*—*very* is a word, making sense with *correctly*—*correctly* is a word, making sense with *writes*.

Now, what particular advantage has D's. mode over the other person's ? By both, the words receive their *true connection*. So far, then, as a capacity to connect words, constitutes a grammarian, D. is no more a *grammarian* than the other person. But perhaps D. can speak, and write the language with more propriety ? O, no ! It is not from the old grammars that one learns what is *correct* English—hence, a man may use our language with as much propriety without the old grammar, as he can with it. Has any thing ever been learned from the *RULE*,

“The verb must agree with the nominative case in number and person.”

Has this *rule* ever enabled one to use the verb with propriety ? No—the examples which are given to illustrate the *rule*, leave the *rule*, and illustrate the *relation* between the *verb*, and its *nominative* ? This *rule* in itself is *nothing*. And the moment you undertake to *illustrate* it, you leave the *rule*, and present the genius of the *language*. If, then, the language is illustrated by the examples which are intended to enforce the *rule*, surely the language may be illustrated by the *examples* without the *rule* !

But to put the point to rest, I need only remark that this rule is so far from enabling one to use the verb with its *nominative*, with propriety, that he *actually acquires* the capacity for using it thus, from a long *drill* in correcting *bad* English !

SPECIMEN.

INCORRECT.

I *writes*.

We *am*.

He *runnest*.

They have *wrote*.

Of *who*.

With *he*.

CORRECT.

I *write*.

We *are*.

He *runs*.

They have *written*.

Of *whom*.

With *him*.

This is the manner in which correct English is taught and learned. This can be carried on without *technicality* even better

than wish it. What advantage, then, I again ask, has the *technical* grammarian over him who knows nothing of these *arbitrary* names? None at all.

Both can connect the words in a sentence, sufficiently well to acquire the true sense of the writer—or at least, one can do this as well as the other. But when the parsing of the words, requires a further connection than is necessary to acquire the sense of the period, *neither* can do any thing!

So long as the *sense* acts as a *pioneer* to the mechanical connection of the words, any two men who can read equally well, are equally able to connect words in their *true order*—hence, one is as much entitled to the appellation, “*Grammarian*,” as the other. A grammarian, in the proper sense of the term, is one who can extend his grammatical ken beyond that precise point where the *sense* ceases to give him *light*. Grammar is not the *sense*, but the *mechanism* of a sentence—and the sense may be clear where the grammatical *mechanism* is very obscure; as, for instance—“*Much* as man desires, a little will answer him.”

Sentences require to be stated for grammatical solution as much as sums for arithmetical operation. The following are stated for solution :

“*In order to be a grammarian, I must be taught.*”

(In order) (, , a grammarian to be) [I must be taught.]

“*He rode for two days together.*”

Stated thus—[“He rode] (for two days) , , together.”)

“O,” says the reader, “this part of the business I am completely up to! Why, I have taught it *for years* ! !”

Reader, I ask you, then, to state the sentences which follow, in a way which will enable you to parse the italic words,

I. “He is virtuous and brave *both*.”

You will call “*both*” a conjunction. But will you tell what this conjunction *connects*? If you please, you may put the sentence in this form,

1. “He is *both* virtuous, and brave.”

2. “*Neither* despise the poor, nor envy the rich.”

3. “As far *as* I am able to judge, this book is well printed.”

N. B. Should you say that *as* connects—“*As far*,” and “*I am*,” I must dissent—you are *wrong*.

4. "*Either* she, or her sister must return; or we cannot hear from town."

5. "He would *neither* do it, nor permit me to do it."

6. "And *both* Jesus and his mother were there."

7. "*Verily, verily*, I say unto you, HE that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief and a robber."

8. "*Much* as man desires, a little will answer."

All the marked words except *verily*, *as*, and *much*, will be called *conjunctions*. What is a conjunction? "A conjunction *connects*," &c.

What, then, do these conjunctions connect? Can you tell this, D.?

Now, it is possible that you have deceived yourself upon this subject—you may think that you have parsed the above words. What does the conjunction, *both*, connect?

"James is learned, and wise *both*."

As to the word, *verily*, I am sure that you fairly laugh at me for giving it out. But, gentle reader, have you parsed it? You have called it an adverb very well—but to what verb does it belong? Here is the rub! And how, sir, have you parsed the word *much*? This word bears the same relation in the sentence which *little* does,

"*MUCH* as man desires, a *little* will answer."

Reader, will you accept of another word?

"For never, since language thundered in the ear, or lightened in the mind, has there been a time more favourable to the introduction of improvement than the present. *As* to the works of my predecessors, the shortness of the time since their commencement, and the difficulties attending philological investigation, forbid a belief, that they have attained that degree of excellence to which our language may be carried."

As will be called a *conjunction*—hence, I ask, what this conjunction connects.

Should you reply that *as* connects the two periods, or sentences, I must tell you that *as never* connects two sentences—besides, the conjunction which connects the two sentences is *and*, understood. That you may not be deceived on this point, I will inform you that there is a whole section understood before *as*, and that *as* connects this implied section, and the one which follows *as*. And as I have

told you so much, I hope you will excuse me if I ask you to supply this section. And to aid you in this, I shall give the number of words in it.

[, , , ,] (*as to the works*) (*of my predecessors*) (*the shortness*) (*of the time*) (*since their commencement,*) (*and the difficulties attending philological investigation, forbid a belief,*) (*that*) (*they have attained that degree*) (*of excellence*) (*to which*) (*our language may be carried.*)

Perhaps you will thank me for some little preparation which will aid you in parsing "*much*."

, *Much*) (*as man desires,*) [*a little will answer.*]

The reader, perhaps, will so far err as to fancy that I hold him obnoxious to my pen, for his inability to parse the words which have been given out in the above examples. I, however, acquit the reader, even if he is a teacher. I think that the Grammars are too defective to enable teachers to become Grammarians—and I acquit the Grammars, and their authors upon the ground that more time is necessary to give a correct, and full Grammar of our language than the old school Grammarians have given to the formation of the old theory of English Grammar. Perhaps no one among those who have attempted to form a Grammar upon the old principles, has given more than from six to twelve months to his compilation. It seems, high time, however, that a system should be introduced which will clearly and fully develop the *constructive* genius of our language. This system, I verily believe may be found in the Rational System of English Grammar.

I have not undertaken this CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISM under the expectation of being able to give in *it*, a full specimen of even one part of the Rational System. Nor have I introduced the subject of CONSTRUING to satisfy the expectations which I hope I have raised in the mind of the reader. I have introduced CONSTRUING merely to inform the reader that this is one of the parts of the *Rational* System. Connected with CONSTRUING there is a process which is denominated *Sense Reading*.

Sense Reading is the true Reading.

Sense Reading is the reading of the two sections together which make *sense* together while the other sections of the sentence, are omitted :

(, *Much*) (*as man desires*) [*a little will answer.*]

Sections are divided into *trunk* and *branch*.

1. The foundation of the sentence is the *trunk* section.

Trunk, [*a little will answer.*]

2. A branch is a *branch* section, a dependent section :

Branches, { (, *much*.)
 { (*as man desires.*)

By giving the *Sense Reading* of the first *branch* in the sentence, the reader will see what word should be supplied before *much* :

Sense Reading : [A little will answer] (, *much*.)

That is, [A little will answer] (*for much*.)

In the Rational system, that word which is understood, is called a *no-e-ton*. This word means what is perceived by the mind without the aid of the *senses*. A *noeton*, then, is that word, or that section, which the mind perceives without the aid of the *eye*, or *ear* ; as,

“(, *much*) (as man desires) [a little will answer.]”

The mind perceives the *for* before *much*, although *for* is not presented to the mind through either *eye*, or *ear*.

The doctrine of this ellipsis, is this :

As, in the second branch, is substituted for *which*.

(For the *much*) (*which* man desires) [a little will answer.]

For, and *the* are omitted because their insertion would mar the euphony of the sentence :

(*For the much*) (*as* man desires) a [a little will answer.]

But, when *which* is used, *for*, and *the* add to the euphony of the sentence—hence *for* and *the* are inserted when *which* is used :

(*For the much*) (*which* man desires,) [a little will answer.]

Or,

[A little will answer] (*for the much*) (*which* man desires.)

When *which* is used, *for* and *the* are expressed, because their omission would mar the euphony of the sentence as much as their expression would mar it when *as* is employed for *which* :

(*For the much*) (*as* man desires) [a little will answer.]

(, *much*) (as man desires,) [a little will answer.]

FROM HUBBARD'S ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

1. [“What , have I , to do] (with thee ?”)
2. [“What , have you , to say ?”]
3. [“I have a book , to read.”]

Mr. Hubbard is represented as a fine classical scholar—he is a teacher, and a clergyman. His Grammar was published in Baltimore, 1927 ; and it is highly recommended by many learned men. The following extract, taken from the letter of the Rev. Mr. Morrison, will show in what light Mr. Hubbard stands as a literary man :

BALTIMORE, July 12th 1827.

— “I have attentively perused an English Grammar, written by A. O. Hubbard. I had heard some time ago that he was about to publish a work of the kind ; and, from what I knew of his peculiar qualifications for the undertaking—his habits of patient, and

accurate research—and particularly his extensive as well as critical acquaintance with the principles of language—I was expecting a happy result.”

GEORGE MORRISON.

I shall now repeat the above instances, and submit Mr. Hubbard's remarks upon these, and similar constructions.

1. “What have I to *do* with thee?”
2. “What have you to *say*?”
3. “I have a book to *read*.”

The author observes,

“It is sometimes difficult to tell what the object of the verb, is, or whether it has any object at all!”

Mr. Hubbard gives twenty examples where he admits that it is beyond his power to determine whether the verbs *have* any objects! Of the twenty, three have been quoted. The learned author with all “his habits of patient, and accurate research,” seems to work himself into a kind of literary passion, and concludes by saying,

“Should the ingenious student ask the *objects* of to *do*, to *say*, to *read*, &c., we reply that they have *no objects*!”

In this, however, Mr. Hubbard is as far from the truth as is the learned Mr. Kirkham, who defines *rain* to be a *state of things*!

Every verb which is transitive in its nature, must be transitive in its construction in relation to other words. To *say*, to *do*, and to *read* are transitive verbs wherever they are used in the active voice. To *do* is to *do something*—to *say* is to *say something*, and to *read* is to *read something*—for no one can *do*, *say*, or *read* without *doing*, *saying*, or *reading something*. And this *something*, be it what it may, is the *object* of the verb.

1. “I have a book to *read*.”

That is, I have a book *which* to *read*.

2. “What have I to *do* with thee?”

That is, Have I any *thing*, or *act*, now in view, *which* I am about to *do* with thee! *Which*, understood, then, is the object of *do*.

3. “What have you to *say*?”

That is, what have you, *which* you desire to *say*?

STATED THUS.

1. [“What , have I , to *do*] (with thee?)”
2. [“What , have you , to *say*?”]
3. [“I have a book , to *read*?”]

FILLED UP.

1. [“What *thing* have I *which* to *do*] (with thee?)”
2. [“What *thing* have you *which* to *say*?”]
3. [“I have a book *which* to *read*.”]

But I may be told that the insertion of these words, mars the music of the language. This I grant of course! And I add that there is no word that is understood, which, when expressed, does not injure the *euphony* of the sentence. For instance:

“Let *thou* him to go,”

Is not so agreeable to the ear as,

“Let him go”—

Yet, all grammarians admit that *thou* and *to* are *understood*!

“Give *thou* to me a cup of water,”

Is not so harmonious as,

“Give me a cup of water”—

Yet no grammarian has ever entered this *musical* plea against inserting these words, in order to parse the verb, and pronoun!

Those words which have been tried, and condemned by the ear, and banished from the sentence for the crime of marring the *euphony* of the language, must be pardoned, and returned for the purpose of parsing the *innocent* words!

Language is not altogether a *musical* instrument; it is, in part, *mechancial*. To prevent any marring of the music, these *noeton* parts are omitted. And to reveal the exact *mechanism* of the sentence, these parts are brought in.

1. [“I have a book , to read.”]

2. [I have a book *which* to read.]

3. [“The girl is called] (, ,) (, Jane.)

4. [The girl is called] (*by the name*) (*of* Jane.)

What parts are liable to be omitted to prevent any marring of the *euphony*? Prepositions—indeed, all parts.

Q. What prepositions are usually omitted in the *implenary* section?

A. *To, for, in, with, of, concerning, about, and during.*

1. WITH.

1. *WITH* is omitted where *handed* is used instead of *served*; as, he was *handed* , a drink. That is, he was *served* *WITH* a drink.

2. *WITH* is omitted where *willed* is used instead of *presented*; as, he was *willed* , a house, and lot. That is, he was *presented* *WITH* a house, and lot.

3. *With* is omitted where *give* is used in the sense of *presented, favoured, or rewarded*: as, “he was *given* , a hundred pounds for his land”—“he was *given* , an apple”—

That is “He was *presented with* a hundred pounds for his land.”
He was *presented with* an apple.”

2. IN.

IN is omitted where *taught* is used instead of *instructed*; as, he was *taught* , grammar. That is, he was *instructed* IN grammar.

3. OF.

OF is omitted where *denied*, or *refused* is used instead of *deprived*; as, The king was *refused*, or *denied* , his seat. That is, the king was *deprived*, or *refused* OF his seat.

The first objection which will be made to these examples, is that they are bad English; because, as will be alleged, they are wrong in point of fact! For, say the objectors, the *person* was not given—the *pounds*, and the *apple* were given to *him*!

My first, and weakest reply to this objection, is that grammar has nothing to do with facts: an absolute falsehood may be written in perfectly good English! The *earth* has *ceased* to exist, is as good English as, the *earth continues* to exist!

An error in the fact, then, cannot be urged to show any defect, or disorder in the mechanism, or rhetoric of the sentence which makes the false assertion. But it has not yet been demonstrated that there is an error even in the fact. When one says,

“He was *given* a cup of water,” in what sense is *given* used? Certainly, in the sense of *favoured*—“he was *favoured* with a cup of water.” I ask, then, which was *favoured*, the person, or the *cup of water*? Was the *water* favoured or was the *person*? There is, then, no error in point of fact!

But I am now told that *give* is never used in *this* sense. I ask, then, what one means, when he says,

“I was *given* a cup of water.”

Does he not mean that he was *favoured* with a cup of water?

“He means that he was *served*, or presented with a cup!”

Very good, I shall, then, say,

That *with* is omitted where *give* is used in the sense of *served*, or *presented*; as he was *given* , a cup of water. That is he was *presented*, or *served with* a cup of water!

Finally say my opponents, *give* should never be used in the sense of *favoured*, *served*, *rewarded*, or *presented*—hence the above examples in which *given* is used, are all improper English.

But why should this word not be used in the sense of *favoured*, &c.? Because, the *dictionary import* of the word, is against it. Sir, can you find a dictionary, which asserts that *give* should not be used in the sense of *favoured*, *served*, *presented*, or *rewarded*? You mean, sir, to assert nothing more than that the *dictionary* says nothing about this way of using *give*! Therefore, the dictionary does not even attempt to condemn this use of the word. But you will say, that the dictionary affords no *sanction* to this

use of the word, *give*. This I grant—for it says nothing about this *particular* use of the word in question. I do not depend upon the dictionary for a sanction—I rely solely upon general practice in similar instances. Every scholar knows that words are often used in a sense of which dictionaries know nothing. For instance—the word, *die*, which according to the dictionary, signifies to *expire*, is used in the sense of to *have*, to *meet*, to *obtain*; as,

“Let me *die* the death of the righteous.”

That is, let me *have* the death, or *meet*, or *obtain* the death of the righteous. But if this word, *die*, in the above instance, is to be tried by the *canons* of the dictionary, the meaning of him who uses it, is obscure *indeed*!

The word *live* is used quite often in the sense of *have*, or *lead*; as,

“May they *live* lives of sobriety.”

That is, may they *lead* lives of this character. I might give thousands of instances—but they are unnecessary—two will show what I mean; and the common observation of all, asserts that this principle is a general one—and adopted by the best, and poorest writer. If, then, the principle, that words may be used in a sense different from their strict dictionary import, is established, I call on my opponents to show that *give* forms an exception to this general principle, and universal *practice*! When they prove that this use of words, is not general—or when they admit that it is common, and show that *give* forms an exception, I shall be ready to yield.

The *nouns*, therefore, which follow the verbs that are used in the sense of other words, must be *parsed*. But how is this to be done? It is to be done, not according to the *literal* dictionary sense of these *vicarious* verbs, but according to their *figurative*, or *borrowed* sense! The pupil throws his sentence off into different sections. This presents the plenary, and the implenary state of the sentence,

[“He was given] (, a cup) (of water.”

The implenary section contains an *objective* noun. Therefore, a *transitive verb*, or a *preposition* must be supplied. The *sense* is now to determine from which class this vacancy in the machine, is to be supplied—the sense is to do more—it is to ascertain what individual word will fill the vacancy. The sense of the sentence will not admit a verb of any kind—the vacancy must be filled, then, from the class of prepositions. And in order to ascertain which one of the whole class, will supply this ellipsis, the pupil must ask in what particular sense, the word, *given*, is used—because the *preposition* that should be supplied, is the very

one which would be employed with that verb for which *given* is used.

I have thus stated the substance of a few conversations which I have been permitted to hold with literary gentlemen, upon this point. In my conversations upon the subject of grammar, my position has generally been that the pupil cannot parse the English language with the little light afforded by teachers, through Mr. Murray's Grammar. And to sustain my position, I have, (among many other examples,) given the following,

"He was *given* a dollar."

To this my opponents have replied that, this construction is *bad English*! The ground which they have generally taken, is that, *he* was not given; but that the *dollar* was given to *him*. Still to the interrogation, *is the following sentence GOOD English*?

"He was *presented* with a sword."

They have uniformly replied, *yes*.

Yet here is the same apparent *want of truth*, which exists in the sentence, "*he was given a dollar*." They have pleaded, that *he* was not given, but that the *dollar* was given. Now, I plead that *he* was not given; but that the *sword* was given. What, then, does this prove? It proves this; namely, that my opponents have considered the first construction bad, merely on the ground that they are not *able* to parse the noun, *dollar*; and that they have considered the last good, from the simple fact of finding a *preposition* which puts the noun in the objective case!! All should know that when words are used figuratively, they must be parsed under *figurative* characters. All should recollect, that when one word is used in the sense of another, they are not to adhere to the *literal* import of the word so employed; in this case, they are to be controlled by the import of the word for which the figurative one has been *substituted*.

This work will very likely fall into the hands of many persons—and among them, I trust that not one will be found, who will be even disposed to charge me with any attempt to exhibit grammatical skill, or to take any undue advantage of other writers. All the examples which I have presented in this chapter, have been given me by distinguished scholars. They were presented as *anomalies*.

The following, I received from an officer of Princeton College:

["They rode] (for two days) (, , together.)"

The following, from a teacher in the city of New York:

("In order) (, , to be a *grammarian*.) [I must be taught.]"

This sentence, as said the gentleman from whom we received it, had been a subject for grammatical discussion, a number of times in the "*Teacher's Society*." "This society," as remarked the gentleman, "has had the sentence upon its records for *fifteen* years! Within this time they have frequently made attempts to parse the noun, *grammarian*—but nothing has been done with this word, which has satisfied the society, or myself. And indeed," said he, "I have, in my house, *twenty written solutions* of this word. The last which I received, is from the pen of Mr. *Ingersoll*." The gentleman to whom I refer is Mr. *Forest*—and I need not add that he was *much pleased* with my solution of this word. Have I, then, made too much *fuss* about these sentences? To this society, belonged some fine *linguists*. But, with all their knowledge of the *Latin, Greek, French, and Hebrew*, they were not able to parse the word, *grammarian*, as used in the following sentence:

"In order to be a *grammarian*, I must be taught."

Why, then, should it be pretended that the *Latin* is a *key* to the *mechanism* of the English?

I have not written this chapter with a view to *boast*. If I know my own feelings, I derive no pride from my *connection* with this subject—I wish, yea, *most heartily* do I wish that this enterprise had fallen upon some other one—something, however, has thrown it upon me; and I am resolved to carry it as far as my *ability* will permit. I have not made this *fuss* about these two words, *grammarian*, and *together*, for the sake of *their* solution *alone*—I have brought them forward to show that, the words upon which the *received system* of Grammar sheds no light, may, by the Rational system, be clearly, and easily parsed. And I think that I have fully established this fact—yea, I have established more—for I have most conclusively shown that, with all the knowledge of the *Latin*, which the linguists of the age possess, these words have not been parsed.

The gentleman from whom I received the following sentence, is a great *Latin, Greek, and Hebrew* scholar:

["They rode] (for two days) (; , *together*.")

With *him*, "*together*" was an *adverb* belonging to the preposition, *for*! Or, it was an *anomaly*! Yet, I assert, (under an expectation too, that he will soon see, and peruse this book,) that, with my solution, he was *highly pleased*. But there is no necessity that I should be confined to these instances—I can present thousands, and thousands! How do all Grammarians parse the word, *when*, in the following verse?

“And *when* he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him : for they know his voice.”

“*When*” is parsed as belonging to the verb *putteth* ! !

Nor does the so much vaunted *Latin*, and *Greek* enable one to *detect*, and correct this error ? Not that we are opposed to the delightful, and *important* study of the dead languages ! But it is worse than *useless* to ascribe to a knowledge of these languages, feats which they, who understand them, cannot perform ! It is injurious to the cause of science itself to impress the public mind with a belief that *our own* language can never be acquired through any other means than that of studying other tongues ! Besides, it brings a disgrace upon our language, of which every true American should be *ashamed* ! If it was true, then should we bear with it.

I know that a more copious, and free use of the words in our language, may be acquired through the means of studying the Latin, and Greek ; but I do know too, that the organization of the English language, can never be well understood from a knowledge of the anatomy of the Latin, and Greek ! The Corinthian architecture of these, can never illustrate the Doric structure of that.

The English, and the Latin, in mechanism, are almost totally distinct—how, then, can one illustrate the other ? This so much vaunted doctrine creates its own confutation—for, if a knowledge of the grammar of the Latin, gives so clear, and so complete a view of the structure of the English, as some contend it does, why, I pray to be informed, will not a knowledge of the grammar of the English, give this clear, and complete view of the organization of the Latin ?

That a knowledge of the dead languages, is of essential service in becoming acquainted with ancient literature, is not to be denied. That such knowledge is of vast service in the study of theology, medicine, and law, is too clear to admit of the least doubt ! Nor is a knowledge of these languages useless to any one—and all who can, should acquire it. But to assert that one cannot understand the mechanism of the English without a knowledge of these languages, is to say that, no one can comprehend the structure of a barge, a skiff, or a canoe, without learning it through the mechanism of a *steam boat* ! Ah ! is the Latin so much more like the English, than the English is like *itself*, that one cannot understand the English without the Latin ! ! What ! the true geography of America cannot be acquired without studying the maps of Rome, Greece, France, Spain, Germany, &c., &c. ? !

In the Latin, one short word may express as much, and the same, as a whole clause in English. For instance, the conjunction,

ut, is equal in sense to "*in order that*" in English. Hence, those who have undertaken to acquire a knowledge of the English through the means of the Latin, call "*in order that*," a conjunction. And identity in *sense* is pleaded to sustain this strange solution. The sense, say these grammarians, is the same! But it is not the sense which we are analyzing—it is the mechanical parts which convey the sense—and we are to analyze them according to their mechanical structure. I believe that, if the grammar of a language, is the sense which it expresses when formed into periods, and books, the grammar of all languages, must be the same. Because the *sense* of every language is the same—for all nations have, so far as they have kept pace with each other, had the same ideas. But grammar is the mechanism of a language—and as different nations have constructed their fences, walls, sleighs, carts, carriages, farming instruments, houses, &c., &c., differently, so they have formed their languages differently—hence, there is a difference in the grammars of different tongues. If the sense was to decide the grammatical solution, *no*, and *not* must be parsed in the same way! "*No man is here.*" "*There is not a man here.*"

No is an adjective, belonging to *man*. But *not* is an adverb, belonging to *is*! Whence this difference in the two solutions? Surely not on account of a difference in sense! it arises from a difference in mechanical shape, and mechanical execution!

"Again—he writes *with accuracy*."

"He writes *accurately*."

The above two sentences convey the same sense! Yet, in grammatical structure, they are different; and this difference is recognized in the mechanical solution.

With is a preposition, relating to *accuracy*—*accuracy* is an objective common noun, third person singular. But "*accurately*" is an adverb, relating to *writes*! Identity in grammar, is not to be established from the sense, but from the organization of the machinery itself! In the following versè, the sense of the section "*by some other way*," is expressed in Greek by the adverb, *allachothēn*.

"Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that entereth not by the door into the sheep-fold, but climbeth up '*by some other way*,' the same is a thief, and a robber."

But how absurd would it be to call "*by some other way*" an adverb!! Not even one of the words in the whole clause, has any relation with the verb, *climbeth*! *By*, *some*, and *other* are mechanically connected with *way*; and *way* is a noun. The sense of this section unites with the sense of '*but climbeth up*,' and

thus aids in the joint representation of the collective fact on which the entire verse is founded.

1. The assemblage of words which can be taken out of the sentence, and parsed, or connected by themselves, can never be taken as one part of speech!

2. When an assemblage of two, or three words cannot be taken out of the sentence, and connected by themselves, it must be taken as one part of speech; as, He went *so as* to see his mother.

He writes *as well as* reads.

In these instances, *so as*, and *as well as*, cannot be parsed, or connected *individually*, when they are taken out of the sentences. They are conjunctions, and are mechanically connected with the following parts of the sentences. But in the instance,

“He went *in order* that he might see his mother.”

“*In order*” may be taken out of the sentence, and parsed without any mechanical connection with it.

“*In order.*”

In is a preposition relating to *order*—*order* is an objective common noun, third person singular.

Before *that*, *for* is understood; as, [“He went] (in order) (*for* that) (he might see his mother.”)

That in the old system is called a *conjunction*. Now, this word bears the same constructive relation in a sentence which *it* bears. But *it* is called a pronoun; as, *it* is said that he is in the city.

Here *it* is parsed as a pronoun representing the clause, *he is in the city*. *It*, and *that*, however, mean the same thing—they are *synonymous*. It is said—what is said? *that*.

It is from these remarks clearly seen why it is that “*with accuracy*,” cannot be taken as an adverb upon the ground that it expresses the same idea which is denoted by *accurately*!

But if the Latin, and Greek are so very effectual in developing the true organization of our language, how does it happen that they who depend solely upon these languages, are more deficient in the particular anatomy of our language than they who rely entirely upon Mr. Murray’s English Grammar?

And finally, how does it happen that *all* are so deficient in the mechanical solution of our language? It arises from the fact that, neither the Latin, Greek, German, French, Spanish, nor even our

English Grammars are suited to the *eccentric* mechanism of the English language. Have they who have written Grammars succeeded in parsing our language? Surely not. Let us see Mr. *Kirkham's* success.

INTRICACIES UNFOLDED.

Under this head Mr. *Kirkham* gives the following sentence, with many others equally simple both in *sense*, and *mechanism*,

“He that formed the ear, can he not hear?”

The learned author proceeds to unfold the *intricacy* of this construction! And, in doing it, I think that he turns both the sense, and mechanism into *mystery*! He supplies *can hear*; thus:

“He that formed the ear, can hear, can he not *hear*?”

This sentence comprises two sections:

[“He, (that formed the ear,) can he not hear?”]

The first *he* is the nominative to *can hear*, it being synonymous with the second. The sentence is framed in conformity to the Hebrew. The true meaning of the sentence, may be better seen, from the use of *what*—What! *he*, that made the *ear*, can *he* not *hear*? But, bless me, how the sentence *pires* away under this simplifying burden,

“He that formed the ear, can hear, *can* he not *hear*?”

Now, Mr. *Kirkham* is quite a grammarian upon the old plan. But neither he, nor any other compiler of Grammars upon the British scheme, can grapple even with common English sentences. Is not this true? Untrue as it may seem, I pledge myself to prove that not only is Mr. *Kirkham* incompetent to this task, but that our distinguished scholars have not the mental sinews to wrestle with these giants which have hitherto been nicknamed, *anomalies*, *idioms*, and *eccentricities*.

I would not be understood, however, to ascribe the *incapacity* to the learned, in any other way than through an *incompetency* in the system, by which they have been taught! They were taught when young; and, of course, when they were not equal to the task of detecting, and correcting those errors which came to them under the seal of *antiquity*, and the sanction of *custom*! They are now, however, *able*, and *free*—let them, therefore, examine the ground of the above position! If they find it *firm*, let them not condemn, but applaud me for placing my feet upon it. I beg them to throw aside their *prejudices* against new things, and their objections to the *mode* in which I come forward—*modesty* is proper

in its proper place—I desire to *provoke investigation* ! I have not yet come to the *slavish hypocritical* practice of *bowing, scraping, cringing, and fawning*, to induce teachers to introduce the RATIONAL SYSTEM ! Let the dealers in dim gold, adopt this course—as for myself, I am resolved never to disgrace the *truth* by this sort of *auctioneering* scheme ! If my country dislikes my frankness, and condemns my *ardour*, let her reject me, and my work together—I will suspend my fate upon the mercies of a God, and seek consolation in an attempt, yea in a *fruitless* attempt, to serve one of his *favoured* people ! If the patient takes umbrage at the *ardour*, and *solicitude* of his *physician*, let him reject the remedy, and rankle in *disease* !

How do they who teach by the British system, parse *when, till, after, as, &c.*, in the following, and similar constructions :

“ And *when* the Lord saw her he had compassion on her, and said unto her, weep not.”

In this instance, *when* is denominated an adverb, qualifying *saw*.

That is, *when* is an adverb, showing at what time the Lord *saw* her ! This, however, is not the construction ; nor is it the *sense*. It is not the intention of the writer to show at what time the Lord saw the woman. It is his intention to say that he *had* compassion on her at the very time of his seeing her. The sense gives the following construction :

[And the Lord had compassion *when*] (*he saw her.*)

[“ And *when* (the Lord saw her) *he had compassion*] (*on her,*) (*and said*) (*unto her,*) (*weep not.*”)]

In this verse there are four verbs, namely, *saw, had, said, and weep*. Now, *when* is employed to point out the time of one of these four events—and the question is, which. The leading idea of the sentence, so far as time is concerned, seems to be the portion within which the Lord *had* compassion. Take a similar case :

1. “ *When* three o'clock comes, they will dine.”
2. “ *When* the Lord saw her he had compassion.”

Is *when* employed in the first sentence to show at what time *three o'clock* will come !

If, then, *when* is not used in the first case to show the time of the event expressed by *comes*, it is not in the second for pointing out the time of the event expressed by *saw*.

Thrown into sections,

1. [*When* (three (o'clock) comes) *they will dine.*]

Or,

[*They will dine when*] (three (on the clock) comes.)

2. [*When* (the Lord saw her) *he had compassion.*]

[*The Lord had compassion when*] (he saw her.)

Again :

“ John, *when* will you pay your bill ?”

[“ *When* (my ship arrives) *I will pay it.*”]

Observe—the question here is, *at what time* John will pay. John employs a word in his answer which denotes *time*. And the question is, whether this word of time, is intended to qualify *will pay*. Why, if “*when*” does not belong to *will pay*, John’s reply is not an answer to the interrogation. The interrogation is,

“ John, *at what time* will you pay your bill ?”

The reply is,

“ *When* (my ship returns) *I will pay it.*”

And yet those who teach the grammar of the very language in which this reply is made, inform their pupils that *when* is an adverb qualifying *returns*. Thus forcing John, in his attempt to tell *when* he will *pay* his bill, to leave the question which he intends to answer, and to inform us *when* his *ship* will return ! The invariable rule seems to be that, “ An adverb is a part of speech added to a verb !” To parse the word, *when*, then, it is only necessary to call it an adverb, and connect it with *some verb*—and, as *returns* is the nearer verb of the two, *when*, of course, is connected with *returns* !

[And *when* (the Lord saw her,) he had compassion] (on her,) (and said) (unto her,) (weep not.)

And is it possible that children are taught to call *when*, as used in this case, an adverb, qualifying *saw* ! Even so ; and worse, as I shall soon show. What says the distinguished Kirkham upon the word, *again* ? Let him speak for *himself*. Kirkham’s Grammar, p. 87.

“ My friend has returned *again*—but his health is not very good.”

“ *Again* is an adverb, a word used to modify the sense of a verb, of time indefinite, it expresses a *period of time* not precisely defined.”

Thus this simple word, *again*, which has never been employed to denote any portion of time whatever, is defined by an author of a very popular English Grammar, to mean “ a *period of time*” ! “ A period of *time*, not precisely defined.” ! “ My friend has returned *again*.”

Does not *again* here mean *repetition*? Is it here used to show at what time he returned? If the author of a Grammar defines words in this way, can much be expected from those who *teach* from his book?

But to turn to *when* "*again*!" Now, if I may be permitted to incorporate an attempt to account for a disease with my essay to demonstrate its existence, I would say that it has come from the untenable position that the words which mark that portion of time within which two, or more events happen, may belong to either of the two verbs which express these events. This doctrine of *option* being taken for a sound principle, nothing but that convenience which arises from *nearness*, has governed the grammarian in his solution of *when*, and similar instances. *When* speaks of an *indefinite* point of time—and to supply the deficiency of *when*, in particularity, some event, the time of which is well known, is introduced into the sentence; as,

"*When* the mail *returns*, we shall get our papers."

Now, the time of the mail's return is well fixed—hence this event is used to show what particular portion of time is denoted by "*when*." And as the portion of time denoted by *when* is thus made to be the very point of time on which the arrival of the mail takes place, Grammarians have concluded that *when* shows the time of both events. And it is true that *when* is made to take hold on the very point of time within which both events are located. But, then, *when* does not seize this point of time, and hold it up before our eyes to say to us at what time the arrival of the mail is to take place, but to inform us within what portion of time the *procuring* of our papers will come into existence. The question as to *what time* it is within which the mail *returns*, is supposed to be fixed by habit, or custom in advance. This must be the case to make the allusion to the event, effectual in rendering *when* definite in respect to the time which it points out. Is *when*, then, introduced to show the time of an event whose time, custom, habit, or practice, had before defined?

In the first of the following constructions, *when* is said to belong to *shall get*; in the second, to *returns*.

1. We *shall get* our papers *when* the mail returns.
2. *When* the mail *returns*, we shall get our papers.

Suppose two men, D. and B., to fix by chance, or otherwise, upon the same hour of the day, within which to do two distinct acts.

1. D. promises as follows:

"I will pay you a hundred dollars *at ten o'clock to-day*."

2. B. promises as follows :

"I will walk with you to town to-day *at sixty minutes after nine.*"

Can it be said that the words, *ten o'clock*, uttered by D., have any bearing upon the verb, *will walk*? The phrase, *ten o'clock*, certainly means the very portion of time within which B. has placed his act of walking. But does it follow because words of time, uttered by different persons, to restrict different acts, specify the same portion of time, that the words so uttered, have a constructive relation with the verbs employed by these different persons to express these different events?

D. "I *will* pay you a hundred dollars at *ten o'clock* to-day."

"*At ten o'clock.*"

B. "I *will walk* with you to town to-day, at sixty minutes after nine."

"*At sixty minutes after nine.*"

Can it be pretended that the section, "*at ten o'clock*," has any frame-work connection with the section, "*I will walk*?"

Or can it be pretended that the section, "*at sixty minutes past nine*," has any frame-work relation with the section, "*I will pay a hundred dollars*?"

Here, then, you have two phrases, both denoting the same point of time; and two events, both taking place within this one portion of time; yet the two phrases, denoting time, belong to their respective events.

But it may be said that these two phrases of time fall into different sentences, and that they may have been uttered in different countries. Then, let us, bring them into the same country, into the same book, and even into the same sentence,

D. "I will pay you, B., one hundred dollars to-day *at ten o'clock*, if you will walk to town with me, to-day *at sixty minutes after nine.*"

Before I dismiss these words, it may not be amiss to say that *Goold Brown* has advanced the doctrine that these adverbs, with some others, belong to *both verbs*! Hence the word, *when*, in the sentence,

"I will pay my bill *when* my ship arrives,"

Is denominated an adverb qualifying *will pay*, and *arrives*!!

It may not be improper to observe here also that the compiler styles these words *conjunctive* adverbs!! This classification is intended to recognize the *connecting* influence which these adverbs exert in keeping up a relation between two main parts of the sentence. And upon a first look, this will seem to many a

"*lucky hit.*" But, whether they who have examined the subject of grammar so thoroughly that they have found that *nouns, verbs, articles, pronouns, participles, and interjections*, connect as much as *when*, and the compiler's other *conjunctive* adverbs, will be much tickled with this ingenious classification, I cannot say with so much certainty.

"*When the mail returns we shall get our papers.*"

True, on omitting the ligature, *when*, the frame-work of the sentence tumbles into instant ruin—or as printers would say, into *pi*. And as the frame-work is held together by *when*, *when* is called a *conjunctive* adverb. But, before I can give my assent to this classification, I must be satisfied that I may not have upon this principle, *conjunctive nouns, conjunctive verbs, conjunctive articles, conjunctive pronouns, conjunctive participles, and conjunctive interjections!*

ILLUSTRATION.

1. "*John has a book.*"

2. *has a book.*

Here the omission of the noun, *John*, breaks down the frame-work of the sentence. Hence, *John* is a *conjunctive* noun!

1. "*John has a*"

What, has the old frame tumbled again! Indeed it has. *Book*, then, is a *conjunctive* noun! According to *Goold Brown* it is.

"*John a book.*"

What, down again! *Has* is a very strong connector indeed—it must be a *conjunctive* verb!

1. That is the pupil *who* writes so well."

Does not *who* connect the two members of this sentence as much as *when* does those of the following?

2. "*When the mail returns, we shall get our papers.*"

1. That is the pupil writes so well.

2. the mail returns we shall get our papers.

1. *When*, a *conjunctive* adverb!

Who, a *conjunctive* relative pronoun!

Again. These are *the* very men.

 These are very men!

Thus it is seen that *the* is a *conjunctive* article!

Again. He laboured *an* hour.

He laboured hour!

“*An*,” then, is an indefinite conjunctive article!

And again. John is *writing* letters.

John is letters!

Writing is an imperfect conjunctive participle!*

I must now dismiss Mr. Goold Brown for a while.

I deem it somewhat important, to show in what way the word, *verily*, is parsed in the following verse:

“*Verily, verily*, I say unto you, he that entereth not by the door into the sheep-fold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief, and a robber.”

Verily, and *verily*, are parsed as adverbs, belonging to *say*. Thus conveying the idea that the author of this verse, which he addressed to a present audience, desired to convince his audience that he was *actually speaking* to them!

This adverb, *verily*, has no bearing either in sense, or mechanism upon the verb, *say*. Both words belong to a different section, and, in sense, and construction, are connected with the verb, *is*—

“*Verily, verily* he *is* a thief, and a robber.”

It is this proposition which the speaker wishes to enforce.

I shall now throw this verse into sections.

“(*Verily, verily*, [I say] (unto you) *he* (that entereth not) (by the door) (into the sheep-fold) (but , climbeth up) (, some other way) (,) (the same ,) *is*) (a thief,) (and , ,) (a robber.”)

[I say]

(*Verily, verily*, he is) (a thief,)

(and *he is*) (a robber,)

(unto you)

(that entereth not)

(by the door)

(into the sheep-fold)

(but *that* climbeth up)

(*by* some other way)

(*who is*) (the same person.)

But it may be pretended that those who have so very recently attempted to mend Mr. Murray, have found a better way of pars-

* The same compiler denominates the present participle, the *imperfect* participle!

ing the constructions which I have here been presenting. Hence I feel bound to examine their method of solution as they themselves apply it to similar instances.

CONSTRUCTIONS SAID TO BE OF DIFFICULT SOLUTION.

I. From Bullions's English Grammar, p. 82.

"In sentences of this kind, the infinitive mood and participle are often used for the name of the action, or state, or affection expressed by the verb ; as, To profess (professing) regard, and to act (acting) differently, mark a base mind. Here it is to be observed that the infinitive and participle are really abstract nouns perfectly indefinite in their application, there being no particular subject to which the action may be referred."

1. Why are these words *abstract nouns*? Because they express actions which belong to no agent!

But *are* there any actions which have no agents? Can the act of professing be done without some one to do it!?

2. Why are these words *perfectly indefinite* in their application? Because there is "*no particular subject to which the actions may be referred!!*" There is a particular subject to which these actions belong: *For a human being* "to profess regard, and *for him* to act differently, mark a base mind."

Can this proposition refer to any thing for its subject but a *human being*? The act of professing, and that of *acting* are not perfectly indefinite, then!! These acts are ascribed to a human being. But because the sentence does not decide to what human being they belong, Mr. Bullions declares them to be perfectly indefinite in their application!! Upon this principle, the verb, in the following sentence, is *perfectly indefinite* in its application:

"A human being died last evening."

Who died? A *human being*. Yet says Mr. Bullions, the act of expiring, expressed by *died*, cannot be ascribed to any subject, to any agent—hence *died* is an *abstract name perfectly indefinite* in its application!!

II. From the same page.

"If the infinitive, or the participle of the verb, to be, or of a passive verb of naming, &c., is used in this way without a definite subject, the substantive which follows it as a predicate, receives the same indefinite character ; it is neither the subject of a verb, nor is under the regimen of any word ; Thus, His being an expert dancer, does not entitle him to our regard." "This will be allowed to be a correct English sentence, complete in itself, and requiring nothing to be supplied." The phrase, "being an expert

dancer," is the subject of the verb, "does entitle;" but the word, "dancer" in that phrase, is neither the subject of any verb, nor is governed by any word in the sentence.

"His being an expert dancer does not entitle him to our regard."

The learned author pronounces this a correct sentence—"complete in itself, requiring nothing to be supplied." Yet he says that "dancer" has no case! "*Dancer*" is not the subject of any verb—hence it is not in the nominative—it is not the object of any verb or preposition—hence it is not in the objective!"

Here, then, is a correct English sentence which has but two nouns,—and one of these can not be parsed because no case can be found for it!!

This sentence, which the old school Grammarians pronounce good, is shamefully bad.

"His being." Whose being? why, *his*! *his* is no one at all! He is some one—but *his* is a gentleman who is very little known, except to *Murray menders*! *His being* an expert dancer, does not entitle him to our regard! But, I will not waste time in amusement. I will correct the sentence, and leave it.

His expertness in dancing does not entitle him to our regard. (RULE 1., BOOK I., p. 130.)

"Of this kind," says the author, are all *such* expressions as the following: *

1. "*It is an honour to be the author of such a work.*"
2. "*To be virtuous is to be happy.*"
3. "*To be surety for a stranger is dangerous.*"
4. "*Not to know what happened before you was born, is to be always a child.*"
5. "*The atrocious crime of being a young man, I shall neither attempt to palliate or deny.*"
6. "*He was not sure of its being me.*"
7. "*Its being me needs make no difference in your determination.*"
8. I took it to be *him*.

That *for* is understood before *him* will be obvious to all who give the subject a moment's careful reflection.

1. "I took it *for* good money."
2. "He was taken up *for* dead."
3. I take you to be a gentleman.

Why is *for* omitted in the third instance?

* *Such* is here improperly used.

The insertion of *to be* requires *for* to be omitted.

The sense, which is the grand rule of judging, is the same with *for*, which it is without *for*. When the half section, *to be*, and the preposition, *for*, are both *expressed*, the ear is offended—and to please this organ, *for*, or *to be* is generally omitted.

1. "I take you *for* a gentleman."
2. "I take you *to be* a gentleman."

1. "I take you *for to be* a gentleman."
2. "I take you *for a gentleman to be*."

The insertion of every implied word, substracts from the music of the sentence.

1. "It is an honour to be the *author* of such a work."

According to Mr. Bullions, the word, *author*, has no case! It is not in the *nominative*, because it is not the subject of a verb—it is not in the *objective*, because it is neither the object of a verb nor preposition. Mr. Bullions is in error—the word, *author*, is in the objective case after *as*, or *for*, understood. This is obvious from the construing of the sentence:

[It is] (an honour) (, , , to be) (, the author) (of *such* a work.)

Plenary:

[It is] (an honour) (*for a man* to be) (*as* the author) [of such a work.]

Should any one object to the use of *as*, I should endeavour to please him with *for*.

[It is] (an honour) (*to a man* to be) (*for* the author) (of such a work.)

The objector may say that I have not consulted his *ear* in this use of *as*, and *for*; but he can not say that I have disregarded his judgment. The word, *as*, as here used, is synonymous with *for* where *for* signifies *in the character of*. Hence the objector must ascertain the exact character of the idea before he can adopt, or reject these words.

The word, *author*, is nearly synonymous with the syllabane, *character of*. It is said that the world is a stage, and men, and women actors. Hence each one must be a *character* in the great play. The *characters* in the play, are various, and distinguished by different names: some are denominated *lawyers*; some, *doctors*; some, *merchants*; some, *cobblers*; some, *makers*; some, *compilers*, some, *authors*, &c., &c.

Where euphony will allow, *as*, or *for*, is expressed before the character name of the various actors ; *as*,

1. "John came *as* a prophet."
2. "I took him *for* a merchant."
3. "He took you *for* an author."
4. "He received the bill *as* good money"
5. "That man went *as* a servant."
6. "He was taken up *for* dead."

But where euphony will not allow the expression of *as*, or *for*, either, *as*, or *for*, is understood ; *as*,

1. "I thought him to be (, a merchant.")
2. "He took it to be (, him.)"
3. "It is an honour to be (, the author) of that book."
1. [I thought him to be] (*for* a merchant.)

That is, I took him *for* a merchant, in the character of a merchant

2. [He took it to be] (, him)
That is, he took it *for* him.

3. [It is] (an honour) (, , to be) (,
the author) (of *such* a book.)

[It is] (an honour) (*for* a man to be) (*for* the author) (of *such* a book.)

That is, it as an honour for a man to exist in the character of the *author* of such a book.

That is, it is an honour for a man to play the character of *author* of such a work.

Where *to be* is employed, euphony requires the *non-expression* of *as*, and *for* ; *as*,

I took you *to be* him.

That is, I took you *for* him. Or,—I took you *as* him. That is, I once knew a certain character on the stage of life—and I took you *as* the very character.

2. "*To be virtuous is to be happy.*"

Here, say the old school Grammarians there is nothing *to be*—hence *be*, and *virtuous*, belong to no subject! They say too that, as there is nothing *to be happy*, *be* and *happy* belong to no subject. What! is there virtue enough to make one *happy*, and yet no one to be *virtuous*—and none to be *happy*!

This is indeed *mysterious*!

To be virtuous is to be happy.

Perhaps nature has not left things in this way. And I verily believe that the English language which is *generally true to nature*, does not express them so :

“*To be virtuous is to be happy.*”

That is, *for a man* to be virtuous, is *for him* to be happy.

Be, and *virtuous* belong to *man*, understood—and *be*, and *happy* to *him*, understood.

3. “*To be surety for a stranger is dangerous.*”

It is said that the word, *surety*, has no case, and that *be* has no subject. But *be* relates to *man*, understood, and *surety* is the object of the preposition, *as*, or *for*, implied :

For a man to *be*, *as* surety for a stranger, is dangerous.

That is, for a man to exist in the *character* of surety for a stranger is dangerous.

“*Surety*” itself is a *character* name :

1. “He was taken *as* surety for his friend.”

2. “The magistrate took this man *for* their surety in both cases.”

For a man to *be for* surety for a stranger, is dangerous.

Will it be said that as the expression of *for* is prejudicial to the euphony of the sentence, *for* can not be understood? The expression of *any* word which is *understood*, is hurtful to the euphony :

1. “He was offered *with* a dollar for his knife.”

2. I heard him *to* sing.

3. Get *thou for* me a book.

1. *He was offered a dollar for his knife.*

2. *I heard him sing.*

3. *Get me a book.*

4. “*Not to know what happened before you were born, is to be always a child.*”

“*Know* has no subject—and *child* has no case !”

For you not to *know* what had happened before you were born, is *for you* to be always *as a child*.

Know belongs to *you*, understood ; and *child* is in the objective case after *as*, implied.

5. “*The atrocious crime of being a young man, I shall neither attempt to palliate, or deny.*”

"*Man*" is said to be without a *case*: and *being* without a subject, a *nominative* noun.

The atrocious crime of being *as* a young *man*, I shall neither attempt to palliate, *nor* deny.

That is, the atrocious crime of being in the *character* of a young man.

True, *being* has no subject—and this renders the sentence bad. And, although the old school Grammarians pronounce the sentence good English, I verily believe it bad. What, can that frame-work be *perfectly accurate, good*, which does not afford *supers* for its various *subs*! ? Can the hand be pronounced *perfect, complete*, that does not furnish a finger for each *finger* nail! ? "*Being*" is a nail which has no finger—hence the sentence is *bad*.

1. The atrocious crime *that I am* a young man I shall neither attempt to palliate nor deny. [RULE IX., BOOK I., p. 130.]

I apprehend that this construction expresses with exactness what Pitt himself meant. But his own expresses more than he intended :

"*The atrocious crime of being a young man.*"

This construction makes it a crime to be *young*, which, I think, is more than he meant. If, however, he meant what his own improper construction intimates, I would substitute the following :

The atrocious crime *that a man is young*, I shall neither attempt to paliate nor deny.

But the sentence would read better if amended as follows :

I shall neither attempt to palliate, nor deny the atrocious crime of my youth.

6. "*He was not sure of its being me.*"

This is grossly improper. Yet Mr. *Bullions* attempts to sustain it.

Corrected :

He was not sure *that* it was *I*. (RULE XXVI., BOOK II., p. 157.)

Nor is this any better :

7. "*Its being me needs make no difference in your determination.*"

The fact that it is I should make no difference in your determination. (RULE L., BOOK II., p. 171.)

I. From Goold Brown's Grammar.

Verbs of *declaring*, of *making*, and of *naming*, are often followed by two objectives by apposition; as, Thy saints proclaim thee *King*, The author of my being formed me *man*, And God called the firmament *heaven*.

“Verbs of *declaring*, and verbs of *making*,” is neither *English*, nor *sense*! *Of* imports *source*; as, a hat made *of* good wool.

But is there a word in any language, which is made *of making*?

Verbs which express the acts of *declaring*, *making*, and *naming*, is both *English* and *sense*.

Mr. Brown is not only grossly incorrect in his *language*, but remarkably erroneous in his doctrine.

“Thy saints proclaim thee *king*.”

The word, *king*, which he says is in the objective case, and governed by *proclaim*, is in the objective, and governed by *of*, understood.

[Thy saints proclaim thee] (, , ,) (, king.)

[Thy saints proclaim thee] (*by the name*) (*of king*.)

That is, thy saints publish thee (*by the title*) (*of king*.)

2. “The author of my being formed me *man*.”

“*Man*” is not the object of *formed*. This construction would be a shameful perversion of the sense itself:

1. The author of my being formed *me*.

2. The author of my being formed *man*.

“*Man*” is used to show the *character* which God gave to *me*.

The author of my being formed me *for man*.*

3. “And God called the firmament *heaven*.”

[And God called the firmament] (*by the name*) (*of heaven*.)

No verb can have *more* than one nominative; nor can any verb have more than one *objective* noun. There is no verb which *can* bear any relation to more than two nouns, or two pronouns, or one noun, and one pronoun, in the same sentence.

Instances like the following, do not subvert the *truth* which is here advanced:

[“*Paul* , ,] (and *Silas* sang praises) to God.”

2. [“They buried *Annanias*] (and , , his wife.”)

[See page 68.]

II. From Gould Brown's Grammar.

“We sometimes find a participle that takes the same case after as before it, converted into a verbal noun, and the latter word retained unchanged in connection with it; as, He has some recol-

* In the *character of man*.

lection of his *father's* being a judge." "The noun after the verbal, is in apposition with the possessive going before."

That is, the word, *judge*, is in apposition with the word *father's*!

"We sometimes find a participle that takes the same case after as before it, converted into a verbal noun."

"*Being*" is a participle of this kind :

"He has some recollection of his *father's* being a judge."

"*Being*" says Mr. Brown, is a verbal noun which takes the same case after as before it.

What case is before *being*? the possessive : *father's*!

What case is after *being*? the possessive : *judge*!?

So says Mr. Brown, and that too, in his finished labours !
father's being a judge!!!!

A disgrace to the age in which we live—that the slimy eel like the serpent of old, should attempt, while yet in his native mud, to raise his head with the words of knowledge in his mouth. "Verbs of making"—*judge*, in the possessive case, in apposition with *father's*—and both connected with a verbal noun!!

"He has some recollection of his *father's* being a judge."

This construction, which is obviously bad, may be corrected by
RULE L., BOOK II., p. 171.

He has some recollection *that* his *father* was a judge.

I. From Bradford Frazee's Grammar.

"Be it enacted." Here the verb is in the imperative mode, and "*it*" is the nominative, and stands for the whole section or act spoken of. (p. 135.)

The author of this singular manner of parsing the word, *it*, would have conferred a favour upon me, had he given the *foundation* of this solution. And, as his book abounds in foundations, I am somewhat surprised that he has given none in this instance! Perhaps he has built here without a foundation, from a want of suitable timber!

If "*be*" is a verb in the imperative mode, to whom is the command addressed? Is "*it*" which Mr. Frazee says, is the nominative to be, commanded to be enacted!? Really, Mr. Frazee pays a high compliment to legislatures: he says that they *command* their *laws* to be enacted!!

“*Be it enacted.*” Here the verb is in the imperative mode, and the pronoun, *it*, is in the nominative, and stands for the whole act, or section!

As Mr. Frazee has erected this superstructure without a *foundation*, he will not be surprised to find the whole in ruins! This verb is not in the *imperative*, but infinitive, mode:

“Be it enacted.” That is, *Let it* “be enacted.”

Construing.

[Let , it , be enacted.]

Let ye it to be enacted.

II. From Frazee's Grammar.

“Foundation of Note II.”

“Manner or degree may be predicated of relation.”

“Hence,

“NOTE II.”

“Adverbs sometimes belong to prepositions; as, He is *far from* home.”

Does it follow because manner, or degree, may be predicated of relation that *far* qualifies *from*! ? Can the import of *from* be modified! ?

“He is *far from* home.”

From separates the man from his home.

And does *far* aid *from* in this work of separation?

The man exists *far from* home.

“*Far*” indicates where this process of existing takes place :

1. He *exists far* away.
2. “He *exists far from* home.”
3. He *died far from* home.

Does not *far* place these acts, *exists*, and *died* a considerable distance off! *Far*, then, has a relation with *is*, *exists*, and *died*.

If *from* can be influenced by adverbs, every other preposition can be.

1. “He went *almost* to Ovid.”
1. “He went to Ovid.”

That *almost* qualifies *went* is obvious from the fact that it stops the action this side of Ovid.

1. "He went *not* to Ovid, but to Bristol."

"*Not* qualifies *went* : *not* turns the action *from* Ovid."

Mr. Frazee has built—and has laid a strong foundation. But his foundation is *far* from his house!!

True, *manner*, and *degree* can be predicated of *relation*. But the NOTE which he undertakes to fix upon this truth, has no more bearing upon it than the *capitol* at Washington has upon the pillars of Cambridge bridge at Boston!! His reasoning is like the following :

The word, *bell-flower*, is compounded of *bell*, and *flower*. Hence the word, *man*, is masculine gender!!

CHAPTER VI.—SCANNING.

As no one who is ignorant of Construing, can parse easily, and readily, so no one who is ignorant of SCANNING, can see clearly, and readily, the connection of the *relative* words of a section.

In teaching, care should be taken to *encourage* the *beginner* by giving him, in the *first place*, principles which he can *readily* comprehend. The *first* classification of the things which the beginner is to study, should be made upon the simplest principles on which a useful division can be effected. All teachers know that the *zeal* with which a pupil prosecutes his study, is in exact proportion to the *ease* with which he takes the very first step. If the child is discouraged at the *commencement* of his study, by an inability to take the first step with *ease*, he takes the others with great *reluctance*, or with *manifest indifference*. To encourage the child at the very *commencement* of the study of English grammar, the author of the Rational System makes the *first* division of words upon the simple principle of the *trunk* relation of some words, and the *branch* relation of others. Hence his *first* classification of words, is into *trunk* words, and *branch* words.

This simple classification not only encourages the learner to prosecute his study with alacrity, but it furnishes him with two *important, simple*, technical terms which he has occasion to use in the subsequent parts of the same study.

In the Rational System a SENTENCE is divided into SECTIONS, and a SECTION, into *trunk*, and into *branch* words. But the advantage of this division cannot be seen without a careful examination of the subject. In the *old* theory, the attention of the learner

is too much divided at the *commencement* of the study. He there has *ten* distinct classes of words—hence *TEN* distinct technical names which he must apply in the *best way he can*. True, in the application of these technicals, he is often aided by *chance*, frequently by a *confused* recollection, and perhaps sometimes, by a *partial* comprehension of the definitions of the denominations of words. But, if the characteristic *fancies*, on which the ten definitions given in the old books are founded, were even *painted* on each class of words in the brightest colours which have ever been spread upon any objects, still, the *ten technical* terms would, when coupled with an *appropriate* distribution of them among the various classes of words, be *far* too much for a beginner's immature faculties. But, when we consider that words are not only not classed by any *visible* marks, but by signs, the comprehension of which requires a *philosopher's* mind, our conclusion *must* be that the beginner in grammar, will advance with more ease with two technical names only than with ten !

Admitting, however, that the beginner is able to make a *correct* application of all the technicals in the old Grammar, with the utmost ease ; yet, as these technical names are not applied in reference to the *constructive* relation of words, this relation, this important part of grammar, is entirely disregarded in the *usual* way of teaching. The constructive relation which the words of a sentence, bear to each other, is the main part of grammar as a science. Hence, as the old theory does not found its *Etymological* distinctions upon this relation, a pupil who may be able to make these distinctions with great ease, and perfect accuracy, may be totally ignorant of the *grammatical* relation which one word bears to another.

That the *FIRST BOOK OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR*, is far more *simple*, and *thorough* than the *old Irrational* theory, is clearly demonstrated from the following view of *both* methods.

The *value* of the right-hand figure expresses the *rank* of the words of the *branch* order ; the *erect* posture, their *uni* adaption ; and the *horizontal* posture, their *plus* adaption. Words of the *trunk* order, have no figures. The brackets [] denote the *trunk* section.

The First Book.

The Old Theory.

1 [The 1*	a word of the <i>branch</i> order	<i>The,</i>	an article
1 power	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order	<i>power,</i>	a noun
2 (of 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order	<i>of,</i>	a preposition
2 speech)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order	<i>speech,</i>	a noun
1 is] 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order	<i>is,</i>	a verb
3 (a 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order	<i>a,</i>	an article

* All the words which have the *same* figure, belong to *one* section.

The First Book.

3 <i>faculty</i>)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
4 (<i>which</i>	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
4 is 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
4 <i>peculiar</i> 1)	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
5 (<i>to</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
5 <i>man</i> ;))	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
6 (<i>and</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
6 <i>it</i>	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
6 <i>was</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
6 <i>bestowed</i> 1)	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
7 (<i>on</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
7 <i>him</i>)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
8 (<i>by</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
8 <i>his</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
8 <i>beneficent</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
8 <i>Creator</i>)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
9 (<i>for</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
9 <i>the</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
9 <i>greatest</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
9 <i>uses</i> ;))	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
10 (<i>and</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
10 <i>it</i>	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
10 <i>was</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
10 <i>bestowed</i> 1)	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
11 (<i>for</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
11 <i>the</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
11 <i>most</i> 2	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
11 <i>excellent</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
11 <i>uses</i> ;))	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
12 (<i>but</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
13 <i>alas</i> !)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
12 <i>how</i> 3	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
12 <i>often</i> 2	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
12 <i>do</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
12 <i>we</i>	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
12 <i>pervert</i> —	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
12 <i>it</i>)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
14 (<i>to</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
14 <i>the</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
14 <i>worst</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
14 <i>purpose</i>)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order
15 (<i>of</i> 1	a word of the <i>branch</i> order
15 <i>purposes</i> .)	a word of the <i>trunk</i> order

The Old Theory.

<i>faculty</i> ,	a noun
<i>which</i> ,	understood, a pronoun
<i>is</i> ,	understood, a verb
<i>peculiar</i> ,	an adjective
<i>to</i> ,	a preposition
<i>man</i> ;	a noun
<i>and</i> ,	a conjunction
<i>it</i> ,	understood, a pronoun
<i>was</i> ,	a verb
<i>bestowed</i> ,	a verb
<i>on</i> ,	a preposition
<i>him</i> ,	a pronoun
<i>by</i> ,	a preposition
<i>his</i> ,	a pronoun
<i>beneficent</i>	an adjective
<i>Creator</i> ,	a noun
<i>for</i> ,	a preposition
<i>the</i> ,	an article
<i>greatest</i> ,	an adjective
<i>uses</i> ;	understood, a noun
<i>and</i> ,	a conjunction
<i>it</i> ,	understood, a pronoun
<i>was</i> ,	understood, a verb
<i>bestowed</i> ,	understood, a verb
<i>for</i> ,	understood, a preposition
<i>the</i> ,	understood, an article
<i>most</i> ,	an adverb
<i>excellent</i> ,	an adjective
<i>uses</i> ;	a noun
<i>but</i> ,	a conjunction
<i>alas</i> !	an interjection
<i>how</i> ,	an adverb
<i>often</i> ,	an adverb
<i>do</i> ,	a verb
<i>we</i> ,	a pronoun
<i>pervert</i> ,	a verb
<i>it</i> ,	a pronoun
<i>to</i> ,	a preposition
<i>the</i> ,	an article
<i>worst</i> ,	an adjective
<i>purpose</i> ,	understood, a noun
<i>of</i> ,	a preposition
<i>purposes</i> ,	a noun.

But the most important part of BOOK I., is the CONSTRUING which it teaches. CONSTRUING is the analysis of Sections as the *trunks*, and *branches* of sentences.

[Moses smote the rock] (with his most sacred rod.)

This sentence contains two distinct *Sections*. The first, is called the *trunk* section. [Moses smote the rock.]

The second, is styled the *branch* section. (*with his most sacred rod.*)

Now, as "*Moses smote the rock*," is the *trunk* section of the entire sentence, so *Moses*, and *rock* are the *trunk* words of the *trunk* section. *Moses, rock*.

And, as "*with his most sacred rod*," is the *branch* section of the sentence, so *smote*, and *the* are the *branch* words of the *trunk* section. *Smote, the*.

And, as *rod* is the *trunk* word of the *branch* section of the entire sentence, so *with*, *his*, *most*, and *sacred*, are the *branch* words of the *branch* section. *With, his, most, sacred*.

1. The entire sentence : [*Moses smote the rock*] (*with his most sacred rod*.)
2. The *trunk* section of the sentence : [*Moses smote the rock*.]
3. The *trunk* words of the *trunk* section : [*Moses, rock*.]
4. The *branch* words of the *trunk* section : *smote, the*.
5. The *branch* section of the sentence : (*with his most sacred rod*.)
6. The *trunk* word of the *branch* section : *rod*.
7. The *branch* words of the *branch* section : *with, his, most, sacred*.

The *division* of a *sentence* into sections, cannot be thoroughly discussed in *this* place. But, narrow as the author's space is here, he cannot dismiss the subject without saying that however unimportant Book I. may seem to the cursory reader, it must be of great moment to the *thinking* teacher. They who reject Book I. must remain in the dense cloud which, whether it rises out of the subject itself, or out of the *numerous gross* absurdities with which the old school Grammarians have marred it, can never be removed *without the aid of this work*.

CHAPTER VII.

THE OLD THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR NOT A SYSTEM.

THAT the old theory of English Grammar is not a *system*, is obvious to all who have learned it. How, then, it may be asked, does it happen that so many admire it? They that admire the old theory of English grammar, do it not because they find any thing in it, worthy even of approbation, but because they find a high degree of *mystery* about it. Any other thing equally mysterious, is as well calculated to gain the admiration of these persons. I could give the names of hundreds who teach by this theory, and who say that they like to teach English Grammar much better than any other branch. But these persons teach this theory, not because they *do* understand it, but because they *do not*. There is something *mysterious* in this theory of *rough names*, *contradictory principles*, and *bewildering long notes*, which acts as a charm even upon the *reason* of some. In this, there is nothing strange: human beings, in general, almost revere in adult age, what they acquire in childhood. This is particularly the case when the thing acquired, is a *theory* taught from a book in general use. Children are inclined by nature, to adopt whatever is advanced in books, as true. And adults are inclined by nature, to "*hold on*" to whatever they bring up with them from the nursery, and the school-room. This accounts for the tenacity with which so many hold to an old theory long after they become *convinced* that the theory cannot sustain them. In general, both teacher, and pupil, in *grammar*, are dependent upon mere *book* authority. Should it be laid down by an author of an *arithmetic*, that *five* with *four*, are *fifteen*, neither teacher, nor pupil would believe it upon the *authority* of the book.

But, in grammar, whatever the *book* says, is true to the letter! In *arithmetic*, there are principles which can be understood; and which, when applied, will decide whether *five* with *four* are fifteen. In grammar, however, the only principles which can be understood, are the *dictums* of the book!—And the only process of *reasoning* consists of reciting *false rules*, *definitions*, *notes*, *observations*,—and *exceptions*, from *Murray*, *Ingersoll*, *Bullions*, *Comly*, *Webster*, *Smith*, *Kirkham*, *Goold Brown*, *Frost*, &c., &c., &c.

Would the prediction of fifty *false* prophets, establish it in the minds of the people, that JOHN JONES is to be *translated*? Or would the declarations of fifty *blind* men establish it as a fact, that a *white* horse is a *black* one?!

I will not say that I have demonstrated that these *grammar menders* have no *eyes*—but I am entirely mistaken if I have not

proved, that if they have any, they have made little, or no use of them!!

The English language has *constructive* principles. It is the province of a maker of an English Grammar, to explain these principles, and to construct his theory upon them.

The old theory of English grammar, is denominated a *system*. This, however, is a gross misnomer; it bears no analogy to a *system*. In a *system*, the classes of the same set, are all formed in reference to the same trait of character in the thing. That is, in the general classification of things, words, principles, or ideas, every class is formed in reference to the same principle, the same characteristic, the same *ear-mark*. And in each *sub classification*, each class is formed in reference to the same *ear-mark* to the thing.

Botany is the science of the *structure, functions, properties, habits, and arrangement* of plants. But a theory on this science, which does not adopt a *uniformity* in the plan of classification, is any thing but a *system*. For instance—were some of the *general* classes formed in reference to the *structure*, and others in reference to the *functions*, of plants, the theory would not be a *system*. *Uniformity* in classification, is absolutely essential to *system*—indeed, *uniformity* is *system* itself. Have the old school Grammarians observed a *uniformity of basis* in their classification of words as parts of speech?

Noun.

Verb.

Adverb.

Conjunction.

Participle.

Article.

Adjective.

Preposition.

Pronoun.

Interjection.

Here are ten classes in one *set*—yet no two classes in the set, are formed in reference to the *ear-mark*, the same *trait* of character.

1. The NOUN is defined in reference to the *name* character of a word.

2. The ARTICLE is defined, not in reference to the *name* character of a word, but in reference to a *limiting* power which it is said to exert over other words.

3. The VERB is defined in reference to the *being, action, and suffering*, which it expresses.

4. The ADJECTIVE is defined in reference to *adjection, and quality*.

5. The ADVERB is defined in reference to “*how, when, and where*.”

6. The PREPOSITION is defined in reference to *relation*.
7. The CONJUNCTION is defined in reference to *connection*.
8. The PRONOUN is defined in reference to the *prevention* of the *repetition* of the noun.
9. The PARTICIPLE is defined in reference to its *participation* of the nature of a *verb*, and *adjective*.
10. The INTERJECTION is defined in reference to the *position* which it occupies with respect to other words, and to the *ideas* which it expresses.

The different principles in reference to which these ten classes are formed.

1. *Name* character of a word.
2. *Limiting* power over other words.
3. *Being*, *action*, and *suffering*. (Three.)
4. *Adjection*, and *quality*. (Two.)
5. *How*, *when*, and *where*. (Three.)
6. *Relation*.
7. *Connection*.
8. *Prevention* of repetition.
9. *Participation* of two natures!
10. *Position*, of words, and character of ideas. (Two.)

As the verb is defined in reference to three things—the adjective, in reference to two—and the adverb, in reference to three, the number of things as here indicated, is augmented to *sixteen*. These ten classes, then, which *system* requires to be formed in reference to one thing, are formed in reference to sixteen!! And these sixteen things in reference to which this one set of classes is formed, are as *dissimilar* as any two things which can be mentioned!!! This is *uniformity*.—this is *system* indeed! If one class is formed in reference to the *name* character of words, each class of the set of classes should be formed in reference to this character. And, if all these classes cannot be defined in reference to this character, no one should be.

I have discussed the *manner* of forming each of these classes fully in another part of this work—hence I shall say nothing more in this place of this *error* of classification.

The old theory of English grammar is denominated a *system*. But this is a gross misnomer. In a system, the classes of the same set, are all formed in reference to the same trait of character. Any classification of words, which is not formed upon this principle, is *confusion*,—not *system*!

1. NOUN.

“A noun is the *name* of something;” as,

Book, John, London, Virtue, Accuracy.

Upon what principle is a word called a *noun*? The principle is the *name* character of the word.

2. ARTICLE.

“An article is a word put before a noun, to show the extent of its meaning; as, *a man, the man.*”—BULLIONS.

This definition conveys no allusion to the *name* character on which the noun is defined.

That the absurdity of this way of classing the words of a language, may be fully seen, let it be asked what would be thought of a teacher of a Seminary, who should attempt to make a classification of the pupils of his institution upon totally dissimilar principles. For instance—the pupils who study grammar, he classes in reference to this study, and denominates them the

Grammar Class.

But, them who study *geography*, he classes, not in reference to this study, but in reference to their ages!!!

Thus, instead of having a *Grammar* class, and *Geography* class, the teacher has

1. A *Grammar* class, and

2. An *age* class!!!

What man, what child, does not see that if one is a *Grammar* class, the other is a *Geography* class?

1. A noun is the *name* of a thing; as, *John, London, book.*
BULLIONS.

An article is a word put before a noun, *to show the extent* of its meaning; as, *a man, the man.*—BULLIONS.

That is, they that study grammar, are a *Grammar* class, but they that study geography, are an *Age* class!!!

3. ADJECTIVE.

“An adjective is a word added to a noun to express its quality; as, *a good boy.*”—BULLIONS.

Here the principle of classing words, is changed again. In the definition, no allusion is made to the showing of the *extent* of the *meaning* of the noun!! An article is a word which is put before a noun to show the noun's *extent* of meaning; as, *a man, the man.*

But an adjective is a word added to a noun to express the noun's quality; as, *a good boy*!!!

4. PRONOUN.

"A pronoun is a word used instead of a noun; as, John is a good boy; *he* is diligent in *his* studies."—BULLIONS.

Here too we find another *distinct* principle of classification. Here the principle of classing bears no analogy to that on which the noun is defined,—to that on which the article is defined,—nor to that on which the adjective is defined!

A pronoun is used instead of a noun; as, "He promised to come, *which* he did not do."

(Is *which* here used instead of a noun, or instead of a verb!!!?)

5. VERB.

A verb is a word that expresses an *action*, or *state*; as, I *write*, you *sit*, he *sleeps*, they *are*."—BULLIONS.

Another change in the principle of classing words! The idea of substitution is entirely rejected: *action*, and *state* are here made the basis of classing words!

(We should be pleased to learn whether *resembles* falls under the idea of *action*, or *state*!?) We feel somewhat curious too to learn whether *will*, in the expression, "I *will* pay you soon," expresses *action*, or *state*!! In this case *will* appears to express a *promise*!!!) BULLIONS' English Grammar, p. 32!!!

6. PARTICIPLE.

The participle is a part of the verb which contains no affirmation, but expresses *being*, *doing*, or *suffering*; as,

John *being* a good pupil, his teacher thought much of him."—Bullions' English Grammar *being* worse than Murray's, we cannot recommend it.

Being is a *participle*—but as the participle is the part of the verb, which contains no *affirmation*, we trust that we shall not be charged with having *said* that Bullions' Grammar is worse than Murray's!

7. ADVERB.

"An adverb is a word joined to a *verb*, an *adjective*, or to another *adverb*, to modify or denote some circumstances respecting it; Ann speaks *distinctly*; she is *remarkably* diligent, she reads *very correctly*."—BULLIONS.

Here too is new ground. But it may be said that it is utterly impossible to class all words in reference to the same thing. We shall discuss this point in its proper place. Still we will simply enquire here whether *reads* is not as much the *name* of the action as is *Ann* the name of the agent—whether *correctly* is not as much the *name* of the *manner* in which she reads, as is *reads* the name

of her action ; and whether *very* is not as much the *name* of the degree of her manner as is *correctly* the name of the manner itself ?

8. PREPOSITION.

“A preposition is a word which expresses the relation in which a substantive stands to a verb, or to another substantive in the same sentence ; as, *Before* honour is humility ; they speak *concerning* virtue.”—BULLIONS.

Nothing of the old ground is here seen : Behold old things have passed away—all things have become new !

9. CONJUNCTION.

“A conjunction is a word which joins words, and sentences together ; as, You and I must study ; *but* he may go, *and* play.” BULLIONS.

10. INTERJECTION.

An interjection is a word which expresses some emotion of the speaker ; as, *Oh ! What* a sight is here ! *Well done !*—BULLIONS.

Thus we have given not only *ten different* principles in reference to which the ten parts of speech are defined, but the definitions themselves. The ten principles are not only entirely foreign to the subject of grammar, but totally different from one another. The *irrelevancy* of the principles to the subject of grammar, and the heterogeneousness of them may be well illustrated by the following principles on which a distinguished pedagogue classed the pupils of his school.

1. *Age* of the child !
2. *Height* of the child .
3. *Weight* of the child !
4. *Colour* of the child's coat !
5. *Extent* of the child's family connection !
6. *Kind* of food most desired by the child !
7. *Form* of the child's nose !
8. *Distance* which the child lives from the school house !
9. *Health* of the child !
10. *Number* of pigs possessed by the child's father.

Ridiculous as this may appear to the reader, we assure him that it is a fair illustration of the old theory of English grammar.

“Age ! has age any thing to do with the classification ?” Nothing—nor has the *name* character of a word any thing to do with its *part of speech* character. As every pupil must have *age*, so every word in a language, must possess the *name* character ! If you show us a word which is not the name of something, you will exhibit the *fifth* wheel to a coach. What enables a word to be a

name? It is the *sign* character. Do not all words have the *sign* character? What says the following definition?

“Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas.”

Who disputes the soundness of this definition of words? Does any one? Can any one!? All words, then, are *signs*. And, as no word has any thing but the *sign* character which this definition gives to all words, to enable it to become a name, how can *book* become a name any more than *behind*? If one word can become a name by virtue of its *sign* character, cannot all words become names by virtue of their *sign* character? And, if one word can become a noun by virtue of its *name* character, cannot all words become nouns by the same means!? Why, then are not all words nouns!?

It seems from the following extract that DR. WEBSTER holds that the *part of speech* trait of character is founded in *nature*:

“Thus the distinction between the sexes, between things and their *qualities*, between the names of *substances*, and of their *actions*, or *motions*, between *unity*, and *plurality*, between *present*, and *future* time, and some other distinctions are founded in *nature*, and gives rise to different species of words, and to various *inflections* in all languages.”

Let us now ask this simple question: *what is founded in nature*? The *distinction* between the *sexes* is founded in nature. What else is founded in nature? The distinction between *things* and their *qualities*, is founded in nature. This is all very true: but while nature makes these distinctions in her works, she points out no exact method to man by which he is to *express* these *distinctions*. In very many instances indeed the distinction of sex in our language must be sought from the context itself, from the nature of the proposition, from the circumstances of the case.

True, nature makes a distinction between the *quality* and its *subject*. But nature does not point out the means by which men shall express this distinction! This distinction is expressed in different ways in different languages. And even in the same language there is a variety of ways of expressing this very distinction! The distinction is one thing; the method of expressing it is another. With the distinction itself nature has every thing to do—but with the means of expressing this distinction nature has nothing to do! For instance: In the following words, and forms of words, we find nine modes of expressing the quality of *accuracy*: *correctness*, *correct*, *correctly*, *accuracy*, *accurate*, *accurately*, *propriety*, *proper*, *properly*.

But it is said by Dr. Webster in the subjoined part of his sentence which he offers as a definition of grammar, that these distinctions give rise to different species of words :

“And give rise to *different* species of words, and to various inflections in all languages.”

Is it possible that the distinctions which nature has made in her works, give rise to *different species* of words, and various *inflections*? *Accuracy* denotes a *quality*; yet *accuracy* is a noun; *pen* denotes, not a quality but an instrument; yet *pen* is a noun! *Accurate* denotes a quality, and *accuracy* denotes a quality; yet, *accurate* is an *adjective*, and *accuracy* a *noun*!

If Dr. Webster's doctrine is sound, all words denoting qualities, should be of the same species, or of the same part of speech! But is it so? Examine for yourselves :

QUALITY.

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------|
| 1. <i>Accuracy.</i> | Noun. |
| 2. <i>Accurate.</i> | Adjective. |
| 3. <i>Accurately.</i> | Adverb. |

But Mr. Webster does not stop here: he proceeds as follows :

“The distinction between the names of *substances*, and the names of their *actions*, or *motions*, give rise to different species of words, and to various inflections in all languages.”

This is so far from the truth, that the very same word which is the name of the substance is the name of the *action* of the substance; this is not rare, but common.

Noun. Verb.

1. The *judge* will *judge* us all.

Noun. Verb.

2. This *man* will *man* the ship.

Noun. Verb.

3. That *ship* did *ship* the articles.

Noun. Verb. Noun.

4. *Love* will *love* *love*.

Noun. Verb.

5. This *plow* will *plow* well.

Noun. Verb.

6. His *order* will *order* him to return.

Noun. Verb.

7. *Water* does *water* the plants.

Noun. Verb.

8. My *note* will *note* that fact.

Noun. Verb.

9. This *punch* did *punch* the brad.

Noun. Verb.

10. This *pen* did *pen* these lines.

Let us now give some instances in which the name of the *action*, or *motion*, is a noun :

1. The *race* was run last week.
2. The *flight* of the bird was high.
3. *Investigation* is his employment.
4. He is never found in the *act* of *decursion*.
5. They are engaged in the act of *dedication*.

All the italic words in the above instances, and thousands of others, are the names of *actions*—yet these words are nouns. What, then, becomes of Mr. Webster's doctrine, that the distinction which nature has made between the substance, and its action, give rise to different species of words? It is not the *kind* of thing denoted, which determines the grammatical species of words. Words may denote *action*, and be *nouns*; they may denote *action*, and be *verbs*.

The dictionary import, the general signification of a word, is not the true basis for its grammatic classification. And I undertake to say that the *cause* of our present *destitution* of a correct system of English grammar, is the effect, may be found in the *error* which all have committed upon the very threshold of their essays to form a system of definitions, and rules for the full expression of the constructive principles of our language, to the juvenile mind. The import, the meaning of words, has been made by all Grammarians, the main principle for the classification of the words in a sentence. Hence, as nouns, verbs, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, adjectives, and adverbs, may signify the *same* ideas, the pupil, teacher, Grammarian, and philosopher, have ever been unable to find that clear line of distinction, which all Grammarians have attempted to draw in their classification of the words of a sentence. For instance: *of*, *my*, *John's*, *own*, *have*, and *owns*, all denote the idea of *possession*.

1. This is the hat *of* John. *Of*, a preposition.
2. This is *John's* hat. *John's*, a noun.
3. This is *my own* hat. *My*, a pronoun; *own*, an adjective.
4. They *have* three hats. *Have*, a verb.
5. They *own* three houses. *Own*, a verb.

II. The words, *resemble*, *resemblance*, *similar*, *similarity*, *like*, *likeness*, *analogous*, *analogy*, all denote the same general idea, viz. the relation, or quality of resemblance.

1. He *resembles* me. *Resembles*, a verb.
2. There is a *resemblance* between us. *Resemblance*, a noun.
3. This is a *similar* circumstance. *Similar*, an adjective.
4. There is a *similarity* between those books. *Similarity*, a noun.
5. These two books are *like* mine. *Like*, an adjective.
6. The *likeness* between them is obvious. *Likeness*, a noun.
7. The cases are *analogous*. *Analogous*, an adjective.
8. The *analogy* between the cases, is clear. *Analogy*, a noun.

III. It is said a verb signifies *being*, or *action*, or some *state* of being. But many nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and even interjections express the same things.

1. An adjective denotes action ; as, a *quivering* leaf, *running* water, *flying* clouds, a *breathing* body.

Adjectives denote some state ; as, I am *well*, she is *sick*, he is *dead*, they are *safe*, we are *afraid*, John is *alive*.

2. Nouns denote some state ; as, He is a man of *grief*, he is a man of *sorrow*, he is in great *distress* of mind, and body, I have great *misery*, I am in constant *fear*.

3. Prepositions denote some state ; as, he is *under* a millstone, he is *under* a tyrant, I am placed *over*, not *under* these men, he is *in* good heart.

4. Adverbs denote some state ; as, he is *out* of temper, he fell *out* with his friend, he fell *in* with this gentleman in June last, one is, but the other is *not*. Here *not* signifies a state of non-existence.

IV. Nouns, and adjectives may denote the same ideas ; as, a man of *virtue*, a *virtuous* man, a man of *merit*, a *meritorious* man, he is a man of *worth*, he is a *worthy* man.

V. Nouns, and adverbs denote the same ideas ; as, he writes with *accuracy*, he writes *accurately*.

VI. Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs denote the same ideas ; as, he is a man of *merit*, they *merit* praise, he is a *meritorious* man, he conducted himself *meritoriously*.

Now, is there any one who can not see from the preceding exhibition, that the British English grammarians have attempted what can never be accomplished ; namely, a consistent classification of words upon their significations ?

There is much contention among grammarians respecting the *number* of the parts of speech. Some of the old school contend for *six*, some for *eight*, some for *nine*, and some for *ten*. Now, as the number of the parts of speech must necessarily depend upon the principle of classification, there may be but *one* part, and there may be as many parts as there are words in a language. If words are classed upon their exact dictionary import, the English language would have *seventy*, or *eighty thousand* parts of speech. But, if words are classed upon the number of syllables which each word contains, there would be but *four* parts of speech, viz., *monesyllable*, *dissyllable*, *trisyllable*, and *polysyllable*.

Specimen of Parsing.

He *surely* understands geography.

He	-	-	-	a monosyllable.
sure-ly	-	-	-	a dissyllable.
un-der-stands	-	-	-	a trisyllable.
ge-og-ra-phy	-	-	-	a polysyllable.

No word can be found which does not fall into one of the above classes.

The above is one among a thousand bases on which words may be classed; each basis giving a different number of parts, or classes. But among all these bases of classification, there is but one which is sound; there is but one which is calculated to give the true *constructive principles* of our language; that one is the *frame-work philosophy* of a sentence.

1. A sentence is a frame-work of signs, employed by men for the communication of their ideas.

2. Grammar is a science which treats of the constructive principles of a sentence.

To *construct* is to build, to form. The word, *construct*, is derived from the Latin elements, *con*, together, and *struo*, to arrange, to pile up. Hence, it is natural enough, that *construct* should mean the process, or act, of placing the parts of a thing according to some fixed principles of arrangement.

The word, *construction*, may mean the act of building, or forming; it may mean also the particular *form* which the thing receives from being constructed; and it may mean the *manner* in which the constituent parts of the thing constructed, are put together

Perhaps, you will ask whether the word *grammar*, is synonymous with the word, *construction*. The word, *construction*, is no

more synonymous with the word, *grammar*, than the word, *boy*, is with the word, *Nathaniel*.

Boy.

Nathaniel.

“*Boy*,” is *general* in its application—it means not only the same being to which the word, *Nathaniel*, applies, but it includes all the other beings of the same class. “*Construction*,” like *boy*, is *general*; but “*grammar*,” like *Nathaniel*, is *special*, *particular*.

General { *boy*.

Particular { James,
Joseph,
Nathaniel.

General { *colour*.

Particular { red,
yellow,
blue,
black,
scarlet.

General { *construction*.

Special { architecture,
mechanism,
organization,
anatomy,
grammar.

1. If the construction belongs to a *house*, we call it, if we speak *literally*, (the construction) *architecture*.

2. If the construction belongs to a *machine*, we call it *mechanism*.

3. If the construction belongs to *trees*, or *plants*, we call it *organization*.

4. If the construction belongs to an *animal body*, we call it *anatomy*.

5. If the construction belongs to a word, or a sentence, or to a language, we call it *grammar*.

We speak of the *architecture* of a house, a temple, a bridge, a fortification, &c., as *fine*, or otherwise. But we never speak of the *mechanism* of a house. Nor do we speak of the *anatomy* of a watch, or the *grammar* of a clock: we say the *mechanism* of a watch, the *mechanism* of a clock. Nor do we say the *organization* of a word, the *organization* of a sentence, the *organization* of a language. We say the *grammar* of a *word*, the *grammar* of a *sentence*, the *grammar* of a *language*.

“A Language is a *frame-work* of signs, used by men for the communication of their ideas.”

In what way language is a *frame-work*, grammarians of the old school seem unable to comprehend. They appear to be *willing* to understand no system which is not composed of *actors, actions* and *objects* ! Now, actors, actions, and objects may hold a conspicuous place in a system of *metaphysics* ; yet how they can become parts of a system of grammar, is not so very clear. But, is it not strange that these Grammarians, after making actors, actions, being, and objects, the principal parts of their theory, should proceed upon the ground that language itself is an *abstract nothing*, and a sentence the mere child of the imagination ? Language, considered in its true character, seems to be as tangible as a clock ; and a sentence as much a piece of mechanism as a watch. A sentence is a frame-work of words. A word is a sort of house, a kind of temple, constructed of sound, ink, paint, metal, or other matter, and is occupied by the *meaning*, the *signification* itself. Thus a sentence is a little *village*, a cluster of buildings, various in their shape, size, and occupants. Thus, too, while a chapter is a whole ward of a verbal city, and a sentence one block of houses in this ward, a whole book is the entire city, peopled by those significant citizens that are engaged exclusively in the commerce of ideas. Language, then, is a frame-work whose constructive principles are not derived from *actors, actions, and objects* ; therefore, it can never be developed by any system of grammar which makes these its foundation. Grammar concerns the construction of the language, not the actors, actions, and objects which the words of a sentence denote. Hence, he who attempts to make a book to unfold the grammar, the mechanism of any language, should confine himself to constructive principles. To say what a word in any sentence *means*, is to leave the frame-work, the architecture of the house for its occupants. Bear this in mind : the Grammarian is not to teach the nature of the *liquid*, but to illustrate the *construction of the vessel* ! In other words, it is not the province of the Grammarian to describe the fruit, but to teach the frame-work of the basket which contains the fruit.

Mr. Webster continues as follows :

“ The grammar of a particular language, is a system of *general* principles, derived from *natural* distinctions of words, and of particular rules, deduced from the customary *forms* of speech in the nation using that language.

The grammar of a *particular* language is not a system of *general*, but of *special* principles !

This system of principles is not derived from the *natural* distinctions of words. Indeed, if the distinctions among words, are the

production of nature, nature is without any *uniformity* whatever; for according to the sentence quoted above, she is *different* in different nations.

“The grammar of a particular language is a system of general principles derived from *natural* distinctions of words, and of *particular* rules deduced from the *customary* forms of speech in the *nation* using that language!”

But how can a system of *general* principles be deduced from *particular* forms?

Mr. Webster continues :

“These usages are mostly *arbitrary*, or *incidental*; but when they become common to a nation, they are to be considered as *established*, and received as rules of the *highest authority*!”

And yet this distinguished man has spent a long life in opposing these very rules!! Yes, in relation to these very rules he remarks:—

“It is the last effort I shall make to arrest the progress of *error* on this subject. It needs the club of a Hercules, wielded by the arm of a giant, to destroy the hydra of educational prejudice. The club and the arm I pretend not to possess, and my efforts may be fruitless; but it will ever be a satisfaction to reflect that I have discharged a duty demanded by a deep sense of the importance of truth. It is not possible for me to think with indifference, that half a million of youth in our schools are daily toiling to learn that which is not *true*. It has been justly observed that ignorance is preferable to *error*.”

In a preceding paragraph, Mr. Webster says, that these usages are founded in *natural* distinctions of words—yet in the sentence now under consideration, he says that the usages which constitute the grammar of a language, are “mostly *arbitrary* or *incidental*.”

“These usages are mostly arbitrary or incidental; but when they become common to a nation, they are considered as *established*, and received as rules of the *highest authority*.”

And yet Mr. Webster, in another book, holds the following language:

“In the gradual progress of language, many words acquire *new* meanings, while the old ones become *obsolete*. So numerous are such instances, that between *thirty and forty thousand* definitions are contained in this work, which are not known to exist in any other!!” (A house divided against itself cannot stand.)

We have now arrived at that place in the discussion of this subject where it becomes important to mention somewhat formally the true basis of a system of grammar. But before we do this, it may be well enough to ask the reader to give close attention to the following points :

1. The *constructive* character of a sentence.
2. The *significant* character of words.
3. The *relative* character of the things which are denoted by the words of the sentence.

1. The true basis of a system of grammar must depend upon which of the above characters, the author wishes to develop. If he desires to develop the *relative* character of the things which the words of a sentence, denote, the *foundation* of his system must be the *relative* character of these things.

2. If he wishes to develop the *significant* character of the component parts of a sentence, the foundation of his system must be the *dictionary* import of words.

3. But, if he wishes to develop the *constructive* character of a sentence, and of its component parts, the foundation of his system must be the *constructive*, the *frame-work*, philosophy of a sentence.

He must not begin by affirming that "a verb is a word which signifies, *being*, *action*, or *suffering*." The *lexicographer* proclaims the *signification* of words! Let the Grammarian publish their *construction*.

Nor must he begin by affirming that the nominative case is the name of the *agent*, the *actor*, the *subject*! Let the Grammarian speak of the aid which the *nominative* noun renders the verb in forming a diction, in the production of the sentence character. Whether the nominative case denotes the agent, the object, or neither, is no part of the Grammarian's province to decide! The relative character of the things denoted, is no part of grammar.

But to be more formal : what does a system of grammar profess to teach? Does it not undertake to teach the constructive character of language? How, then, can it succeed in this undertaking while it founds all its distinctions, classifications, and rules, not upon the constructive, but upon the significant character of words, and the relative character of the things denoted by words?

Mr. Murray, his predecessors, and successors, have undertaken to teach the constructive principles of the English language; and, incredible as it may appear, in all their attempts to accomplish this great object, they have founded their theories, not upon

construction, but upon the *signification* of words, and the *relation* of things!! That is, in their numerous attempts to form a system by which to teach the constructive character of a sentence, they have paid no regard to this constructive character; but they have founded a system partly upon the *significant* philosophy of the words of a sentence, and partly upon the *relative* character of the things which the sentence points out!

THE BASIS OF THE OLD THEORY.

1. The *constructive* character of a sentence.
2. The *significant* character of words.
3. The *relative* character of the things which are mentioned in a sentence.

CHAPTER VIII.—“PARTS OF SPEECH.”

WHAT is the meaning of the word, *parts*?

Particular division; distinct species, or sort belonging to a whole.—WEBSTER.

This is the only definition in any Dictionary which can justify this use of the word, *parts*.

“Distinct species or sort belonging to a *whole*.”

Belonging to a whole *what*? What whole is it which the old school Grammarians divide into nine, or ten *species, parts*? The following will answer the question:

“Parts of *speech*.”

Speech, then, is divided into nine species!!! There are nine *parts* of speech. That is there are nine *species* of speech!!!

Let us hear Mr. Bullions:

“The parts of speech in the English language, are nine, viz., Article, Noun, Adjective, Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Interjection, and Conjunction.”

What! Is an article a *species* of speech!? Is *a*, Is *the* a species of *speech*!!!?

1. A *command* is a species of speech:

“Go off,” “Return,” “Take off thy shoes, for the ground on which thou standest, is holy.”

2. An *affirmation* is a species of speech :

“ *And God said,*” Let there be light—“ *and there was light.*”

3. An *interrogation* is a species of speech :

“ *Does the sun shine ?*”

4. A *petition* is a species of speech :

“ *Forgive our sins !*”

5. A *subfirmation* is a species of speech :

“ *Thou canst make me whole if thou wilt.*”

The genus to which these five species of speech belong, is denominated *diction*.

The word, *parts*, is here used with much impropriety, or it is used in the sense of *species*—hence the phrase, “Parts of speech,” must be *species* of speech ! But a noun is not *speech* at all !

How, then, can a noun be a *species* of speech ! *Book* is a noun—but is *book* speech ! ?

As *parts* is used in the sense of *parts*, would it not be much better to say, *parts of words*.

In English, there are nine *parts* of words :

Article, Noun, Pronoun, Anjective, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Interjection, and Conjunction.

But is an article a *species* of speech ?

“ *Parts of speech.*”

In what sense is the word, *speech*, here used ?

This question is answered by Dr. Webster, who says that,

Speech means *Language*. A particular language, as distinct from others. “ *That which is spoken.*—WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY.

If *speech*, as used above, means *language*, the import of the head,—“parts of speech,” is *species of language*.

Hence the old school Grammarians mean, by *nine parts of speech*, *nine species of language* ; as, the Latin, the Greek, the French, the English, &c.

“ *Parts of speech.*” We presume that the old school Grammarians mean to express by this head, the idea of *classes of words*. This we infer, not from the language used, but from the nature of the subject. As grammar concerns words, it is natural to pre-

sume that in a theory of Grammar, the author would attempt to divide the words of the language upon whose *constructive* principles he writes, into classes. This presumption is the more natural from the consideration that almost every body knows that where there is not a throwing of things into classes, there is little science, or method.

It is the province of science to classify things upon the basis of their *analogies*. Things, however, can not be considered in *classes* without appropriate *class* names. Hence, when the terms which are used in analyzing, are the names of the things as *individuals*, and not as *classes*, there is a great want of scientific method, and scientific truth. That the old theory of English grammar, has no *class* names, will be evident from a little attention to the subject of classification itself. Hence it may be well enough to devote a few moments to the subject of classification before we attempt to demonstrate that the old theory of English Grammar is without this *vital* part.

We have already said that it is the province of science to make a distribution of things into classes. Hence, philosophers have divided all the objects of thought into genera. "ARISTOTLE made ten categories, viz., *substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation, and habit.*"

Things, however, are now considered in classes, under the following *class* names,—*Class, Order, Genus, Species, and Variety.*

We have not room for fixed definitions of these technical *family* names, as used in works of science. We must content ourselves with the observation that they are the *classifying* names of the various families of things, and beings, which are the subject of human contemplation. This method of disposing of the objects which surround us, is the work of *division*, and *subdivision*. The entire family, or race, is first divided into *classes*; each class is subdivided into *orders*; each order is subdivided into *genuses*; each genus is subdivided into *species*; and, if the classifying properties are not exhausted in the species, each species is subdivided into *varieties*. We will give a specimen of this scientific analysis in the following classifications of the letter, O.

O, a letter of the *Orbic Class, Perfect Order, Branchless Genus.*

Here the *Genus* cannot be subdivided into *species*, for the classifying properties on which this series of classification is instituted, are exhausted in the *genus*.

ALPHABETIC CLASSISCOPE.

The whole race.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z.

ORBIC		CLASS.	B C D G J O P Q R S U.
Perfect	}	Order	{ O Q B C D G J P R S U.
Imperfect			
Branch	}	Genus	{ Q O B D J P R C G S U
Branchless			
Stem			
Stemless			
Monopart	}	Species	{ J D P B R
Duopart			
Tripart			
D Branch	}	Variety	{ B R
Q Branch			

IN-ORBIC		CLASS.	A E F H I K L M N T V W X Y Z.
Rightangle	}	Order	{ E F H L T A K M N V W X Y Z
Acuteangle			
Monostem	}	Genus	{ E F L T H A K N V X Y Z W M
Duostem			
Monostem			
Duostem			
Unibranch	}	Species	{ L F T E X Y V A K N M W
Duobranch			
Tribranch			
Unibranch			
Bibranch			
Double A			
Double V			

Let us now give the analysis of Q.

Q, a letter of the *Orbic Class*, *Perfect Order*, *Branch Genus*.
(*No Species*.)

R, a letter of the *Orbic Class*, *Imperfect Order*, *Stem Genus*,
Tripart Species, and *Q Branch Variety*.

Let us remark again that where there is not a throwing of things into classes, there is little science; it is the province of science to classify things upon the basis of their analogies. Things, however, cannot be considered in classes, without appropriate *class* names. And where the terms which are used in analyzing, are

the names of the things as mere *individuals*, there is neither *method*, nor *truth*. For instance, the word, *be*, is not the name of a *class* of letters, but of an *individual* letter. The word, *O*, is not the name of a *class* of alphabetical characters, but the name of an *individual* character. This may be seen from the following attempt at a definition of the word, *be* :

1. The word, *be*, is the name of a *class* of letters in the English alphabet !

2. *B*, then, is a class of letters in the English alphabet !

3. *B*, is a *letter* in the English alphabet.

The word, *O*, then, is not a *class* name.

The phrase, *Orbic Class*, is a *class name*. This name not only includes *O*, but every other letter which has any *orbic* quality ; as, *B*, *C*, *D*, *G*, *J*, *O*, *P*, *Q*, *R*, *S*, *U*.

1. *Individual* name of *B* ; *Be*.

2. *Class* name of *B* ; *Orbic Class*.

If we have made the reader understand the principle on which science proceeds in analyzing, he will see a great want of science in the method of analyzing words by the old theory of Grammar. The technical terms that the old school Grammarians apply to the words which they parse, are not *class*, but *individual* names ! The word, *noun*, is the name of an individual word. This may be seen from the following :

1. A *NOUN* is a *class* of words, which is the name of any thing of which we can have a notion ! !

2. A *NOUN* is the name of any *thing* of which we can have a notion.

The word, *noun*, then, takes words as *individuals* ; whereas the technology which the Rational system proposes to substitute, considers words in *classes*.

“*Moses smote the rock.*”

The word, *Moses*, when taken alone, is called a *noun*, in the Rational system. But the class to which this word belongs, is called, *noun denomination*.

The word, *smote*, when taken alone, is called a *verb*. But the class to which this word belongs, is styled, *verb denomination*.

When the pupil parses a word, he necessarily mentions it by *name*. Having mentioned the word, the next step should be to *class* it. But it may be thought that when he applies *noun*, to the word which he is parsing he classes the word.

“*Man is mortal.*”

Man is a *noun*.

But, then, the application of the word, *noun*, to *man*, is not referring the word, *man* to its appropriate *class*. The phrase, a *noun* is a *class* of words, is not sense—how, then, can it be *science* ?

THE SUBSTITUTE.—A DENOMINATION OF WORDS.

A *Denomination* of words is a number of *verba* signs which have the same *characteristic* mark.

In English, there are ten denominations of words, viz.,

1. *Noun* Denomination.
 2. *Pronoun* Denomination.
 3. *Verb* Denomination.
 4. *Preposition* Denomination.
 5. *Conjunction* Denomination.
 6. *Adjective* Denomination.
 7. *Subadjective* Denomination.
 8. *Adverb* Denomination.
 9. *Subadverb* Denomination.
 10. *Interjection* Denomination.
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CHAPTER IX.—OF THE GENERALLY RECEIVED OPINION, THAT MR. MURRAY, IN COMPILING THE OLD THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, DESIRED TO CONFORM TO THE GRAMMAR OF OTHER LANGUAGES.

It is generally admitted that the theory of English Grammar, compiled by Mr. Murray, is not suited to the genius of the English language. And this unsuitableness is accounted for in the following manner :

It is pretended that it was the intention of Mr. Murray to construct his theory upon the principles of the Latin, to enable the English scholar to prepare through his own language, to enter upon the study of the Latin. But this reasoning, besides imputing a weakness to Mr. Murray, does an injustice to truth itself. For, what geographer in giving a description of the earth, would so far copy after a description of the moon, as to ascribe to the earth many parts, and peculiarities which belong exclusively to the MOON herself; more especially when it is considered that the sole inducement for such imitation would be a mere indirect preparation on the part of those who may happen to study the astronomy of the *moon*? Who does not see that this method must subject the student to very serious injury—of the earth, the very place which he inhabits, he has *false ideas*. But of the moon, a planet with which he has nothing to do, he has *correct* notions.

There are two languages, a *living* one, and a *dead* one—one in *general* use—the other in *limited* use.

The English being the *living* language, and the other the *dead*, the English being the one in *general* use, and the Latin being in very *limited* use; the English being studied by *all*, but the Latin by a mere few only, if only one of the two can be clearly, and truly presented, the English should have the decided preference. Both languages, however, may be described without any sacrifice of either. Mr. Murray openly disclaims any forced imitation—he declares in his Grammar, and more than once too, that the English is a language, peculiar to itself, and that it should have a Grammar suited to its own character. That great scholar had not the least inclination to compound for the sake of this pretended accommodation. The following is an extract from a review of Mr. Murray's Grammar—and with the sentiments here expressed, Mr. Murray was so well pleased, that he has given the extract a place in his work:

Under the head of Etymology, the author of this Grammar judiciously adheres to the *natural* simplicity of the English language, without embarrassing the learner, with distinctions peculiar to the Latin tongue."—*Analytical Review*.

And Mr. Murray himself, in speaking against the principle of *imitation*, remarks:

"That our grammar should conform to the grammar of the Latin and Greek, no further than *convenience and the IDIOM of our language require*."

Again says Mr. Murray:

"This would encumber our language with many improper terms, and a heavy and useless load of distinctions." "On the principle of imitating other languages in names and forms, without a correspondence in nature and idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions as well as a variety of cases for English substantives."

The following, taken from Mr. Murray's English Grammar, shows with what pertinacity he intended to adhere to the genius of the English language.

"The author of this work, long doubted the propriety of assigning to English nouns, an objective case." "The business of parsing, however, and of showing the connection and dependence of words, will be most conveniently accomplished by the adoption of such a case; and the irregularity of having our nouns sometimes placed in a situation, in which they cannot be said to be in any case at all, will be avoided."

Those therefore, who would object to a revolution in the present theory of English Grammar, upon the ground of a further *depar-*

ture from the Latin, act upon a principle which is strongly opposed by Mr. Murray himself.

The cases, as they now stand in English, are so very different both in name, and principles, that the student is much perplexed in attempting to acquire those of the Latin through his knowledge of those of the English.

ENGLISH.		LATIN.
<i>Nominative</i>	-	{ <i>Nominative.</i> <i>Vocative.</i>
<i>Possessive</i>	- -	<i>Genitive.</i>
<i>Objective</i>	- -	{ <i>Accusative.</i> <i>Ablative.</i> <i>Dative.</i>

Every language should be taught upon its own principles—and unless this is the case, no person can acquire a critical knowledge of any.

It may be said that although the cases in English afford the student in grammar, little, or no aid in the Latin, yet the technical names of the parts of speech in English, greatly assist him in the study not only of the Latin, but in other languages.

True, they who pass from the English to the Latin, are aided by the analogy in the technical names of the different classes of the words in both languages. It is not true, however, that they are *greatly* aided by this similarity; for any one of common verbal memory, can commit all the names of the ten parts of speech in half an hour, with ease.

But how *few* are they who ever study the Latin—and how *numerous* are they who study the English? If, then, the production of the greatest amount of good is to decide upon the expediency of introducing a few new, appropriate technicals, the point is decided in the affirmative with *acclamation*.

There are many who condemn a new word as soon as they find it has not received its alphabetic niche in a Dictionary. With such, all words of recent formation, are without comeliness, utility, and even existence, till they are scraped up by some lexicographer! Upon this principle, a merchant's goods are destitute of beauty, utility, and even of being, unless they are methodically placed upon his shelves! Mr. Webster, and many others, however, frankly denominate these *significant concretions*, words even before they have been taken into the *sanctum sanctorum* of the lexicographer! In speaking of the *number*, and *kind* of words,

which have been added to our language within a few years, Dr. Webster says :

5. "Terms in the arts, and sciences—of these some thousands have been added to our language within the last fifty years, of which a small number only, have found their way into any Dictionary." "An accurate definition of these terms in accordance with the advanced state of science at the present day, is now rendered important to all classes of readers by the popular character given of late, to the sciences, and the frequent occurrence of scientific terms and allusions in literary works. The exact number of these terms now introduced for the first time into a Dictionary, is not known. It cannot, however, be much short of four thousand." "Among them are some of the most common words in the language, such as *oxyd*, *muriate*, *sulphate*, *sulphuric*, *nitric*, *azote*, *phosphorus*, *phosphorescent*, *planetarium*, *polarize*, *polarization*, &c." Since the time of Johnson a complete revolution has taken place in almost every branch of physical science. New departments have been created, new principles developed, new modes of classification and description adopted."—*Advertisement of Webster's Dictionary*.

The best preparation which a pupil can have for his *future* studies, is a *critical* acquaintance with his *present* ones. And the best terms for the teacher, and the learner of any art, or science, are those which are truly appropriate in meaning, purely technical in character, and strictly uniform in application.

CHAPTER X. A SYNOPTICAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT.

NOTWITHSTANDING few subjects have received more attention than "English Grammar," a system has not yet been formed which suits the peculiar genius of the English language. Why have all attempts failed? Is the subject too intricate, too profound, for the distinguished scholars who have spent their days, and exhausted their learning upon it? Or has the time since this subject was first agitated, been too short for the accomplishment of the object in view? The author of this work is compelled to believe that neither the shortness of the time, nor the intricacy of the subject, can be urged as the reason why the world has not yet received a *correct*, *clear*, and *full* system of English Grammar. The *cause*, of which our present destitution of an English Grammar, is the effect, may be found in the ERROR which all have committed upon the very threshold of their books. The import, the

meaning of words, has been made, in all works on English Grammar, the main principle of classification. Hence, as nouns, verbs, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, adjectives, and adverbs, may signify the same ideas, the pupil, teacher, Grammarian, and philosopher have been unable to find that clear line of distinction, which all Grammarians have attempted to draw between the different families of words. For instance—*Of*, *my*, *John's*, *own*, *have*, and *owns*, all denote the idea of possession.

1. This is the hat *of* John. *Of*, a preposition.
2. This is *John's* hat. *John's*, a noun.
3. This is *my own* hat. *My*, a pronoun; *own*, an adjective.
4. They *have* three hats. *Have*, a verb.
5. He *owns* three hats. *Owns*, a verb.

II. The words, *resembles*, *resemblance*, *similar*, *similarity*, *like*, *likeness*, *analogous*, *analogy*, all denote the same idea; namely, the relation, or quality of resemblance.

1. He *resembles* me. *Resembles*, a verb.
2. There is a *resemblance* between us. *Resemblance*, a noun.
3. This is a *similar* circumstance. *Similar* an adjective.
4. There is a *similarity* between these two books. *Similarity*, a noun.
5. These two books are *like* mine. *Like*, an adjective.
6. The *likeness* between them is obvious. *Likeness*, a noun.
7. The cases are *analogous*. *Analogous*, an adjective.
8. The *analogy* between the cases, is clear. *Analogy*, a noun.

III. It is said that a verb expresses *action*, *being*, or some *state* of being. But, as so many *nouns*, *adjectives*, *adverbs*, and even *interjections*, express the same things, the above is not a definition of a verb.

1. An ADJECTIVE denotes action; as, a *quivering* leaf, *running* water, *flying* clouds, a *breathing* body.

ADJECTIVES denote some *state*; as, I am *well*, he is *sick*, she is *dead*, he is *safe*, he is *afraid*, he is *alive*.

2. NOUNS denote some *state*; as, he is a man of *grief*, he is a man of *sorrow*, he is in great *distress* of mind, and body, I have much *misery*, I am in constant *fear*.

3. PREPOSITIONS denote some *state*; as, he is *under* a mill-stone, he is *under* a tyrant, I am placed *over*, not *under* these men, and I must control them, he is *in* good heart.

4. ADVERBS denote some *state*; as, he is *out* of temper, he fell *out* with his friend, he fell *in* with this gentleman in June last; one is, but the other is *not*

NOTE.—Here *not* denotes a state of *death*, or non-existence.

IV. NOUNS, and ADJECTIVES may denote the same ideas ; as, a man of *virtue*, a *virtuous* man, a man of *merit*, he is a *meritorious* man, he is a *worthy* man, he is a man of *worth*.

V. NOUNS, and ADVERBS denote the same ideas ; as, he writes with *accuracy*, he writes *accurately*.

VI. NOUNS, VERBS, ADJECTIVES, and ADVERBS denote the same ideas ; as, he is a man of *merit*, he *merits* praise, he is a *meritorious* man, he conducted himself *meritoriously*.

Who from the preceding exhibition, cannot see that the British Grammarians have attempted what can never be accomplished ; namely, a consistent classification of words upon their signification.

A hypothetical tree, comprising as many parts as our language has words, each part yielding fruit, and the whole tree producing as many kinds of fruit as the British Grammarians have made parts of speech, may aid in giving a clear view of the erroneous course pursued by these distinguished scholars in forming the old theory of English Grammar.

Now, what construction, organization, is to the frame-work of this tree, grammar is to the frame-work of language. And, as the construction, the organization of the tree, is not the fruit which its component parts yield, so the grammar of a language, is not the *Dictionary* ideas which its words express. As grammar bears the same relation to language, which organization does to the tree, the proper course in forming a system of grammar, is to divide the words of a sentence, not according to their dictionary signification, but according to their constructive principles.

Would it not be absurd in forming a book from which to learn the construction of this tree, to make the classification of the different parts according to the kind of fruit, which each part yields ? This course would abandon the structure of the tree, and bring into the same class, parts, sustaining very different constructive characters. Would it be at all important, in presenting the mere frame-work of the tree, to ascertain how many kinds of fruit the whole tree yields ? Certainly not.

The British Grammarians, in attempting to form a system from which the *construction*, the grammar, of our language, may be acquired, have founded their whole theory, and practice, upon the *dictionary signification* of the words in a sentence. Or, to pursue the figure, they have founded their theory, not upon the *constructive* principles of this tree, but upon the particular *kind* of fruit, which its different parts yield !

Their first step has been, as is obvious from their principles, to

ascertain how many kinds of fruit the whole tree produces. These, they have ascertained to be ten—hence they have thrown the seventy thousand parts into ten classes, each part being classed, as they tell us, according to the kind of fruit, which it yields. The parts are :

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Apple-part, | 6. Pear-part, |
| 2. Peach-part, | 7. Citron-part, |
| 3. Plumb-part, | 8. Lemon-part, |
| 4. Cherry-part, | 9. Currant-part, |
| 5. Grape-part, | 10. Walnut-part. |

The first objection to this course is, that the theory abandons construction, which is the very science it sets out to teach! The second, is that the practice abandons the theory itself! for, in practice, the parts of the tree are not classed according to the kinds of fruit which they produce. For instance, the branches which produce apples, are not referred to the apple-part class, while those which do not produce this kind of fruit, are often referred to this class!

DEFINITIONS.

1. An Apple-part is a part which yields apples.

1. An article is a word prefixed to substantives to point them out, and show how far their signification extends; as, *a* woman, *an* eagle, *the* garden.

A, *an*, and *the* do not yield apples—yet these parts of speech, are referred to the apple-part class. That is, *a*, *an*, and *the* do not point out, do not show how far the signification of their nouns extend—yet *a*, *an*, and *the* are ranked as articles. Does *a* point out what woman is meant? Does *an* show what eagle is intended? And does *the* ascertain the identity of any garden? To show what woman is meant, *this*, *that*, *old*, *young*, *coloured*, or *white* might be used; as, *this* woman, *that* woman, *old* woman, *young* woman, *coloured* woman, *white* woman.

These words, however, which, to a greater, or less extent, do point out, are wrested from the class of articles, and forced into the class of adjectives. That is, these branches which actually produce apples, are compelled to leave their natural family, and take up their abode with *strangers*.

To show what eagle is meant, *bald* might be used—and to point out what garden is intended, *Washington* might be employed; as, *Washington* garden, *bald* eagle.

Now, *bald*, and *Washington*, do show how far the signification

of their respective nouns, extends. These *defining* words, however, are not referred to the *article* class; but, contrary to the theory (which is that the parts of the tree are to be classed according to the *kind of fruit*, which they bear) they are forced into other families!

In reply to these strictures upon this discrepancy in the grammatical disposition of *a*, *an*, and *the*, it may be said that it is not meant by the British Grammarians that *a*, *an*, and *the* point out without the aid of other words. Their definition of an article, however, does not call on other words to aid *a*, *an*, and *the*, in the work of measuring the noun's extent of application. But let this objection to these reflections stand—and what follows? why, that all words which can point out the noun's application, either alone, or by the aid of other words, are articles. And what adjective is there, which, by the aid of other words, cannot do this more minutely than *a*, *an*, or *the*?

Good boys that are properly educated, will become good men.

In this example, *good*, aided by the section, *that are properly educated*, shows to what boys the word, *boys*, reaches.

II. PEACH-PART.

A Peach-part is a part which yields fruit!

A substantive, or noun, is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion; as, *London*, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*.

As the definition of the peach-part, is universal in its application, so is that of a noun. As every part of the tree yields fruit, the definition of the peach-part embraces the whole tree. A peach-part is a part which yields *fruit*.

Now, as every part of the tree yields *fruit*, so does every word in the language express some idea. This is in accordance with Mr. Murray's *own definition* of words, which says that—"Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas."

How can a word be the *sign* of an idea, and not be the *name* of the idea? For example—The book is *under* the table.

As *under* is the *sign*, or *name* of a place, (of which we certainly can have a notion,) this preposition is a *noun*.

But it may be said that *under* expresses a relation. Be it so—For, if *under* expresses a relation, it must be the *name* of a relation—Because it is not possible for a word to express an idea unless it is the *name* of an idea—It is the *namitive* power of a word.

which enables it to express, or signify an idea. Hence, if a word has no *nominative* power, it can express no idea, and, in truth, is no word at all!

The substitution of *idea* for *thing*, would not change the import of the British definition of a noun—A noun is the name of any idea which we have of any thing that exists; as,

John, and Foster write letters with accuracy.

If the British definition of a noun, is sound, all the words in the above sentence, are nouns, for each is the *name* of something. As *and* is the first word in the sentence, which is not called a *noun*, it may be well to commence with this word. Why is not *and* a noun? Is not this conjunction the *sign*, the *name* of an idea? If not, why does the use of *or* change the sense? *John, or Foster writes with accuracy.* And, if neither *and*, nor *or* is a sign, a *name* of any idea, why does the omission of both these conjunctions, *change* the sense of the sentence?

John Foster writes letters with accuracy.

But it may be said that *and* does not mean a literal thing. This I grant, and while I concede this, I take occasion to remind the objector that *accuracy* does not mean a literal thing; that *virtue* does not mean a literal thing; and that *vice* does not mean a literal thing!! Nor indeed is there any word in the language which does mean a literal thing. Words express the ideas which men form of things. Hear Mr. Murray on this point:

“Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the signs of our *ideas*.”

The definition of a noun, to be strictly literal, should read thus—A noun is the name of any thing that exists; as, *London, man, virtue, vice.*

The word, *thing*, as here used, includes something more than pen, book, knife, &c., &c.; it must embrace whatever exists, whether it is a being, fact, circumstance, action, mode, relation, time place, &c.

“John, and Foster *write* with accuracy.”

The next word in this sentence, which is wrested in practice from the hands of the old theory, is *write*. *Write*, is the name, or the sign of an action; or it is the name of an idea which men have formed of the act of making letters with a pen, or pencil. Why, then, is not *write* a noun? Does not the definition say that any word which is the name, or sign of any thing that exists, or of which we have a notion, is a noun? And is not *write* the name, or sign of something of which we have a notion?

One of two things is certain, namely, either *write* is the name of the act of forming letters with a pen, or pencil, or this action has no name. But is this action a nameless action? Do not men know by what name to call it? Do they not at this advanced stage of things, know by what word, by what sign, by what name to designate this action which they so frequently perform?

“*With.*”

If *with* is not the sign, the name, of an idea, why is it employed in the expression of ideas? And if *with* has no definite meaning of its own, why is it that the substitution of *without*, produces so great a *change* in the *sense* of the sentence?

With is the sign that the quality of which *accuracy* is the name, belongs to the letters. But *without* is the sign, the name of the fact that this quality does not belong to them. Or in other words, *with*, is the name, or sign, of the idea of the presence of the quality which is denoted by *accuracy*. But *without* is the name of the idea of the absence of this quality.

Take the word, *nothing*, in the following case:

He went: but he saw *nothing*.

Is *nothing* the name of a thing? Just as much as *without* is, and no more. *Nothing* is the name, or sign of the idea which we form of the absence of something—and *without* is the name, or sign, of the idea which we form of the absence of something. If *nothing* is a noun, why, then, is not *without*?

III. PLUM-PART.

A Plum-part is a part which yields plums.

A verb is a word which signifies, *being*, *action*, or *suffering*: as, “*I am, I rule, I am ruled.*”

I find thousands of words which signify *being*, *action*, and *suffering*, that are not called verbs.

That is, there are thousands of the branches of this tree, actually bearing plums, that are not referred to the plum-part family. For instance:

The *existence* of man is short: but the *being* of God is eternal. Man runs a short *race* here, he is seized with *pains*: he expires in the *pangs* of disease.

Do not the nouns, *existence*, and *being*, express being? Why, then, are they not *verbs*?

Does not *race* express action? Why, then, is not this common noun, a *verb*?

Do not the words, *pains*, and *pangs*, signify suffering? Why, then, should not these common nouns be yielded up to the definition of the verb, which imperiously demands them as its own?

Nor is this all,—for there are many parts of this tree, which do not bear plums, that are actually referred to the plum-part class; as,

1. John *resembles* his mother.
2. The papers *are* extinct.
3. Man *can* be just.
4. John *has* one acre of ground, which he *ought* to cultivate.

Resembles, *are*, *can*, *has*, and *ought*, do not express the ideas which the definition of the verb requires; hence these words are not verbs by the authority of the definition. Here, then, is the double absurdity of withholding branches that yield plums, from the plumb-part class, and of referring the branches which do not bear this kind of fruit, to this class.

IV. CHERRY-PART.

A Cherry-part is a part which yields cherries.

An adjective is a word which is added to a noun to express its quality; as,

1. He is a *good* boy.
2. They are *fine* children.

In considering this definition, it seems important to make a remark, or two upon the word, *add*.

To *add*, says the Dictionary, “is to join something to that which was *before*.” This is not only the language of the Dictionary, but that of sound sense, and universal usage. We cannot even think of adding any thing unless there is something *already* placed, to which we may add. No man talks about building an *additional* house unless he has one *already* up. Under this view of the subject, let me inquire which are the added words in the following assemblages:

1. “He is a good boy.”
2. “They are fine children.”

In the vocal, as well as in the written formation, of the above sentences, *is*, *a*, *good*, and *boy*, would be *added* words—because, they must be introduced in addition to *he*, the first word spoken, or written.

In the second sentence also, the words, when spoken, or written, in the formation of the sentence, must be divided into added,

and unadded. *They* is the unadded word, while *are*, *fine*, and *children*, are the added ones.

But as the words of a printed sentence, are all presented at the same point of time, a printed sentence can have no adjective! What, can one of two houses which have been erected at the same time be denominated an *additional* house? It cannot be; the distinction is without sense.

The word, *added*, not only indicates a state, but it implies the manner in which the state is produced. When the state of connection is produced in any manner different from that which the word, *add*, indicates the state is expressed, not by *add*, but by some other word; as, *junction*, *conjunction*, *connection*, *conjection*, &c.

Hence, when the right hand is put upon the left, the right hand is the added one. And this state of connection may be denominated adjection.—But, when both hands start from given points, and approximate till they come in contact, the state of connection thus produced, cannot be denominated adjection.

Small apples.

The only proof that *small* is an adjective, is derived from juxtaposition, nearness. And is not the word, *apple*, as near to the word, *small*, as *small* is to *apple*? If, then, juxtaposition constitutes *small* an adjective, both words are adjectives. As both words are presented at the same time, and one is as near to the other as the other is to it, what is it which can render one an *added* word more than the other? Is it replied that *small* is more an adjective than *apple* because *small* expresses a quality? The answer is that *small* does not fall within the first part of the definition of an adjective; for *small* is not an added word—hence, unless the mere fact of expressing quality, renders a word an adjective, how can *small* be an adjective? And if a word is an adjective merely from the fact of expressing quality, then the italic nouns in the following instances, are all adjectives:

1. He is a man of *virtue*.
2. This is a man of great *strength*.
3. The *roundness* of the ball.
4. The *smoothness* of the paper.

Does not the noun, *virtue*, express a quality of the man? Does not *strength* also denote a quality of the man? Does not *roundness* denote a quality of the ball? And does not *smoothness* signify a quality of the paper? What, then, becomes of that definition of an adjective, which is founded upon the expression of a quality?

Watts, who has written much upon the subject of qualities, says : “ Motion, (yes, *action*,) shape, quantity, weight, &c., &c., are properties or modes of bodies, and that wit, folly, love, doubting, judgment, &c., &c., are modes, or qualities of the mind.”

Again says Watts : “ The term, *mode*, extends to all attributes whatever, including the most essential, and inward properties, and reaches even to *actions* themselves, as well as to the manner of action.”

A quality is defined by Watts, and others, in the following manner :

“ A mode, or quality, is that property which cannot exist in, and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and as subsisting by the help of some substance which, for this reason is called its subject.”

Thus the words, *solidity, brightness, similarity, roundness, softness, accuracy, action, thinking, thought, to think, motion, &c.*, all denote qualities, of some subject, upon which they depend for their existence.

But, let it be conceded that *small*, in the phrase, *small apples*, comes within the first part of the definition of an adjective. That is, grant that *small* is an added word : and what follows ? why, that all words which are added to nouns to express qualities, are adjectives. Now, all *verbs* are as much added to nouns as is *small*, or any other adjective—verbs in general too express quality—therefore by virtue of this definition of an adjective, verbs in general are adjectives !

Blair, in speaking of the verb, says :

“ The verb is so far of the same nature with the adjective, that it expresses, like the adjective, an attribute or property of some person, or thing—thus, when I say the sun shines, *shining* is the attribute ascribed to the sun.”—*Blair's Lectures*.

The same doctrine is taught by Beattie—who says : “ The verb, and adjective agree in this, both express qualities, or attributes.”

Thus it is asserted by these British oracles in English grammar, that *verbs* do express qualities, and that they are in this respect perfect adjectives.

Nor is Murray himself less clear in his expression of this doctrine. For in Etymology, he tells us that an adjective expresses the quality of a noun ; and, in his Syntax he informs us that the verb expresses a *quality* of the noun :

“The principal parts of a simple sentence, are the *attribute*, and the *object*; as, a wise man, *governs* his passions. Here, a *wise man* is the subject; *governs* the attribute; and *his passions* the object.”—MURRAY.

The only difference between the definition of an adjective, and that of a verb, arises from generalizing in one case, and particularizing in the other. In defining an adjective, Grammarians make it express all qualities; as, *good, bad, high, run, walk, &c.*

But in defining a verb, they particularize *being, action, and passion*, and that too in a way which interdicts the idea that *being, action, and passion*, are qualities! Thus, after including *all animals* in one definition, they define a horse in a way which indicates that a horse is not an animal of any kind!

Having included all qualities in the definition of an adjective, the proper course for the old school Grammar makers, and Grammar *menders* seems to be this:

A verb is an adjective added to a *noun*, to express the quality of *being, action, or suffering*.

CHAPTER XI.—THE OLD DEFINITION OF A NOUN.

I HAVE devoted several years to the subject of grammar—and the main part of my attention has been given to four points; namely, *truth*, and *error* in the science itself, and *right*, and *wrong* in the means of communicating it to others. And although I have read many books which professedly treat on this subject, I cannot bestow a very high encomium upon any. How much I have been benefitted by giving them a share of my attention for a few years I cannot tell. But, while I am constrained to say that the advantage which I have derived, is too small to be considered a fair compensation for my labour, I cannot withhold the expression of my surprise, and even astonishment, at the introduction of these works into our schools.

All the books through which I have *plodded*, seem to me to be founded upon detached principles of various sciences which are entirely unconnected with the subject of grammar. For example—action, yes, *motion* itself, is employed as one of the parts of these conflicting systems! Action, motion, however, is not a grammatical principle! Nor does the absurdity stop here, for even *actors* themselves have been brought into them, and been made to play no inconsiderable part in the grammar *farce*! And *being*, as

though these systems could hardly even exist without it, figures as a star of the first magnitude.

Now *action*, *agents*, and *being*, may hold a conspicuous place in a system of metaphysics, but how they can become parts of a system of grammar, is not very clear to me. But what is as much of a curiosity as any thing which these grammar *kaliedascopes* present, is the fact that their authors, after making *action*, *actors*, and *objects* the very foundation of their systems, proceed upon the ground that language is an *abstract nothing*, and a sentence, the mere child of the imagination! Whereas, language considered in its true light, seems to be as tangible as a clock, and a sentence as much a piece of mechanism as a watch. A sentence, indeed, is a frame-work of words! A word is a house, a temple, constructed of sound, ink, paint, metal, or other matter, which is occupied by the *meaning*, the *signification* itself!

Thus a sentence is a little village, a cluster of buildings, various in their shape, size, and occupants. Thus, too, while a chapter is a whole ward of a verbal city, and a sentence one block of houses, a whole book is the entire city, peopled by those significant citizens that are engaged exclusively in the commerce of ideas. Language, then, is a frame-work, and grammar the architectural principles upon which this frame-work is formed. Hence he who desires to make a book to be used in teaching grammar, should confine himself to *constructive* principles. To say what the word must mean to be of any particular class, is to leave the frame-work of the house, and attempt to say something of its occupant. Remember this—the mere Grammarian is not to teach the nature of the liquid, but the entire construction of the vessel. Or, it is not the province of the mere Grammarian to describe the fruit, but the frame-work of the basket which contains the fruit!

“A SUBSTANTIVE or NOUN is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion; as, *London man, virtue, vice.*”
MURRAY.

That Mr. Murray should have given the above as a definition of a noun, is really astonishing! If we compare it with his definition of words in general, we shall find the two to be the same in substance, and nearly the same in expression! Mark the universality of the above attempt at the noun's definition;

“A noun is the name of anything that exists!”

One is here led to ask, what are the names of things which do not exist, called ?!

“Or a noun is the name of that thing of which we have any notion.”

The name of the thing of which we have an idea, a notion, is a noun! But the name of the thing of which we have no idea, no notion, is not a noun!

By the old definition things are divided into four distinct classes, viz.,

1. Things which exist!
2. Things which exist not!
3. Things of which we have some idea!
4. Things of which we have no idea!

Every one who reads this definition of a noun with care, must see that it supposes things to be divided in this way. A noun is the name of any thing which *exists*, or of any thing of which we *have a notion*.

This definition of the noun compels the pupil to anticipate that the next part of speech will be defined as follows:

An adjective is the name of a thing which does not exist, or of a thing of which we have no notion!

The old school Grammarians define words as follows:

“Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas.”

Here they hold that all words are *signs*; and, as signs are neither more, nor less than *names*, they inadvertently say that all words are nouns! This truth, however, they deny when they come to the process of parsing.

1. “John writes letters accurately.”

John, a noun.
writes, a verb!
letters, a noun.
accurately, an adverb!

All the words in this sentence are *signs*, *names*; yet only two of them are parsed as nouns!

To say that *writes* is a *verb*, is to affirm that *writes* is not a *sign*, not a name, of any thing!

But who can not see that *writes* is as much the name of the action as is *John* the sign of the actor? If, then, *John* is a noun because it is a sign, a name, is not *writes* a noun?

By saying that *accurately* is an adverb, it is declared that this word is not a sign, not a name. But is there a child who can

read English, that can not see that *accurately* is as much the name of the manner of writing as is *letters* the sign of the things written?

2. "John put his hand behind his head."

John, a noun.

put, a verb!

his, a pronoun!

hand, a noun.

behind, a preposition!

his, a pronoun!

head, a noun.

1. Is not *put* the sign, the name of the action? Why, then, is not this word a noun?

2. Is not *his* the sign of an idea? Why, then, is *his* employed? Does not *his* express the same idea which *John's* would express was *John's* used in the place of *his*? And, would not *John's* be called a noun! Why, then, is not *his* a noun!? *John's* is the sign, the name, of John, in his possessive relation to the hand—and, as *his* is the sign, the name, of the same thing, why is not *his* as clearly a noun as is *John's*!!? *Behind* is the sign, the name of the place where John put his hand. And, as a noun is the name of any person, *place*, or thing, why is not this preposition a noun!!? Will it be said that *behind* is not the name of a place!? Reader, is not *behind* the sign, the name of the place in which it is said that John placed his hand? *Head* is the name of the thing—and *behind* is the name of a *place* which belongs to *that* thing!

The true sense of the definition of a noun as given by the old school Grammarians, is that,

A noun is the name of any thing whatever. And to this idea all Grammarians have adhered.—A word is what? A word is the *sign* of anything *whatever*. Hence, there is no difference between the definition of a noun, and the definition of all words. *Sign*, and *name* are the same in idea.

1. Words are articulate sounds, used by common consent as the *names* of our ideas.

2. A noun is the *sign* of anything of which we have a notion; as, *man*, *London*, *virtue*, *vice*, *behind*, *under*, *red*, *high*, *in*, *out*, *at*, *with*, *near*, *on*.

If, therefore, the definition which the old school Grammarians give of words, embraces all words, the definition which they give of a noun, includes all words!

"A noun is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have a notion."

We ask who can reconcile this definition to the constructive genius of any language?

The practice under this definition proceeds upon the absurd ground that all verbs, all adjectives, all articles, all prepositions, all conjunctions, all adverbs, and all interjections, are not signs of ideas. Yes, it is the bold, the inconsistent, ground of this definition of a noun, that all these classes of words are *redundant* parts of that glorious production whose beauty, power, and usefulness, are admired by man, and ascribed to God himself!

1. "Henry purchased *leather* in shoes."

2. "John purchased *leather* shoes."

"As Henry purchased *leather* in shoes, he must have purchased *leather* shoes." Or,

"As Henry purchased *leather* which was made into shoes, he must have purchased *leather* shoes."

1. "*Leather*," before *in* or *which*, is a noun.

2. "*Leather*," before *shoes* is not a noun, but an adjective.

Is not the word *leather* a sign, a name, in both places? This word is not only a sign, a name in both instances; but in both, it is the name of the same thing! Yes, here is a word which is the name of the very same thing, (the material of which the shoes are made) in both instances—yet in one the word is parsed as a sign, a name, a noun, while in the other it is parsed as an adjective!!!

Still the perplexed pupil is unblushingly told, both by teacher, and author, that the *name* of a thing is a noun!!

What is the difference between *virtue*, and *virtuous*?

1. "A woman of *virtue*."

2. "A *virtuous* woman."

A woman of *virtue* is a *virtuous* woman—and a *virtuous* woman is a woman of *virtue*. Yet *virtue* is called a noun—and *virtuous* an adjective! But why this difference in the manner of parsing these two forms of the same word? Does the definition of a noun answer this question?

"A noun is the *name* of something."

That is, a noun is the sign, of something. And is not *virtuous* the sign, the name of something? If not, *virtue* is not the name of any thing: *virtue*, and *virtuous*, express the same idea, the same thing. Hence, if *virtuous* is excluded from the noun family upon the ground that it is not the name of any thing, *virtue* is an illegitimate member of this family of words!

We admit that there is a grammatical difference between these two forms, of the same word. But we say that this difference should be expressed in the definition of the noun. The definition which expresses that *part of speech* trait of character, which is peculiar to the noun, must express that particular property which makes *virtue* grammatically different from *virtuous*.

Both *virtue* and *virtuous* are names. Hence the definition which is founded upon the *name* trait of character must include both forms.

When *virtuous* is used as a foundation name in the frame-work of a sentence, it is used in the primitive form ; as,

“ *Virtue* is commendable.”

But, when *virtue* is used as a mere branch, it is employed in one of its two derivative forms ; as,

“ *Virtuous* persons live *virtuously*.”

Virtue, virtuous, virtuously.

These are one word in three different forms. Under one of its forms, this word is not only able to sustain itself, but other words which may depend upon it ; as,

Inflexible virtue, Stern virtue.

But when *virtue* becomes *virtuous*, and *virtuously*, it resembles a drunken man : it can hardly stand alone ; as,

Virtuous.

The mind is driven to inquire—*virtuous* what ? What is *virtuous* ?

The word in this form is constantly reaching for some post, pump, chair, or wall, against which to lean !

Virtue, like the man before he is intoxicated, stands without reeling, without staggering ; as,

Virtue.

The mind sees that *virtue* can sustain itself—hence it is not engaged in searching for something on which virtue can rest.

When the word is in that form which enables it to sustain itself, and other words also, it is parsed as a noun ; as,

A woman of *virtue*.

But when it is in a form which deprives it of self-sustaining power, it is parsed as an adjective, or as an adverb ; as,

“ *Virtuous* persons live *virtuously*.”

Noun, noun! What a name for a word! "*Noun*," is derived from the Latin *nomen*, a name!!

Noun, and *name*, then, are synonymous. Hence the definition which the old school Grammarians give of a noun is as follows—

1. A *noun* is the *noun* of any thing which exists, or of which we have a notion! Or,

2. A *name* is the *name* of any thing which exists, or of which we have a notion!!

And as *nominative* is made from the Latin, *nomen*, *nominative* is much the same as *name*. Here then, are three technicals all derived from the same source—all having the same import; and all applied to one part of speech, to the confusion of both teacher and pupil.

"*John laughs.*"

John, a noun, in the nominative case to is!

That is, *John* is a *name*, in the *name* case to is!!

Noun is *name*—and *name* is *noun*—and *nominative* is as much *noun* as *name*!

The whole batch is <i>nonsense</i> .	{	name.
		noun.
		nominative.

Let us repeat the old definition.—

A NOUN OR SUBSTANTIVE is the name of any thing that exists, or of which we have any notion; as, Foster makes carding machines.

The words, *Foster*, and *machines*, are called nouns. And why? Because they are the names of things of which we have a notion!

And what is the word, *makes*, called? *Makes* is a verb! Why not a noun? Surely *makes* must be the name of an action of which Foster has a notion; for, how can he construct these complicated machines without a notion of the action which he performs?

"The last RACE was RUN by these two horses."

Race is a noun—but *run* is a verb!

Now reader, observe this.—The definition of a noun, and that of a verb, are founded upon the *signification* of the words which are called nouns, and verbs. And here are two words which signify the same action, yet one is called a *noun*, the other a *verb*! Yes, *race* is called a noun! But *run*, which denotes the same action, is called a verb!

That word which denotes a thing of which we can have a notion, is a noun; as, the last *race* was *run* by these horses!! But what is a verb? "A verb is a word which signifies *being*, *action*, or *suffering*; as, the last *race* was *run* by these horses!"

1. Which word denotes something of which we can have a notion—is it *race*, or *run*? Why both—then both are nouns! Which words denotes action? Both denote action—then both are verbs!

AGAIN—*For*, *to*, *from*, *through*, &c., are called prepositions.—By this fact, it seems that the old school Grammarians consider that these words are not signs, not the names of any thing which exist, or of which we have a notion. But a slight attention to the following illustration, will show that these words are the signs of things that exist, and of which, we have notions not less clear than are those which we form of "*London*, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*."

From :	Beginning.
Through :	Door.
To :	End.
For :	Cause.

From is synonymous with *beginning*, *through* with *door*, *to* with *end*, *for* with *cause*.

	from		through		to
John	rode	<i>beginning</i>	Philadelphia,	<i>door</i>	New Jersey,
	for				<i>end</i>
York,					<i>cause</i>

his brother.

Now, as these prepositions are evidently the names of things which exist, and of which we have a clear notion, we trust, that the friends to the old theory, will abandon this definition of a noun, or consent to call these prepositions, nouns.

Further,—“He writes **ACCURATELY**.”

“The pupil writes with **ACCURACY**.”

ACCURATELY is styled an *adverb*. This word, however, should, from the old definition of a noun, be called a noun. The word is the name of the *manner* of writing: and it follows that the mind has no idea of this manner, or that the word, *accurately*, is inaccurately named!

Waiving the misnomer in this case, let us examine the denomination of the word which denotes the same thing, in the following instance:

The pupil writes with *accuracy*.

Here, *accuracy*, is the sign of that for which *accurately* stands in the first instance. But is *accuracy* called an adverb? *Accuracy* is denominated a noun. Were we to take these classifications with the definition of the noun, as a rule of judging, must we not say that in the first instance, the mind has no idea of the *manner* of writing, while in the last, it has a clear, a distinct notion of it?

The definition of the noun, includes too much to comport with the parsing of the language. By the definition, all words are nouns; but in the solution of the language, a small part comes under the denomination of noun.

Accuracy, and *accurately* are two forms of the same word. The import of the word, is the same under both modifications. *Accuracy* differs from *accurately*, only in its degree of constructive importance in the section. *Accuracy* is employed as the *foundation* of the section, and is that to which the word *with* is appended.

Accurately in point of construction, is employed as a *branch* part of the section, and is two constructive degrees from the foundation of the section to which it belongs. *Accuracy* is the independent form; that is, a form in which the name is when it is used without requiring, or implying, a constructive dependence upon any other word. *Accurately* is the social, or dependent form, and implies, and requires constructive dependence upon another word of higher rank.

In the spirit of Mr. Murray's definition, both *accuracy*, and *accurately* are nouns; because, his definition is founded on the capacity of a word to denote *some idea*!

The definition in the Rational system, being founded on *constructive importance*, or mechanical independence, *accuracy* only, can become a noun. All the words denominated nouns in parsing the language, are exalted, and linked together by their *constructive* rank,—by their power to stand alone, and thus brought into the *same* family; hence, a definition of a noun, to include all words denominated nouns in the solution of the language, without embracing any more, must be founded on this constructive importance. A definition, founded on this, is a Hercules against the sophist, and a blazing torch in the hand of the learner.

We will fancy that the common definition of a noun is presented to a child; and, after he has fairly perused it, let it be supposed that the following sentence is placed before him, and that he is requested to select the nouns which it contains:

“Stephen built the red house; but Samuel, the yellow house.”

Now, then, as a noun is the name of any thing which we can see, feel, taste, or discourse of, would not the child be as likely

to call *red*, and *yellow* nouns as *house*? Or, will it be said that these adjectives are the names, the signs, of things which do not exist, of things that we cannot see? Perhaps, too, it may be replied, that these colours are *not things*; hence, *yellow*, and *red* cannot be nouns! We would ask those who reason thus, whether *virtue*, *vice*, *necessity*, *sweetness*, &c., are things? We would ask, too, whether a *man* is a thing? and whether *London* is a thing? The names, *London*, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*, &c., are nouns.

“A noun is the *name* of any thing that exists; as, *man*, *London*, *virtue*, *vice*.”

As *man*, *London*, *virtue*, and *vice* are nouns, they are *names*. But what renders these words names? The definition of words gives these four signs nothing which it does not bestow upon all other words. How, then, can these four words be any more names than *in*, *red*, *black*, *green*, *walks*, *writes*, *here*, &c.?

It is the *sign* trait of character, which renders *man*, *London*, *virtue*, and *vice*, names. And have not all words this very trait? Why, then, are not all words rendered names by it? If the *sign* trait can render *man*, *London*, *virtue*, and *vice*, names, can it not render all other words names? Why, then, are not all other words as much nouns as these four?

Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs* of our ideas.—MURRAY.

A noun is the name of any person, place, or thing, any thing which exists, any thing of which you can have a notion.—MURRAY.

Read the following with care

1. If all words are signs, *under*, *over*, &c., are signs: all words are signs; therefore *under*, *over*, &c., are signs. 1

2. If all signs are names, *under*, *over*, &c., are names: all signs are names; therefore *under*, *over*, &c., are names.

3. If all names are nouns, *under*, *over*, &c., are nouns: all names are nouns; therefore *under*, *over*, &c., are nouns!

The Substitute.

A DENOMINATION OF WORDS.

A denomination of words is a number of verbal signs, which have the same *characteristic* mark.

[The word, *noun*, means but one word, as *John* is a noun. But, the words, *noun denomination*, mean an entire class of words, the whole family of nouns.]

It seems perfectly inconsistent with philosophy, that a *system* of grammar should not contain *class* names.

The word, *book*, is a noun; but this word is not a *class* of words! The word, *walks*, is a verb; but as the word, *walks*, is not a class of words, how can it be said that the word, *verb*, is the name of a class of words?

To supply this deficiency, it seems necessary to have a technical term which means a *class* of words. Therefore I have employed the word, *denomination*, in the sense of a class of words.

Characteristic.

In grammar, a *characteristic* is the property by which a word is thrown into a particular denomination.

Classification.

The words of the English language are divided into ten denominations. But, as in analyzing words, it is convenient to speak of them singly, each member of a denomination, receives, as its individual name, the particular distinctive epithet which designates its own denomination.

In English, there are ten denominations of words, viz. :

1. *Noun* denomination.
2. *Pronoun* denomination.
3. *Verb* denomination.
4. *Preposition* denomination.
5. *Conjunction* denomination.
6. *Adjective* denomination.
7. *Subadjective* denomination.
8. *Adverb* denomination.
9. *Subadverb* denomination.
10. *Interjection* denomination.

There is a serious objection to the following language which is used by the old school Grammarians :

“*There are ten parts of speech.*”

As every word in a language is a *part* of it, there must be as many parts of speech as there are words in a language. Every verb is a part of a language. Hence if there are ten thousand verbs in the English language, the verbs alone make ten thousand parts of speech!!

1. THE NOUN DENOMINATION.

The word, *trunk*, expresses not only an ability to stand alone, but a capacity to sustain *branch* matter.

Now, whether an object becomes *trunklike* from the circumstance that it is taken alone, or from the consideration that it is taken with *branch* matter which it is made to sustain, the *name* by which it is presented, is a *noun* ; as, *ring*, large gold *ring*.

In the first, the ring is taken alone—it is able to stand by itself—hence the ring, in this isolated state, resembles a trunk without a branch.

In the second instance, the ring is taken in connection with *branch* matter which cannot sustain itself, for the size, and kind cannot stand without the aid of the ring to which they naturally belong, and on which, they as naturally depend as do the branches upon the trunk.

In the following, the ring is presented by the word, *it*—but, as this little word is not the name of any object, the word, *it*, is not of the *noun* denomination.

That is a beautiful ring—may I examine it.

Additional Illustration.

1. Ring dove.

Why is not *ring*, in this example, a noun ?

Ring here, is not even a *trunk* word. *Ring*, in this instance, is not only not a *trunk* word, but it is not the name of an object which holds a *trunk* rank in the mind's collocation of the two things mentioned in the example. *Ring*, in this instance, is a *branch* word, and is the name of a distinctive mark which holds a *branch* rank in the mind's collocation, or disposition of it in respect to the dove.

REMARK.

What the *trunk* is to the branch parts in the frame-work of a tree, the *noun* is to the *branch* words in the framework of a section ; as, Good gold, Moses smote the rock. *Gold*, *Moses*, and *rock* are nouns.

It is curious to see the course which the formers of the old theory of grammar, have taken to appear to be consistent. In their definition of a noun, they affect to think that *all* words are not signs, not names ! They start out with the position that there are ten parts of speech. And then they construct their definition of a noun in a way which implies that there is but *one* class of words that are signs of our ideas.

"Words are articulate sounds used by common consent as the *signs*, the *names*, of our ideas."

"There are *ten*, or there are *nine* parts of speech in English ; namely, noun, article, verb, adjective, conjunction, preposition, adverb, participle, pronoun, and interjection."

1. "Any word which is the sign of an idea, is a noun ; as, *man*, *virtue*, *vice*."

But, says the objector, this is not the exact phraseology of the old definition of a noun. We quote the *sense*, not the words. The old school Grammarians having defined all the words to be signs, they select a certain class which they define by substituting *name* for *sign* ! And it is really amusing to observe the great pains which they have taken to avoid the use of both *sign*, and *name*, in defining the other classes of words. In defining the article, they do not say in so many words. that an article is the name of the *extent* of a noun's signification. But, instead of saying that an article is the name of the noun's *extent* of signification, by the direct use of the word, *name*, they say it in the following way :

"An article is a word placed before nouns to *point* them out, and *show how far* their signification *extends* !"

To show the extent ! That is, to *name*, to *signify*, to *express*, the noun's extent of application, as the *sign*, or *name*, of this extent ! There is no other way in which an article can show a noun's *extent* of application.

2. In defining the conjunction, they use the following phraseology :

"A conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to *connect* sentences."

But in what way does a conjunction connect sentences ? Why, by *expressing*, by *signifying*, by *pointing out* that which produces the connection. That which produces the connection between sentences, may be the *cause*, the *effect*, the *opposition*, the *similarity*, &c., &c., which exist in any certain cases. For instance "It was a cold day,—*therefore* I remained in the house."

My remaining within is an effect of which the conjunction, *therefore*, is the sign, or name.

Again :—“ He came home, *because* he wished to see his friends.”

His wish to see his friends was the *cause* that he came home ; and, of this cause the conjunction, *because*, is the name, or sign. We do not mean to be understood to say, that *because* is the name of wishing as an *action*, but as a *cause*. The word, *wished*, is the name of this event of the mind, as an action. But this action has a *causative* relation, or connection with the action of returning ; and *because* is the name, the sign, of this causative connection. Let us, then, say that,

A conjunction is the sign, or name of those relative circumstances which produce a connection between sentences ; as, John, is good, *therefore* he is happy. *But* his brother is unhappy, *because* he is bad.

3. They tell us that an adjective is a part of speech which *expresses* some quality of a noun ; as, *Red* cloth, *Blue* eyes, *Great* minds.

But why not say at once that,

An adjective is the *name* of the quality of a noun ; as, *Round* table, *Square* timber ?

But they choose to say that an adjective is a part of speech which *expresses* some quality ! How can a word *express* a quality unless it is the name, or sign, of quality ! ?

4. “ A verb is a word which signifies being, action, or suffering ; as, I *am*, I *walk*, my head *aches*.

Why not say at once,

A verb is the *name* of being, action, or suffering ? Because this way of expressing the idea, would lay the axe at the very root of their definition of a noun. A noun is the *name*. No other signs are to be called names !! To avoid the use of “ *name*,” they choose to say that a verb *signifies* as a *name* !

5. “ An adverb is a word joined to verbs, adjectives, participles, and to *other* adverbs, to *express* some quality, or circumstance respecting it.”

To *express* some quality. That is, to express some quality as the *sign*, or *name* of it !

Why not say, then, that,

An adverb is the *name* of some quality, or circumstance of the verb, adjective, participle, or adverb.

6. "A preposition serves to connect words with one another, and to *show* a relation between them."

What we have said upon the *conjunction*, is applicable to the preposition also.

A preposition is the *name* of the relative circumstances which connect one word with another.

7. "A pronoun is a word which is used to avoid the too frequent repetition of a noun."

A pronoun is a *secondary name*, and is used to prevent the too frequent repetition of a noun, the primary name; as, Jane lost the *book*, and Charles found *it*. (*Book*, the primary, and *it* the secondary name.)

8. An interjection is the *name* of some sudden emotion of joy, fear, dislike, &c.

We have thus demonstrated that each class of words can be defined by the use of *name*. Having done this, we would remark that we believe that the definitions in which we have used the word, *name*, are nearly as unsound in principle, as those from which the old school Grammarians have carefully excluded this word. In the above definitions, we have built upon the principles on which the old school authors have.

Ye that are opposed to a revolution in grammatical system, answer these arguments, — and do it in a *public, candid* manner.

Nouns are *nominative*, and *objective*.

I may be told that I condemn the use of the word, *nominative*. True, I have condemned the use of this word in the sense of *namitive*. I use the word, *nominative*, in the sense of *sentence-forming*. And *case*, I do not use at all. I divide nouns into *nominative*, and *objective*. A *nominative* noun is one which aids the verb in forming the sentence character, which is illustrated on the next page.

DENOMINATIONS OF WORDS.

A Denomination of words, is a *class* of words.

In English, there are ten Denominations of words, namely

1. *Noun* Denomination.
2. *Pronoun* Denomination.
3. *Verb* Denomination.
4. *Preposition* Denomination.
5. *Conjunction* Denomination.
6. *Adjective* Denomination.
7. *Sub-Adjective* Denomination.
8. *Adverb* Denomination.
9. *Sub-Adverb* Denomination.
10. *Interjection* Denomination.

I. THE NOUN DENOMINATION.

The *Noun* denomination is the *large* class of *Trunk* names which are *nominative*, and *objective* in the same form ; as,

Nominative.

Objective

1. The *Rock* was smitten by *Moses*.

Nominative.

Objective.

2. *Moses* smote the *Rock*.

Note I. Nouns have *nominative* power which they exert, or *suspend* without any change of *form*.

When a noun aids a verb in forming the *sentensic* diction of the section, it is a *nominative* noun ; as, the *rock* was smitten by *Moses*. [*Rock*.]

When a noun renders no aid in forming the *sentensic* diction of the section, it is an *objective* noun ; as, *Moses* smote the *rock*. [*Rock*.

In the first, *rock*, and *was* produce the *sentensic* diction, the affirmation, of the section, by their concurrent action.

In the second, *Moses*, and *smote* produce the *sentensic* diction by *their* concurrent action. Hence, in the second, the *sentensic* diction is formed without any aid from the word, *rock*. Therefore, in the second, *rock* is an *objective* noun.

In the first, *rock*-exerts its *nominative*, its *sentence forming* power ; but in the second, this noun, *rock*, without any *change* of form, suspends the exertion of this power.

Red Leather.

Note II. *Red* is not a noun ; but *redness* is. *Red*, and *redness* are both *names* ; and both forms of this one word, mean the same color. *Red* is a mere *branch* name, whereas *redness* is a *trunk* name : as, *red* leather. The *redness* of the leather.

Note III. The words which can be used either as *trunk* names, or *branch* names, are of the *noun* denomination, only where they are of the *trunk* order ; as, *ring*, *ring* dove.

In the first, *ring* is of the *noun* denomination ; in the second, *ring* is a mere *branch* name

CHAPTER XII.—CASE IN ENGLISH.

IN some languages there are certain *endings*, or *terminations*, which are called *case*. These terminations are as significant as the words to which they belong; each pointing out, not only a particular relation, but also the particular words between which this relation exists. But, upon the nouns in our language, no such endings are to be found.

It is possible, however, that the *caseless* condition of a few nouns in the Latin, may be resorted to, to justify the use of *case* in English; and to meet this circumstance in advance, we shall make a few remarks upon this point. And first, if the principles of another language, are to be seized as a rule by which to try our position with respect to case in English, we shall take the general principles, not the *idiomatic eccentricities* of that language. The Latin, so far as it respects cases, proceeds on the principle of *terminations*. And the fact that *cases* is applied in some few instances where the noun has no *termination*, certainly never can be taken as ground for deciding the broad principle of case in our own language. Were case terminations in the Latin, a mere deviation from the general principles of that language, *case* would be improperly used in its grammatical solution. But, as there are few instances in which there is not a case termination, the *general case* principles of Latin nouns involve terminations, hence *case* may be considered somewhat applicable to the nouns in that language.

In English no noun has a case form. The noun in the *possessive* case, is nothing but an adjective; as, *John's* hat. The part which is called the *case*, (*'s*) is as much an adjective affix, as is *ic*, *al*, or *ine*. Among the pronouns, there are only three, or four which vary in their form as they pass, and repass from the *nominative* to the *adjective*.

In every regular language, the nouns have certain forms, or inflections which are called the *cases* of this class of words.

A regular language, however, is very different from ours. A regular language, is rich in terminations; ours is an irregular one, and is lean, poor, in grammatical *trappings*. The genius of the English language does not afford our nouns these significant terminations. And as our language is without the terminations, let our Grammar be without their *name*. *Case* is the name of these terminations; and did the forms pertain to our nouns, their name might be a proper part of our grammar. But, as it is, to give to youth the term, *case*, as means to enable them to under-

stand any of the principles of the English language, is to hand a child a phial, and to bid him fill it with a very particular medicine, when but a mere *speck* of such an article has ever existed in the whole *materia medica* !

But, in reply, it will be said, that the desideratum is to enable the learner to acquire a knowledge of that relation which exists between the verb, and the nouns that are parsed with it : and, because this is effected by the present theory of *cases*, the end is completely answered. To this it may be replied, that even without any fixed *case* theory, the same knowledge could be acquired. But does the possibility of accomplishing without instruments, do away with their use ? or does the certainty of success with *imperfect* means, destroy the importance of those that are perfect ? If so, because D. can dig with his *hands*, to him, a *spade* is of no use !

The pronoun *me*, is said to be the objective case of *I*. But *case* means *form, shape, termination*. The word, *me*, however, is a distinct, a new, a different word ! Was *me*, a mere affix, placed thus,—*Ime, me*, might then be said to be the case of *I*.


The only pronouns in our language, which have the nominative case, are *they, thou, he, and who*. For *they*, and *them*, may be considered the same word in different cases, or forms. *Thou*, and *thee*, are different cases of the same word. *He*, and *him*, are different forms, or cases of the same word. *Who*, and *whom*, are different cases of the same word. (BOOK II. p. 23.)

But *she*, and *her*, are two different words. *We*, and *us*, are different words ; and not different *cases*, or *forms*, of the same word.

The pronouns, *which, it, you, what, as, mine, yours, &c.*, are nominative, and objectives without any variation in form—hence they have nothing at all, which can be called *case* ! Why, then, the question recurs, have we imported the term, *case*, this useless, this worse than useless commodity, from Rome to America ? We have as much use for it as a man who is without a horse, would have for a saddle ! Why should a country that has no grain to grind, erect mills to make flour ! Why should the people of America attach a fanciful property to their language ? Why, merely for the sake of using a Roman instrument in handling this property !! This *case* theory, in the English language, is an artificial hue which hides the native colour from the eyes of the child.

The word, *case*, however, is not applicable to the terminations of which we have spoken in this chapter.

"Case," is made from the Latin, *casus*, which is from, *cado*, to fall. But there is nothing about these terminations which can be denominated *falling*. Grammarians have generally attempted to illustrate the six cases by the following diagram :



It may be well to show here the true meaning of the word, *case*,—hence I shall give its etymology. The word, *case*, is derived from the Latin, *casus* ; and *casus* is made from the Latin, *cado*, to fall. *Case*, then, means that which *falls*, *comes*, or *happens*. In grammar, *case*, means a change of termination, to express the *exact relation* which the word having the termination bears to another word. The word, *liber*, means a book ; *libri*, means *of a book* ; and *libro*, signifies *to a book*.

Now, *ri* and *ro* are *cases* ; but is *er* a case ? from what has *liber* fallen ? Is *er* a declension of *liber* ? It is not. How, then, can *liber* be the nominative case ? *Liber* is the original word, it has the *er*, not as a termination, but as a part of the original word. *Liber* may be called a *nominative noun* ; but, not a noun in the *nominative case*. Strictly speaking this noun has the *oblique cases* only.

The following is from Bailey's English Grammar, p. 21.

"Nouns have three cases."

"The *nominative case*—so called when it is the name of a subject in relation to the verb."

"The *possessive case* denotes possession ;" as, He took the *hen's* eggs to market, the *Farmers'* and *Mechanics'* Bank is in Philadelphia.

Does the *hen* own the eggs ? Do the *farmers* own the bank ?

I have *Murray's* Grammar.

Does Murray own the Grammar ?

"The *objective case* is the object of an action, or of a relation ;" as, the *rock* was smitten by *Moses* ! ! I am by *him* ! ! !

The nominative as well as the vocative has been uniformly denominated the *straight*, the *perpendicular*, case. These are represented in the straight line. The *genitive*, *dative*, *accusative*, and the *ablative* have been uniformly styled the *falling*, the *obliquing*, cases. These are represented by the four lines which fall off from the nominative, or straight line. It really seems that Grammarians have ever been distinguished by gross absurdity. The ancient Grammarians started with the idea that the *genitive*, *dative*, *accusative*, and the *ablative* might be considered as *falling* out of the nominative—and, as “*casus*,” means *falling*, they presumed that case could be applied with marked propriety. But, as the nominative, and vocative, do not *fall* from any thing, how can the word, *case*, be applicable to these!? This subject may be rendered perfectly clear even to the child. From the fact that *case* means a falling, Grammarians have applied it to the different changes which some words undergo in their variation from the primitives; as,

CASE.

writes.
writeth.
writest.
wrote.
wrotest.
writing.
written.

These modifications may be called *case* because they are considered to fall from. But from what do these cases fall? from *write*.

What is *write* called? *Write* also is a *case*!!! Well, from what does *write* fall? from nothing at all!!!

Write is called the *straight*, the *perpendicular*, case!! That is, *write* is *fall* no *fall*!!

CASE.

write!!

CASE.

writest.
writes.
writeth.
wrote.
wrotest.
written.
writing.

This illustration, however, gives the old school Grammarians much more than they are justly entitled to. *Writest*, *writes*, *writeth*, &c., are really variations, from *write*. But the fallings

to which the old school Grammarians apply the word, *case*, are *fancied* into being! This is obvious from the following which we have taken from the Greek Grammar of Professor Crosby:

Case is from *casus*, from *cado*, to fall out, to happen.

"From this *fancied* falling off," says Professor Crosby, in his Greek Grammar, "came the word, *case*, which was at length applied as a general term to all nouns."

The reader will observe that Professor Crosby calls it a *fancied* falling off; and we presume that one moment's attention to the subject as presented in the following examples, will satisfy the reader that the Professor is happy in the selection of the epithet, *fancied*!

1.

2.

1. *Trees* grow among *trees*.

Trees number 1, is in the *nominative* case.

Trees number 2, is in the *objective* case!

Does *trees* number 2, vary, deviate, from *trees* number 1? Has not *trees* number 2—the same letters which constitute *trees* number 1? Where, then, is this falling off? In the imagination only! It is surely a *fancied* falling off!

The word, *case*, is not only inappropriate because of its inability to express the true idea, but because of its absolute want of a *technical* character. *Case* is a word in very common use—and, as it is applied to almost every thing in some way, or other, it has no technical character whatever. Besides, we have no use for the word in grammar. The true idea which the old school Grammarians attempt in vain to express by the word, *case*, may be well denoted by *nominative*, and *objective*, nouns

We will now give a few of the numerous applications of *case*, which Dr. Bullions, and many others, affirm *disqualify*, a word for technical use.

1. Book *case*, Knife *case*, Watch *case*.

2. A printer's *case* should be in the *genitive* case.

3. "Henry purchased a *case* of crown glass."

4. Can you *case* this hat?

That is cover it with some sort of *case* which will preserve it.

5. Have you made his *case* your own?

6. His *case* is desperate.

7. This is clearly a *case* of yellow fever.

8. "My old horse is in a better *case* than my colt."

9. The lawyer stated the *case*.

10. This *case* will never be tried.

11. This was an action on the *case*.

12. In *case* he gains his *case*, will he be in the *nominative*, or *vocative case*?

Having shown that case in English is nothing but the *imagination* of the old school Grammarians, we shall pass on to the next branch of this subject, namely, the *three cases* which these scholars have contrived to form from *no case*!

The cases are three, viz.,

1. The *nominative*,
 2. The *possessive*, and
 3. The *objective*.
-

CHAPTER XIII.—OF THE NOMINATIVE CASE.

ALTHOUGH we consider the different definitions of the NOMINATIVE CASE to be much the same, both in phraseology, and substance, yet we feel bound to examine them all. But before we commence the examination, we invite the reader's attention to the very particular manner which some have adopted to *slide* over this subject, with as little parade as possible!

Mr. Murray, in treating of the NOUN, gives a definition of the noun itself, and then divides this part of speech into common, and proper. In treating of NUMBER, the same author gives a definition of number itself, and then makes the subdivision, into singular, and plural. When he arrives at the GENDER, he gives a definition of gender, and then, adds that there are three genders; namely, masculine, feminine, and neuter. But when Mr. Murray comes to CASE, he gives no definition of it whatever!! The author introduces the subject of NUMBER as follows:

“SECTION 3. *Of Number.*”

“NUMBER is the consideration of an object, as one or more.”

“SUBSTANTIVES are of two numbers, the *singular*, and the *plural*.”

Now mark the difference, reader—

“SECTION 4. *Of Case.*”

“In English substantives have three cases, the *nominative*, the *possessive*, and the *objective*.”

Here we find Mr. Murray informing the pupil how many cases substantives have; yes even before he attempts to tell him what

case itself is!! Mr. Murray could find nothing in our language which can be denominated, *case*—hence he has made no attempt to define *case*.

The next work which we shall notice, is a production, entitled, "ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, &c. By AUSTIN OSGOOD HUBBARD, A. B." This book was published in 1827. The manner of treating the subject of *case* as presented by Mr. Hubbard, is as follows :

"CASE."

"CASES show the relations of nouns and pronouns to other words."

Mr. Hubbard here attempts to define *case*—but instead of telling what *case* is, he informs the pupil what it does!! The subject of *case* comes before Mr. Hubbard in this light—"What is *case*?" But Mr. Hubbard evades the question by attempting to say, not what *case* is, but what *case* does!

He continues—

"The *nominative* case is the *subject* of the verb; as, *I* read, *we* write."

But is it this *case itself* which is the subject of the verb? So declares our author! If, therefore, CASE is a "*showing*," and the NOMINATIVE CASE is the SUBJECT of the verb, *I*, and *we* have no allusion to PERSONS as is generally thought, but to this SHOWING of which Mr. Hubbard speaks!! Enough of this, however,—we have a question for Mr. Hubbard's "patient and accurate research," to solve. It is this—Is the word, *I*, the subject of the verb, *read*, or is the PERSON HIMSELF the SUBJECT?

We have another—Is the word, *we*, the SUBJECT of the verb, WRITE, or are the PERSONS THEMSELVES the SUBJECT?

Now, if the word itself is the subject of the verb, then, indeed, does Mr. Murray's definition of the nominative case seem altogether unintelligible; for he says that the "*nominative case simply expresses the SUBJECT of the verb.*"

If the word itself is the subject of the verb, then Mr. Murray has said in his definition, nothing more than this: namely, the nominative case simply expresses *itself*! Or, in other words—the noun in the nominative case, simply expresses, or signifies itself! To say, then, that "*John*," is in the nominative case, is to assert nothing more than that this noun denotes, not the person, but *its own self*!!

If, however, the real person is the subject of the verb, Mr.

Murray recovers from *insanity*; and Mr. Hubbard is struck *blind*! Mr. Hubbard says that the NOMINATIVE CASE is the SUBJECT of the verb: and if the real person, or the real thing, is the subject of the verb, then, indeed, it follows that CASE belongs not to nouns, and pronouns, but to men, women, and children!! Thus, we see that *cases* have been shaken off of nouns, and fixed upon those persons, things, and animals, that the nouns represent!! According to Mr. Hubbard, the verb may be in America, and its nominative case in England!!

Let us now return to Mr. Murray. This author says, that,
 "The verb agrees with its nominative case in number and person."

This rule favours the doctrine of Mr. Hubbard. Have we said it? But, hold—we cannot now say what it favours. Let us first examine. Does Mr. Murray mean that the verb agrees with the noun itself, or with the subject denoted by the noun? We think that he intends to say that the verb agrees with the noun itself. The noun itself is in the nominative case; but the subject of the verb is the real person, the real thing, the real animal, denoted by the nominative case.

How does Mr. Comly define case?

"CASE."

"CASE is a *change*, or *difference* in the *termination* or situation of a noun or pronoun."

"Nouns and pronouns have three cases; the nominative, the possessive, and the objective."

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun or pronoun when it denotes the *subject* of a verb; as, *I walk*."

In this definition there are two *principal* things; and no one can say upon which the author means to rest his definition of this case. First—"the NOMINATIVE CASE is *simply* the NAME of a thing!" Secondly—"The NOMINATIVE CASE is the STATE of a noun or pronoun," when the noun, or the pronoun is the SUBJECT of a verb!!

The first reflection which we shall make upon this definition of the "*nominative case*," is that, the author's definition of CASE, in general, destroys it. The author in his definition of case, says that, case is a *change*, a *difference*—yet, in his definition of the *nominative case*, he excludes every *change*, and every *difference*! For he declares the *nominative case* to be "*simply* the name of a thing." Now, one would think that as *case itself* consists in

changes, and differences, of termination, and that as there are different cases, the nominative case ought to comprise some one, or more of these changes. But, so far from this, we are informed, that the nominative case is the mere, simple, naked, name!

SECOND BRANCH OF HIS DEFINITION.

“Or, the state of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb.”

When what is the subject of the verb? The *noun* or *pronoun*? What work this is!! First, case itself is a *change*—then the *nominative* case is neither one item more, nor less than the *bare* name—and, after this, the *nominative* case is the *state*—but, what *state*? a very peculiar state, indeed—yes the state of a noun when it is made the *subject* of a verb. Does not this particular state, then, make the *nominative* case something more than a *naked* name? Besides the name, the *nominative* includes *this state*!!

“The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun, or pronoun, when it is the subject of a verb.”

JOHN COMLY.

Mr. Comly introduces the word, *subject* very often, indeed—but has he even *attempted* to show the pupil any kind of distinctive mark by which a subject may be known? Will this author, or his friends, pretend that this point has the character of an *axiom*? Or, will they contend that children distinguish *subjects*, from objects by a kind of instinct?

Let us grant that the subject is the central point of conversation, the thing to which the attention of the speaker, or writer, is principally turned; that the object is a thing which is taken up with a view to help out with the account, history or narrative of the subject; as, the *man* was found ten *days* ago at *Frederick*.

Now, we ask who, or what is the subject in the above instance? Is it the word, *man*? Or, is it the *real man*, the *man himself*? We are not speaking in the above instance of the noun, *man*, but of the individual himself. The person, then, becomes the subject, and not his name! But the word itself may become the subject; as, the word, *man*, has three letters.

In this instance the noun itself is truly the *subject*. Yet not the subject of the verb—but the subject of *attention*, the subject of *thought*. We have yet to learn that the mere *mechanical* connection of a noun with a verb, renders the noun, a *subject* of the verb! What renders a thing a subject? Is it not the degree of *attention* which is bestowed upon it? Does the verb set about

thinking, and reflecting, upon the noun to which it may be joined? And when a verb is connected with two nouns, does it bestow so much thought upon one noun as to render it its *subject*, and so little upon the other as to degrade it to a mere *object*?

If so, the difference between a verb's subject, and its object, is easily made out! That noun is the subject of the verb, upon which the verb bestows the highest degree of reflection, or attention. That noun is the object of the verb, upon which the verb bestows a degree of attention less than that which it pays to the subject!!

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the *state* of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb."

JOHN COMLY.

We would here ask, *what state* can be pointed out which at all times, may be the *state of the subject*? What constitutes this state? Is it the local condition of the noun, or pronoun? *Certainly not!*

"The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of a verb."

MURRAY.

This is much encumbered—the phraseology is ambiguous, and the facts upon which it rests, are concealed even from the philosopher. "*The subject of a verb*," is introduced as though the pupil is familiarly acquainted with the difference between a subject, and an object. "The nominative case 'expresses' the subject of a verb."

Ah! But what, asks the pupil in his own mind, is the subject of a verb? Here is the rub!! If D. says to B. "An apple tree is a tree which bears apples," how will B. know from this, what an apple tree is, unless he is also instructed what an apple is? Yes, replies B.—You tell me that an apple tree is a tree which bears apples! But, as I do not know what an apple is, your telling is to *me* no instruction! The nominative case expresses the subject of the verb—but what the subject *is*, will be as difficult for the pupil to find out, as it would be to find what the *nominative* case is without any aid from Mr. Murray's Grammar! Has Mr. M. already defined the *subject*?—he has informed the pupil that the nominative case expresses the subject, which gives the pupil the liberty of inferring that, the subject is not the nominative case, but something denoted by this case. But in this, Mr. Murray's *simplifiers* contradict him—for *they* say that, the nominative case is the subject itself!!

Let us now repeat the definition, and try it in practice:

"The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing, or

the subject of a verb ;” as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher.

This is not the example by which Mr. Murray illustrates his definition—yet the word, *Jane*, is in the nominative case—hence, if his definition is *correct*, this example is as happy an illustration of his definition as the instance chosen by himself.

“*Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher.”

Jane, in this instance, is parsed by Mr. Murray’s own Grammar, as a noun in the *nominative* case *independent* of the verb ! Observe, it is independent of the verb. Hence this noun cannot be in the nominative case upon the principle contained in the second clause of Mr. Murray’s definition of the nominative case—

“Or it expresses the *subject* of the verb.”

As this noun has no verb, how can it be the subject of a verb ? How, then, can it be in the nominative case ? If this noun is in the nominative by any thing which may be found in Mr. Murray’s definition of this case, it is by the authority derived from the first clause in it :—

“The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing.”

But the noun, *Jane*, expresses more than this—it signifies the *object* acted upon ! Yes, this noun which is parsed in the nominative case even without being described in the *definition* of this case, most happily illustrates the definition which Mr. Murray has given of the objective case ! The objective case, says Mr. Murray, “expresses the object of an action, or of a relation ;” as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy teacher !

If we here ask, *who* was punished—*who* was acted upon, what must the answer be ? Surely, *Jane* was acted upon. Let us change the order of the sentence—(but not the facts ; we shall retain the same facts without the *least* addition—)

“The teacher punished *Jane*.”

Here, the noun, *Jane*, is parsed in the objective case—Why ? Because it expresses the object acted upon. Yet in the first order of this sentence, the same word, denoting the *same* object, is parsed in the *nominative* case. *Jane*, thou wast punished by the teacher !!

The nominative case expresses simply the name of a thing, or the subject of “the verb ;” as, *John*, dost thou know that *I* am very sick !

The reader has probably asked *why* this exclamation point ? We answer that we feel a high degree of surprise at the fact, that

John, *thou*, and *I*, are all excluded from the very case into which the British Grammarians intend to put them.

Let us now present the definition of a subject as given by the British Grammarians :

“The subject is the thing principally spoken *of*.”—MURRAY.

We must ask the reader to keep the two following definitions together in his mind :

1. “The nominative case is the *subject*.”

2. “The subject is the thing principally spoken *of*.”

“*John thou* wast punished by thy teacher.”

The word, *John*, is a proper noun, *second* person, singular number, and in the nominative case.

But is *John* spoken *of*? *John* is of the *second* person ; and the *second* person, it will be admitted, is the person spoken *to* ! In what way, we ask, is it to be shown that *John* is in the nominative case ? Let the British Grammarians answer—let them speak through Mr. Murray—

The nominative case is the *subject* ! And the subject is the thing principally spoken *of* !

But *John* happens to be the *thing* spoken *to* ! How, then, we beg to be informed, can any authority be found for casting this noun into the nominative case ?

Let us now take the word, *thou*.

“*John, thou* wast punished by thy teacher.

Thou is a pronoun, *second* person, singular, and in the nominative—but stay ! How can the *second* person be the *subject*, when the *second* person is the person spoken *to*, and the *subject* the person spoken *of* ? And, as the *second* person cannot be the subject, how, yes, how can a pronoun of the *second* person be put into the nominative case ! ! ? The British Grammarians have shut the door against *thou*, and against every other word of the *second* person, yea, and of the *first* person also ! ! No, not even the *ghost* of a word which is either of the *second*, or *first* person, can enter their nominative case ! ! They have shut the door, and bolted it with the following *bar* :

“The subject is the thing spoken *of*.” And, “The nominative case is the *subject* !”

Having, with these definitions, shut, and barred, the door against these thousands of words, may they not now as well tie up the knocker, and say we are *sick*, we are *dead* !

"Shut, shut the door, good *John*, tie up the knocker; say *I* am sick, *I* am dead."

Indeed their own Pope, in this sentence, does shut their door, and tie up their knocker too, for out of the ten nouns which are either expressed, or understood, three only can be parsed!

Rendered plenary.—Shut *thou* the door, shut *thou* the door, good *John*, tie *thou* up the knocker—say *thou* *I* am sick, *I* am dead.

Now, *thou*, *thou*, *John*, *thou*, *thou*, *I*, and *I*, are excluded from the nominative case, unless indeed it can be shown that these words are of the *third* person!! But what is the third person? "The third person is the thing spoken of."

The third person, then, and the subject, are the same thing—no word can be parsed in the nominative case unless it is of the third person!!

Let us hear Mr. Ingersoll. Mr. Ingersoll is one among the many who have been employed for years in the all important business of *mending* Mr. Murray. Mark, gentle reader, the manner in which Mr. Ingersoll proceeds to help Mr. Murray out of the above dilemma:

"At present," says Mr. Ingersoll, "I will explain to you, only the nominative case: the others will be explained hereafter:" in *eternity*!

"A noun which denotes an animal, or thing that does an action, is in the nominative case; as, Jane, thou wast punished by thy teacher!?"*

* Some few years since, we published a small work in which we claimed that part of Mr. Ingersoll's Grammar, which we thought, belonged of right, to us. In this little work, we made some reflections upon Mr. Ingersoll's definition of the nominative case. Since that period we find that he has made another attempt at defining the nominative case.

It is as follows:—"The nominative case, then, denotes the person or thing, of which some *affirmation* is made."

Now this definition includes no nouns except those which happen to be in mere affirmative sentences; as, *John* is writing letters.

The moment we change the diction of the sentence—"Is *John* writing letters?" Mr. Ingersoll's definition ceases to apply! Nor will his definition apply in even one half of the instances where the noun is in the nominative; as, If *he* is a good *boy*, &c.

Now, here is no affirmation.

N. B.—We have quoted the above definition from *memory*—but we have the exact sense, if not the exact words.

The word, *teacher*, is a noun, and denotes an *animal* that does an action; and, consequently, it must be in the nominative case! Strange, indeed, that men should thus trifle with themselves, and impose upon the tender child! Let us parse the word, *teacher*, as presented in the above illustration of Mr. Ingersoll's definition of the nominative case; "*Jane*, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*."

Teacher, is a common noun, third person, singular, and in the OBJECTIVE case after *by*!! In the *objective*!? What then becomes of Mr. Ingersoll? He has gone to the place to which we will now send Mr. Kirkham. Mr. Kirkham! Who is he! Let him describe himself! Hear, hear—"The nominative case is the *actor* or subject of the verb;" as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*!

Now, *teacher*, is a noun in the *objective* case—and, although *Jane* is a noun in the *nominative* case, yet, it is independent of the verb!! We find, then, that, although the nominative case must be the subject of the verb, words are put into the nominative case, which have no verb at all! And we find, also, that, although the nominative case is the *actor*, yet the actor in this instance, is not the nominative case, but the objective!

Let each man speak for himself. Mr. Kirkham, upon the subject of his book, remarks—"It has been *my* object, by *clear* and *familiar illustrations* to *disperse* those CLOUDS of OBSCURITY, that are so often cast around the *young* student's BEWILDERED imagination, and to *smooth* his way by *removing* those OBSTACLES that generally retard his progress!!"

Let teachers examine before they encourage—let them *know*, before they *adopt*. Let them throw off all disguise—let them despise the principle of recommending books upon the ground of *friendship*, of *local ties*, of *pity*, &c. Teachers stand at the HEAD of the NATION—let them honour their calling, and make our REPUBLIC *sure*.

Shall we now hear Mr. Greenleaf's case?

"The nominative case is the *actor*, or subject of the verb; as, *Jane*, thou wast punished by thy *teacher*, *John*, the apples were eaten by *me*!!

The nouns, *Jane*, and *John*, are independent of the verbs! Hence they cannot be in the nominative case upon the ground that they are the subjects of the verbs!!

The pronoun, *me*, and the noun, *teacher*, denote the actors—yet these words are in the objective case after *by*!! It will be sufficient to add that Mr. Greenleaf, is one of Mr. Murray's *menders*!

Cardell's *matter and thought* Grammar, p. 54 :

“ POSITION OR CASE.”

“ Nouns stand in different relations to other words ; as, Henry conquered *Richard* ; *Richard* conquered *Henry*.”

The compiler begins by saying that “ nouns stand in different relations to *other words*.” He then gives two examples in illustration ; and upon these two examples, he comments in the following manner :

“ The first noun denotes the agent or actor ; and the second the object *whom* the action affects !”

But, pray does this remark explain the mechanical relations which these nouns bear to the verb, *conquered* ? The compiler's remark is not to the point in any respect whatever ! Does this compiler fancy that in telling what the noun, *Henry*, denotes, he explains its constructive relation to the verb, *conquered* ? *Henry* does certainly denote the actor—but what of all this ! The fact that a noun denotes the actor, does not settle its relation to the verb ! For, if we say, “ *Richard* was conquered by *Henry*,” the relation of the noun, *Henry*, to the verb, is entirely changed ; yet *Henry* is still the actor !

1. “ *Henry* conquered *Richard*.”

2. “ *Richard* was conquered by *Henry* !”

So much for the compiler's attempt to explain the relations of nouns to verbs, by telling what *they denote* !

The compiler proceeds :

“ The nominative case is the performer of an action ;” as, “ *Richard* was conquered by *Henry* !”

Henry, is a proper noun, third person, singular, and in the *objective* case, after *by* ! Yet, Mr. Cardell's definition of the nominative case, forces this noun from the objective, and places it in the nominative !

As an illustration of the accuracy of the compiler's definition of the nominative case, he instances the *bull*, and *boat*, which, it is said, were the foundation of a very interesting law suit. The great question was, whether the boat was carried off by the bull, or the bull by the boat ! Now, says this grave compiler—

“ either *it* ran away with *him*,
or *he* ran away with *it*.”

“ Whichever did the action of running away with the other, is the agent or nominative word ; and the one run away with, is the object !”

Let us now see how the compiler comes out with this dignified illustration !

1. The boat was carried off by the *bull* !

2. The bull was carried off by the *boat* ! !

From this representation the name of the actor, is in the objective case—yes, whether the *bull* carried off the boat ; or whether the *boat* carried off the bull ! The compiler's illustration proves that *bulls* may be found in *books* as well as in *boats* !

“ The nominative case is the performer of an action.” (Reader keep this in mind.)

“ Whichever did the action, is the agent, or nominative word, and the one run away with, is the object *suffering* by the action.” (Reader, bear this in mind too.)

Now, says Mr. Cardell, *all* verbs express *action*. The object, therefore, in this bull, and boat affair, is in fact the *nominative*—the nominative case is the performer ! The *object* is the *performer* of that action which is denoted by the verb, *suffers* ! Hence, the very object, be it either bull, or boat, is in the nominative !

That bulls should run away with boats, and boats with bulls, is all reasonable enough. But that Mr. Cardell should so far run away *with himself*, as to run off with J. Horne Tooke, is neither reasonable, nor *honest* ! !

The learned compiler says, *that whichever performs the action, is the nominative*. Hence, where two, or more persons are named, and it is uncertain which performed the action specified, it is impossible to ascertain the nominative word ; as, “ either *John*, *James*, or *Stephen*, went to church.”

Now, whichever *went*, “ is the performer of the action, therefore, the nominative ! ” But which did perform this action ? This point cannot be decided—hence, by Mr. Cardell's Grammar, neither of these can be parsed !

Again.—“ Neither *John*, *James*, nor *Stephen*, went to church.”

Here there is no action performed—hence, there is *no performer*—and, consequently, there is no nominative case to the verb, *went* ! ”

Further.—“ The paper is extinct. Nothing came into the room.”

Now, the noun, *paper*, is in the nominative case—but does this noun denote the actor, or performer ? There is nothing to act—there is no agent in being !

"*Nothing* came into the room."

Nothing is the performer!

Who, it may be asked, is this Mr. Cardell? He is the man that defines *gender* to be a *difference*! He is the compiler of a book made up of antiquated errors, obsolete deformities, and of the monumental wreck of other men's plans, and schemes. He is the man that presents this book as a mass of *original miraculous* truth. He is the deeply skilled Grammarian who has given the preceding definition of the nominative case—and he is the author of the following sentence which is given in commendation of that definition:

"It will be found a very useful practice in schools, for pupils to adduce examples for themselves, in addition to those which their lessons may contain."

Can it be that it would be useful for pupils to give examples adapted to Mr. Cardell's definition of the nominative case? Yet the sentence in question, has a direct allusion to that definition. Yes, the examples adduced, are to be tried by his *inconsistent* attempt at a definition of the nominative case! We fancy that he would recommend them to draw their examples from *bulls*, and *boats*! "This (continues he) will not only show their knowledge of the subject, but by exercising their *inventive* faculties, will increase their interest for ulterior progress."

What will exercise their *inventive* faculties? Why, to adduce examples of the nominative case—but by what rule? By this—

"The nominative case denotes the *performer* of an action; as, the boat was carried off by the *bull*!!"

"Will increase their interest for ulterior progress."

What will *increase* their *interest*? Why, to find such a *consistency* between Mr. Cardell's definition of the nominative case, and the examples adduced!

We should take our leave for the present, of Mr. Cardell, was it not that he has severely impugned all the literary men who preceded himself upon this science. And, indeed, had Mr. Cardell corrected, even *one* of the ten thousand errors which deform the old theory of English Grammar, we should have passed him by in silence, and pity. But as he has lampooned the learned men of all nations, without correcting, or finding, even one of their numerous errors, we feel bound to speak of him in such terms as will render him a better scholar, and a better man!

In the Introduction, we have attempted to show that Mr. Car-

dell, is altogether incapable of writing our language with propriety. And believing ourselves successful in that attempt, we do not make any additional strictures upon his language for the reader's satisfaction, but for Mr. Cardell's *instruction*. We shall now repeat the sentence which we quoted above; and we ask attention to the italic words :

"It will be found a very useful practice, *in schools*, for pupils to adduce examples for themselves, *in addition to those which their lessons may contain.*"

The word, *adduce*, signifies to *add*—hence, the sentence in sense, is as follows

It will be found a very useful practice *in schools* for pupils to *add* examples for themselves *in addition* to those which their lessons may contain. (To *add* in *addition* !)

"*In schools*," is redundant; and, as the sentence should end at themselves, the assemblage of words, "*in addition to those which their lessons may contain,*" is useless.

It will be found a useful practice for pupils to adduce examples for themselves.

The sentence in its original form, comprises 26 words. But in its improved form, it contains only 13, which shows a redundancy of 13 words.

To this sentence the compiler subjoins the following :

"*This will not only show their knowledge of the subject, but by exercising their inventive faculties, will increase their interest for ulterior progress.*"

"Interest *for*," is not English! We say interest *in*, but *desire* *for*.

In idea, however, both sentences are a *unit*—hence it should be expressed in one sentence.

A substitute for both.

That the pupil may show his own knowledge of this subject, and be somewhat instrumental in adding to it, he should adduce instances of the nominative case, for himself. (59 words.)

Before we close this chapter, we deem it somewhat important to show in what way Peter Bullions, and Goold Brown, have mended Murray upon the subject of the cases.

To do these compilers justice, it is necessary to give the reader their respective definitions of *case* itself.

“II. OF THE CASE OF NOUNS.”

CASE is the *state*, or *condition*, of a noun with respect to other words in a sentence!!—P. BULLIONS.

Let us suppose that A., of Boston, attempts, in a letter, to describe his *state*, or *condition*, to his friend in Philadelphia. His friend receives his letter, dated, Boston, June 2, 1844.

The letter, which is long, is read with great care by his Philadelphia friends. But all they can glean from it, which relates to A.'s condition, is the following sentence :

“The *condition* of your friend A., is the state of a man *with respect to other persons in Boston* !”

The *case* of a noun is its condition with *respect* to the *other words* in a sentence !

This definition affords about as much light as a piece of chalk in a dark room.

Even if the child could ascertain what the condition of a noun is with respect to the other words in the sentence, he would be wonderfully enlightened upon the subject of *case* !

“Case is the state, or condition, of a noun with respect to *the other words* in a sentence.”

It seems, then, that a noun is in a particular case with respect to *all* the other words in the sentence! *To the other words* in a sentence.

“*Truth* and *candour* possess a powerful *charm*.” (BULLIONS, page 73.)

Truth is a noun in the nominative case with respect to *and*, to *candour*, to *possess*, to *a*, to *powerful*, and to *charm* !

Under page 73, Mr. Bullions parses this sentence. In his solution we find the noun, *truth*, disposed of in the following way :

“*Truth*,” “A noun, neuter, singular, the *nominative*.”

That is, *truth* is the nominative to *and*, to *candour*, to *possess*, to *a*, to *powerful*, and to *charm* ! If this is not so what does this definition of case mean ?

“Case is the state, or condition, of a noun *with respect to the other words* in a sentence.”

Nouns have three cases, viz.—the nominative, possessive, and objective.

1. “The nominative case expresses that of which something is said or declared ;” as, *John*, *thou* wast punished by thy *teacher*.

Nothing is here said of *John*—hence his name is not in the nominative case by virtue of this definition of the nominative. *John* is a proper noun, of the *second* person—and, as the second person is not spoken of, but *to*, how can *John*, or *thou*, be in the nominative!?

The nominative case expresses that of which something is said, or declared.

Nothing is said of *John*—nothing is said of *thou*! Yet, strange as it may, indeed as it must, seem, these two words are the only ones which are parsed in the nominative case!!!

Teacher, is of the *third* person—and, as the third person is the one of whom something is said, *teacher* which is in the *objective* case, and governed by *by*, is the only word which can be parsed in the *nominative*, by virtue of Mr. Bullion's definition of this case!

Mr. Bullions *himself* says the teacher is the only person mentioned in the sentence of whom any thing is said. He *himself* parses *John*, and *thou*, of the *second* person—by this he declares that nothing is said of them. He parses *teacher*, of the *third* person—by this he declares that something is said of the teacher. (*Book II.*, p. xi.)

Case, says Mr. Bullions, is "*state*, or *condition*." The nominative case of a noun, then, is the *nominative condition* of it!

And, as the nominative case expresses that thing of which something is said, it follows that the thing of which something is said, is expressed, not by the noun, but by the *nominative condition* of the noun! Hence, in the following sentence the thing of which we speak, is not expressed, denoted, by the word, *book*, but by the *nominative condition* of the word, *book*!

The *book* is new.

This certainly does improve Murray!

"The nominative case expresses that of which something is said, or declared;" as, the *rock* was smitten by *Moses*.

Is it not here declared of *Moses*, that he smote the rock!? Is not this proper noun, which Mr. Bullions parses in the *objective* case, actually in the *nominative* case!?

Is it not as clearly said of *Moses* that he smote the rock, as it is of the rock, that it was smitten?

Can we be told that the nouns in the following instances, in italic characters, denote beings of which nothing is said? If nothing is said of them, how can their names be of the *third* person!? (The third person is *spoken of*.)

1. "The world is sustained by *God*."
2. "His son was taught by *Jacob*."
3. The fire was extinguished by *John*.
4. The horse was stolen by *Joseph*.

Let us now hear what Mr. Goold Brown says of the *nominative* case.

"The *nominative case* is that *form*, or *state* of a noun or a pronoun, which denotes the subject of a verb;" as, *John*, go to school.

Appended to Mr. Brown's Grammar, is a KEY which we have perused with great care to enable us to ascertain what is meant by this definition. But, to us, this definition is still under lock and key! the KEY which he furnishes, does not suit the lock, which prevents us from opening this mysterious verbal box!

"The *nominative case* is that *form*, or *state*."

Are the words, *form*, and *state*, as here used, synonymous? Do both words, as here used, mean the same thing?

From the definition which Mr. Brown gives of *case* itself, we infer that he intends to use *form*, and *state*, as meaning the same thing.

"CASE."

"*Cases* are *modifications* that distinguish the *relations* of nouns and pronouns to other words."—GOOLD BROWN.

As *state* is not used in this definition, we conclude that it is used in the other, merely to improve the *euphony* of the sentence!

"*Cases* are *modifications* which distinguish the *relations* of nouns and pronouns to other words."

What are the relations which nouns, and pronouns bear to other words, which the *case modifications* "distinguish?" If *case*, in general, is a *modification* which expresses the different *relations* that nouns and pronouns bear to other words, the *nominative case* must express one, or more, of these relations. But does Mr. Brown, even mention the word, *relation*, in his definition of the *nominative case*? Does he even use a word in this definition, which conveys the least allusion to a relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words?

"The *nominative case* is the *form*, or *state*, of a noun which denotes the subject of a verb."

Does the word, *subject*, convey any allusion to a *relation* of one word with another!? The word, *subject*, alludes to the object, or thing on which the mind acts.

“Subject,—that on which some mental or material operation is performed.”—JOHNSON.

What says Murray. “The subject is the thing principally *spoken of*.”

Why has not Mr. Brown told *what this relation is of* which he speaks in his definition of case? Simply, because he *does not know what it is* ! !

If cases are *modifications* of nouns, and pronouns, why does not Mr. Brown tell us what modifications constitute the *nominative* case! ? Simply, because there is *no modification* which constitutes this case !

What is it which denotes the subject of the verb? The definition of the nominative case, as given by Mr. Brown, does not answer this question :

“The nominative case is the *form*, or *state*, of a noun or pronoun, *which* denotes the subject of a verb.”

Does *which* represent *form*, or *state*, or *noun*, or *pronoun*? No one can decide from the sentence !

We will now give some attention to an illustration of this definition of the nominative case.

Boys, you were punished by the teacher.

Has the word, *boys*, a *form* which enables it to denote the subject? Has the word, *boys*, a *state* which enables it to denote the subject?

“The nominative case is the *form*, or *state*, of a noun or pronoun, *which* denotes the subject of a verb; as, *Boys, you were punished by the teacher.*”

How can the word, *boys*, denote the subject of a verb, when it is absolutely *independent* of all verbs?

Again—as the subject is the thing principally *spoken of*, how can *boys* be parsed in the nominative case? This noun does not denote what is *spoken of*, but what is *spoken to*. *Boys* is a noun of the *second* person !

You is a pronoun—but has no form which is peculiar to it when it denotes the subject—*you* has the same form in the objective, which it has in the nominative: *you were punished*. Here *you* is nominative. “Of *you*.” Here *you* is objective.

With respect to *state*, we have already demonstrated that it is a mere *bubble* !

Does *you* denote the subject! ? How, then, can *you* be of the

second person? The subject is the object spoken of. *You* denotes the person spoken to! How, therefore, can *you* be in the nominative case by virtue of the definition which follows:

“The nominative case is the *form*, or *state*, of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the subject of a verb.”—Goold Brown’s “*finished labours*! !”

If the nominative case denotes the subject, and the subject is the thing spoken of, how can any word of the first, or the second person, be in the *nominative* case!?

1. “*I* was at school in London.”
2. “*We* will call on them soon.”
3. [“*I who* am now reading, understand this matter!”]

If *I*, *we*, and *who*, are not of the *third* person, they can not be *subjects*—and, if not subjects, they are not in the *nominative* case!

The third person, and the subject are defined in the same way! The third person is the thing spoken of; and a subject is the thing spoken of. But these pronouns, *I*, *we*, *who*, denote the speakers—hence, they are of the *first* person—and, consequently, as they can not denote *subjects*, they can not be in the *nominative* case!

“*John* is a boy of truth.”

John is a name in the *name* case to *is*! Or—

John is a noun in the *noun* case to *is*! Or—

John is a sign in the *sign* case to *is*! Or—

John is a nominative, in the *nominative* case to *is*!

As *sign*, *name*, *noun*, and *nominative*, mean the same thing, either of these methods of parsing, is synonymous with the following:

John is a noun, in the *nominative* case to *is*.

Let us now inquire what is meant by the phrase, “*nominative case to is*!”

John is in the *nominative case to is*!

When we say, *John* went to the door, we understand the import of *to*. But when we say that the word, *John*, is in the *nominative case to “is,”* we speak of something of which we know nothing!

Before we pursue this point farther, it may be well to devote a few minutes to the words, “*in the nominative case after is.*”

“*John* is a boy of truth.”

Boy is a noun, in the *nominative case after is*.

Is the word, *after*, employed to express any *nominative relation* which the word, *boy*, bears to *is*? Or, is *after* used to denote the

position of *boy* in reference to *is*? That *boy* comes *after is*, is obvious. But if *after* is employed merely to express the place of *boy* in reference to *is*, why not use *before* to express the place of *John* in reference to *is*!?

“*John* is a *boy* of truth.”

John is a noun in the nominative case *before is*.

Boy is a noun in the nominative case *after is*

But, no, *John* is in the nominative case *to is*—and *boy*, in the nominative case *after is*! Reconcile this method with good sense if you can!

“Is it *they*.”

It, is a pronoun, in the nominative case *to is*.

They, is a pronoun, in the nominative case *after is*!!

When it is said that *they* is in the nominative case, is it not meant that it is in the nominative case in relation to some verb? Or is this pronoun in the nominative case independent of all verbs!? The old school Grammarians do not pretend that *they* is in the nominative case independent of the verb. In relation, then, to what verb is *they* in the nominative case? Is this pronoun in the nominative case *to is*!? *Is they*, is not English. Nor is, *they is*, English. What! Can a pronoun be in the nominative case to a verb, when at the same time the putting of the pronoun with the verb, produces a gross infraction of the rules of grammar!!

[“It is] (*they*.”)

1. What is the meaning of, *in the nominative case to is*?
2. What is the meaning of, *in the nominative case after is*?

“*John* is a *boy* of truth.”

Is the word, *John*, nominative in relation to *is*? Surely not—the word, *John*, is nominative in relation to the person himself. *John*, is the name of the real person! This, word, then, is in the nominative case in relation to the person—and not in relation to the verb, *is*! Is *is* the subject!? No, no!

If the nominative case is the mere name of the subject, and if *John* is the subject, is not the word, the name, the sign *John*, nominative in relation to *John* himself? Preposterous! *John* bear a name, a noun, a nominative, relation to *is*! Then, of course *John* is the name of *is*!!

“*John* is a *boy* of truth.”

John, a noun, in the nominative case to *John* himself.

If the nominative case is the name of the subject, this is the only rational parsing which can be given. We deny that a noun

bears a *nominative* relation to the verb. The noun bears a *nominative* relation to the subject, to the object, to the thing of which it is the name, and to nothing else!

The following is from Hart's English Grammar, p. 46, and proves clearly that, the pupil has much difficulty in learning the cases.

"166. It is of great importance that the pupil should learn as early as possible, to distinguish between the *Nominative* and *Objective* cases. The *Possessive* may be recognised at once by its form. But to distinguish readily the other two, is one of the greatest stumbling-blocks to beginners."

"No mode should be left untried, which the ingenuity of the teacher can invent, of directing the attention of the learner to the true relation of the noun, as being the *subject*, or the *object* of the verb."

[The Substitute, p. 146.]

CHAPTER XIV.—OF THE POSSESSIVE CASE.

WE intend to dispose of this case in a very summary way.

The termination which is called the *possessive* case, is a mere *adjective* affix, and, as such, it converts the noun to which it is affixed into an adjective; as,

1. "He brought Jane's book, and her paper."
2. "Goold Brown's definitions are unsound."
3. "Peter Bullion's Latin Grammar."

As *al*, *ic*, *iv*, *ous*, *ine*, &c., are affixes which translate nouns into adjectives, so are the affixes which are called the *possessive* case, suffixes that convert nouns into adjectives.

NOUNS.	ADJECTIVES.
1. Mode	modal. <i>al</i> .
2. Jane	Jane's. 's.
3. Virtue	virtuous. <i>ous</i> .
4. Philosophy	philosophic. <i>ic</i> .

The *pronouns* which are supplemental to the nouns in the *possessive* case, are called *adjectives*, or *adjective* pronouns:

"John saw her with *his* book."

To *his*, the old theory applies the word, *adjective*.

But is *his*, any thing more or less than *John's*.

John saw her with *John's* book.

If *his*, the true representative of *John's*, can be called an *adjective*, can not *John's* be styled an adjective also?

It is said that there are four sorts of adjective pronouns, viz., the possessive, distributive, demonstrative, and indefinite. The possessive adjective pronouns are, *my, thy, his, her, our, your, their, its, own*. (Bullions's Grammar, p. 26.)

But what is the possessive case?

Mr. Bullions says, that

"The *possessive* case denotes that to which something belongs ; as,"

1. The fan of the *lady* !
2. The hat of *John* !

The nouns, *lady*, and *John*, are in the possessive case, governed by the preposition, *of* !

"Truth and *candour* possess a powerful charm."

Truth, a common noun, third person, singular, in the *possessive* case !

Candour, a noun, of the third person, singular, in the *possessive* case !

Under the thirty-ninth page of Bullions's English Grammar, we find the above sentence.

Under the same page we find *truth*, and *candour*, parsed in the *nominative* case. But, if the *possessive* case is what Mr. Bullions defines it to be, who can not see that *truth*, and *candour*, demand that we put *truth*, and *candour*, into the possessive case ! ?

The *possessive* case, says Mr. Bullions, denotes that to which something belongs.

"*Truth*, and *candour*, possess powerful charms."

Does not a powerful charm belong to *truth*, and *candour* ? Are not *truth*, and *candour*, then, in the possessive case ! ?

Every noun as well as every pronoun in italic characters, in the following sentences, is in the possessive case.

1. *I* have a book.
2. "This is the knife of *Samuel*."
3. "A portrait of the *king* is here."
4. *He* is a *man* of much property.
5. Have *you* boy's hats for sale ?

As the *boys* are not spoken of as *possessing* hats, the word, *boys*, does not denote any thing to which something belongs. But, as the persons, called *you*, are spoken to as having hats, *you*, is in

the possessive case. What work, what work, what work! Oh! these Murray menders!

"The *possessive* case denotes the *possessor* of something!"

1. *I* have a book!
2. *John* is the *owner* of a book!
3. This is the house of *Stephen*!

Under page 41, this same Mr. Kirkham says,

"Now *five* grains of *common* sense" will enable any one to comprehend what is meant by case!!

In a work entitled, *Book Instructor, designed to TEACH the science of English Grammar without a TEACHER*, we find the following definition of the possessive case:

"The *possessive* case denotes the possessor or owner of property!!"

1. "*Durand* has a horse!"
2. "*Davidson* owns a house!"
3. This is the hat of *James*!"
4. This is the book of *Sarah*!
5. *I* have a pen!
6. *Thou* hast an inkstand!

We must congratulate Mr. Ells upon his remarkable success in his attempt to give a definition of the possessive case!

Under page 26, Goold Brown says,

The possessive case is that *form* or *state* of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of property; as, *boy's* hats, *my* hat.

Let us see with what ease this definition can be applied to the following:

1. *John's* uncle!
2. *Nancy's* friend!

Is the uncle the property of John? Is the friend the property of Nancy?

"Henry has *boys'* hats for sale."

Is it to be presumed that these hats which belong to Henry are the property of the *boys*!?

How the definition vanishes before the test!

But is this *relation of property* mentioned in Brown's definition of the possessive case, the same relation to which he refers in his definition of case itself? In his definition of case itself, he speaks of a relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other *words*! But in his definition of the possessive case, he says nothing of this sort

of relation. The relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words, must be very different from the relation of property to its owner!

“CASES.”

“*Cases*, are modifications that distinguish the relation of nouns and pronouns to *other words*!”—GOULD BROWN.

The *possessive* case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of property; as, “*boy’s hat, my hat.*”

Now, as the *boy* is not the *property*, but the *proprietor*, would not Mr. Brown’s definition be much improved by the substitution of *proprietor* for *property*?

The *possessive* case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the relation of *proprietor* to property; as, *John’s book.*

But we will call the attention of the reader once more to the obvious difference between the two relations of which Mr. Brown speaks, and close our reflections upon his wonderful definition of the cases.

The relation of which he speaks in his definition of case itself, is that of nouns, and pronouns, to other words. But the relation of which he speaks in his definition of the *possessive* case, is that which exists between the *proprietor* and his *property*! The definition of case itself, is Mr. Brown’s guide—it is his constitutional definition, out of which he can not travel without subjecting himself to the charge of inconsistency. Has he founded his definition of the *possessive* case upon the relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words? No, no! He has built his definition, not upon the relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words, but upon the relation which a house, and lot, a horse, and wagon, a hat, and book, bear to him who happens to be the proprietor of them! The relation of *property*!

But the definition is false in theory, and false in practice:

1. *Jane’s* uncle!
2. *Sarah’s* friend!
3. Have *you* boys’ hats for sale!?

Here *you*, the *nominative*, is the *possessive*! Are not the hats spoken of as the property of *you*?

And how is the word, *boys’*, parsed? In the *possessive* case. But are the hats spoken of as the property of the *boys*? Nothing like it! The hats are the property of *you*! The hats, then, bear the relation of property to the *nominative* case!

Has Mr. Brown founded his definition of the *nominative* case upon the relation of which he speaks in his definition of case itself?

No, no. He has founded his definition, not upon a relation of nouns, and pronouns, to other words, but upon the relation which the real object, the real things bear, to the mind of the speaker, or writer—he founds it upon the subject!

Under the first page of the Preface to Mr. Brown's Grammar, we find the following which we submit without comment:

"To embody, in a convenient form, the *true* principles of the English language, and to express them in a simple and *perspicuous* style, adapted to the capacity of youth, are the objects of the following work!"

Let us now hear what Mr. Murray says on the possessive case.

The possessive case expresses the relation of property or possession; and has an apostrophe with the letter *s* following it; as, the scholar's duty, my father's house.—MURRAY.

"And has an apostrophe with the letter *s* following it."

What has an apostrophe with the letter, *s*? the possessive case!

"The possessive case expresses the relation of property or possession; and has an apostrophe with the letter *s* following it."

Following what? following the possessive case? The pronoun, *it*, stands for *possessive case*.

"The possessive case has an apostrophe with the letter, *s*, following it; as, the scholar's duty."

As the apostrophe, and *s*, are the possessive case, where is the propriety of saying that the possessive case is followed by an "apostrophe, and *s*!"

According to Mr. Murray, the possessive case of *scholar*, is this 's's! Scholar's's duty!

The *scholar's* duty.

Does this expression convey an allusion to the relation of property? Is a man's duty his *property*!?

The possessive case expresses the relation of property or possession; as, the scholar's duty."

The scholar, then, is the owner, the proprietor, of this duty! We do not believe any such idea is intended by the language used.

The truth is that *scholar* is thrown into an adjective form to express a distinction which could not be made in any other way with as much brevity.

"Get *John's* horse."

John is rendered an adjective to express *what* horse. But the

old school Grammarians say that *John* is rendered an adjective to express that John is the owner, the possessor, of the horse ! This, however, is not so.

1. Call at Mr. Brown's drug store, and get a bottle of *Swaim's Panacea*.

Is it here expressed that this Panacea is the property of *Swaim* ? Nothing like it.

2. "I have one of *Rogers's* knives."

Is it here expressed that Rogers is the owner of these knives ?

3. "We eat *baker's* bread altogether."

Does this mean that the bread which we eat, is the property of the baker ?

4. "Get a copy of *Murray's* Grammar."

Does this mean that Murray is the owner of this book ?

5. "*Lea's* pills are a good medicine."

Does this import that Lea is the owner of these pills, or, does it mean that he is the maker, inventor, of them ?

6. "John has *boys'* hats for sale."

The hats belong not to the *boys*, but to John. Yet *boys* is in the case which the old school Grammarians say expresses the relation of property, possession !

7. "They read all *David's* psalms."

Is David here represented as the owner, or as the author, of the psalms ?

8. "Joseph lives with *John's* friend."

What ! Is the friend with whom Joseph lives, the property of John ?

9. "We followed *John's* directions."

Is it here meant that these directions are the property of John, or that they come from him ?

10. "The *wind's* music was sweet."

Is it here meant that the wind is the owner, or the author, the maker, of the music.

11. "*Earth's* productions are numerous."

Is it here meant that the earth is the proprietor, owner, or the giver of these productions ?

12. "The *trunk's* branches were small."

What is the true idea here ? Is it that the trunk is the mere owner of the branches ? Or is it that the trunk is the *author*, the *giver*, of the branches ? Can branches which are engrafted into the trunk, be said to be the trunk's branches ? The branches which are merely engrafted into the trunk, are not the trunk's branches.

Where a child bears the relation of adoption to Mr. Webster, can it be said to be Mr. Webster's child.

"Mr. Webster's child," means a child of which Mr. Webster is the father.

13. "Webster's son."

Here, *Webster's* is parsed in the possessive case. This, however, is a misnomer; the true case of the noun is *no* case. And the true relation of Webster to the son, is clearly expressed by *parent, origin, source*. *Webster's*, then, is a noun in the *source* deflection, the *origin form*, the *parent modification*.

Significant technicals are well calculated to expose error in false theories. The word, *possessive*, is almost the only technical, in the old theory, which has any meaning. Hence, in general, it requires great care to demonstrate the errors which pervade, and deform it. But where there is a technical which is expressive of a distinct idea, a very short cross examination will expose the work of error, even to the mere child.

"The possessive case expresses the relation of *property*, or *possession*."

1. *Murray's* Grammar.
2. *Baker's* bread.
3. *Webster's* son.
4. *John's* friend.
5. *Goodness's* sake.
6. John has *boys's* hats for sale.
7. A *Hen's* eggs.
8. *Farmers's* Bank.
9. *Merchants's* Bank.

RECOMMENDATION OF BOOK SECOND.

"Although I have not examined the Second Book of Mr. Brown's *Rational System* of English Grammar, as thoroughly as I have the *First*, I am satisfied that Mr. Smith's opinion of it is just, and am perfectly willing to say that I concur in opinion with him, respecting the work. And in imitation of his course, I would ask whether we have not styled words which represent *cats*, *dogs*, and even *inanimate* objects, *personal* pronouns long enough—whether we have not sufficiently long denominated the speech, the diction itself, a mere *mode* of the verb—whether we have not too long paid for teaching our children that there are *three* cases when in truth, and simplicity there is not even one.

"I would ask also whether the hens possess the eggs, the boys possess the hats, the baker the bread, and whether the brewer

actually possesses the yeast mentioned in the following sentences—John carried *hens'* eggs to market—John has *boys'* hats for sale—*Brewer's* yeast is used in *baker's* bread!

"I would ask, likewise, whether we have not already used the word *case*, in English long enough, whether we have not too long parsed the thing for the *name* of the thing—whether we have not too long called words which have no relation to *verbs*, *adverbs*—and whether we are still to be compelled by the use of the old theory to have our children taught that the verb which represents a *perfectly finished* event, is of the *Imperfect* tense? I would ask too whether there is any propriety in continuing to learn that a verb is a word which signifies *being*, *action*, or *suffering*; as, John *ought* to return, He *resembles* her, The timber *wants* strength and solidity, He *can* go, John *has* land in Ohio—whether there is any propriety in teaching that a *noun* is the *name* of any person, *place*, or thing, while the preposition, *behind*, is as much the name of a *place* as is any other word in the language, and while the adjective *red*, is as much the name of something as is any other word, in short, whether there is a propriety in learning a definition of a noun which makes all words nouns. GEORGE W. BIDDLE."

The relations between the things expressed by words in the possessive case, and the noun on which this *possessive* word depends, are too numerous to be comprehended by even a hundred distinctive names. That the relation of property may exist is admitted. But this relation has nothing to do with grammar—hence Grammars should have nothing to do with it. Grammar is a science which treats of the relation of *words*. *Metaphysics* is a science which treats of the relation of *things*. Let the Grammarian, then, abandon metaphysics, and give the relation, not of the *real* horses, *real* oxen, *real* men, and *real* children, but of the *words* which denote these real beings!

A remarkable book in the form of an English Grammar, has recently appeared under the following imposing title:

"*An improved Grammar of the English Language, on the Inductive system*; by Reverend BRADFORD FRAZEE, late principal of Washington Female Academy. Washington, Miss."

Under page 26, we find the following definition of the possessive case:

"The possessive case denotes ownership;" as,

1. *Baker's* bread is not so cheap as domestic.

Does not *baker's* indicate the *kind* of bread! Does the word, *baker's* denote ownership!?

2. *Brewer's* yeast is better than *baker's* yeast.

Do *brewer's*, and *baker's* express ownership?—or do they express the *kinds* of yeast!?

3. He studies Bradford *Frazee's* Grammar.

Do we here mean that *Bradford Frazee* is the owner of this book? Nothing like it.

4. "*John's* friend was shot, and burnt, for the crime of dissection."

What does *John* own!!? Does he possess the annihilated friend!?

5. "James saw *John's* friend."

Is this friend the property of John!? If not, where is the *ownership*!?

Under page 25, Mr. Frazee gives the following definition of case itself:

"CASE."

"*Case* means the *position* of the name in the sentence with respect to other words."

But is this principle found in the following definition of the *possessive* case?

"The possessive case denotes *ownership*!"

What a vast difference there is between *position*, *place*, and *ownership*!?

As *case* signifies *place*, *position*, and as the *possessive* case is involved in the idea of *case*, why not define the possessive case by a description of its *position*!?

In the title page, Mr. Frazee styles his work an *improved* Grammar of the English language! And in his Preface he virtually adopts the following language—

"*I am the door*, by me if any man enter in, he is saved from his grammatical sins—he shall go in and out, and find *pasture*!!" Yes, if that which has been masticated, chewed, almost to annihilation, is pasture, he will find pasture enough! But, if he does not meet with a little *stubble* in going in, and out, we shall conclude that he has neither *eyes*, nor *palate*!

[We have examined several English Grammars of more recent publication than those on whose definitions of the possessive case we have here commented. But, as they contain nothing new, we can not consent to make them the subject of additional reflections Chandler, Welds, &c., &c., are mere copyists.]

The substitute, BOOK II., page 74, and 75.

CHAPTER XV.—OF THE OBJECTIVE CASE.

WE shall commence this chapter by giving Mr. Murray on the OBJECTIVE case. After having given his definition of this case, and made some few comments upon it, we shall examine the definitions which they who have been labouring to SIMPLIFY his works, have given of the same case.

“The objective case expresses the OBJECT of an ACTION or of a RELATION ;” as, *Jane*, THOU wast punished by thy *teacher*, in the *school house* !

The word, *Jane*, is a proper noun, second person, singular—and in what case ? *Jane*, is in the *nominative* case ! Who was punished ? JANE was punished. Was not *Jane*, then, the object acted upon ? Yes. This noun, therefore, must be in the *objective* case. By what rule ? Why by the clearest rule possible—the very definition of the *objective* case ! Can any one say that this noun is not in the objective case ! ? Surely it is not in the *possessive*—nor is it in the *nominative* : for it is neither the subject of a verb, nor the *actor* ! Why not the subject of a verb ? Because it is independent of the verb. “When an address is made, the noun is in the *nominative* case *independent*.”

The word, *thou*, is a pronoun, second person, singular, and in the *nominative* case to *wast punished*. Yet this pronoun expresses the object acted upon. Who was punished ? *Thou* wast punished. How, then, can this pronoun be in the *nominative* case ? “Easily enough,” says Mr. Ingersoll. “The *nominative* case is that word which denotes the animal, or the thing, which does an action !”

Ah ! and does the pronoun, *thou*, denote an animal that does an action ? Or does this pronoun denote an animal to which an action is done ?

What is Mr. Ingersoll’s definition of the objective case ?

“The objective case,” says Mr. Ingersoll, “denotes the object of an action ; as, *Caroline* broke the *glass*.”

Here, the action is done *by* *Caroline*, and *to* the *glass*. The word, *glass*, is presented by Mr. Ingersoll as the *objective* case. How is it in the instance before us ? *Thou* denotes the person to whom the action is done ; and by Mr. Murray, as well as by Mr. Ingersoll, is a pronoun in the objective case ! But this pronoun, the same word, is in the objective, and in the *nominative* at the same time ! *Thou*, expresses the object of an action ;—hence in the *objective*—*thou*, is parsed in the *nominative* ! So it is—and it cannot be helped !

Let us now repeat the definition :

The objective case expresses the object of an action, or of a relation ;" as JANE, THOU wast punished by thy TEACHER, in the SCHOOL HOUSE.

The word, *teacher*, is a common noun, third person, singular, and in the objective case after *by*. Yet the word, *teacher*, denotes the very actor himself ! But what is the objective case ? " The objective case expresses the object of an action." How, *how*, then, we beg to be informed, can the noun which expresses, not the *object*, but the very ACTOR HIMSELF, be parsed in the objective case ? The word, *teacher*, is Mr. Ingersoll's, Mr. Greenleaf's, Mr. Kirkham's, and Mr. Cardell's, nominative case, the actor ! Mr. Murray, however, says,

" The nominative case simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of a verb."

Mr. Murray, and all his SIMPLIFIERS, are grossly absurd.

If the nominative case is the *actor*, then, indeed, the nominative case, in the example before us, is the *objective* case ! Nor are constructions of this description rare ; our language abounds with them.

" *Jane, thou wast punished by thy teacher in the school house.*"

Mr. Murray's definition of the objective case seems not to describe the character of the word, *teacher*. Yet this noun is not entirely lost—for the *simplifiers*, and the *cloud dispersers* of Mr. Murray's Grammar, have caught, most happily caught, this objective case in their definition of the nominative ! They intend their definition for the nominative case—but, as it seems not to suit the nominative, let it not be lost, let it be applied to the *objective* case !

We now come to the word, *house*, which is a common noun, third person, singular, and in the objective case, governed by the preposition, *in*.

House is not the object of an action ; hence, if it is in the objective case by virtue of Mr. Murray's definition of this case, it comes under the last clause—

" The OBJECT of a RELATION."

There is a relation between *Jane*, and the *house* ; for Jane, as says the sentence, was *in* the house.

" *Jane, thou wast punished by thy teacher in the school house.*" Or, Jane, thou, *in* the school house, wast punished by thy teacher.

The preposition, *in*, shows the relation which exists between the *real* house, and the *real* person. And the word, *house*, is put

into the objective case—because of what? because of this relation. Now, was the house *nearer* to Jane than she was to the house? Surely Jane being as near the house, as the house was to her, the noun, *Jane*, ought also to be put into the objective case on account of this curiously objective relation! Yes—before Mr. Murray put the noun, *house*, into the objective, because of this relation, he should have found the extent of the principle. The thing which partakes of the relation to the higher, or highest degree, ought to be considered the *object* of the relation. But, if you examine, you will find that the things which are related, ever partake of the relation existing between them, in an *equal degree*! If *James* is my *brother*, I am his brother. But, if James could be my brother, and I bear no relation to him, Mr. Murray's principle might answer. Yes, if it could be proved that the ear has no relation with the head, then, indeed, the head might be considered as the object of the relation which it bears to the ear, without taking the ear into the account. But, as it is, if we say, "the EAR is on the HEAD," it is absurd to view the head as the only object of this relation. The ear is as near to the head, as the head is to the ear. If, therefore, in parsing the following sentence, the word, *head*, is parsed in the objective on account of the relation, we contend that the word, *ear*, also should be parsed in the objective:

"The EAR is ON the HEAD."

Ear, is in the *nominative* case—but *head*, is the object of a relation, hence in the *objective* case!

Let us now attend to the instructions of Mr. Comly upon the *object*—

"The objective case is the *state* of a noun, or pronoun, when it is the object of a verb, or preposition."

This definition appears well enough, till one tries to understand it. But the first attempt which one makes to comprehend its import, involves it in great obscurity. In the definition before us we find this *state* lugged in again—and to what effect? It is not explanation; but, on the contrary, it is a point which requires much explanation. If Mr. Comly knew what *state* it is of which he speaks so much, why did he not employ Mr. Murray's *definite article*, or some other descriptive word, and point out the kind of state he means?

"The objective case is a STATE of the noun or pronoun, *when* it is the OBJECT of the transitive verb, participle, or preposition."

Let us use the only word which Mr. Comly could have employed for the description of this state:

The objective case is the *objective* state of a noun, or pronoun when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition. More than this Mr. Comly does not mean. But even this he cannot sustain. If he means what we have supposed him to mean, his definition is made out at the word, *pronoun*—"The objective case is an *objective* state of a noun or pronoun." Is there any *such state*? As what? As an *objective state* of a noun. We contend that there is not. If there is such a state, it can be found; yet he has not condescended to define it. If he ever comprehended the true character of this state, we are surprised to find that he has not told in what it consists—and, if he never knew its true character, we are astonished that he should talk so much about it! This *objective* state must consist in the position of the noun—or it cannot exist in our language. Let us, then, see whether the objective noun has any *fixed* place in the sentence: "*John* is a good *pupil*; and such *pupils* all teachers admire."

John, the first nominative, stands *before* the verb—the noun, *pupil*, the second nominative, stands *after* the verb! *Admire* is a transitive verb, and *pupils*, a noun in the *objective* case, and is placed *before* this verb!

"All thorough teachers will enable their *pupils* to think."

Here we find the word, *pupils*, still in the objective case—yet it here stands *after* the verb!

"This is not the thing *which* he thinks of."

The objective case of *of* is found in *which*, *before* he!

"This is not the thing *of which* he thinks."

Here the objective case is found in *which*, and is placed *after of*!

Hence we find that there is no certain place which can be claimed as the position of the objective case. But even if there was, yet, as this place cannot be called a *state*, Mr. Comly's definition of the objective case would be no definition at all! What, then, has Mr. Comly done? Has he attempted to distinguish two things by their colour, which have the same colour? Yes, he has done worse—he has undertaken to distinguish two things by colour, when at the same time, neither of the things has any kind of colour! He has attempted to distinguish the nominative case by a *state* which the noun derives from the fact that it is the *subject* of the verb—the noun, however, derives no state from this source!

He has attempted to distinguish the objective case by a *state* which the noun derives from the fact that it is the object of a

transitive verb, or a preposition—but the noun derives *no state* from this source!

To give a clearer view of this point, it may be well to call the attention of the reader to the definition of case itself, as given by Mr. Comly.

“Case is a *change*, or *difference* in the termination, or *situation* of a noun or pronoun.”

Now, there are three particular cases; and each should have its proper portion of *case itself*! The three special cases he defines in the following manner:

1. “The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the *state* of a noun, or pronoun, when it is the subject of a verb; as, *I walk*.”

2. “The possessive case denotes property or possession; as, *thy book*.”

3. “The objective case is the *state* of a noun or pronoun, when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition; as, *I taught her*.”

Let us now repeat the author’s definition of case itself.

“Case is a difference or change in the termination or situation of a noun or pronoun.”

This definition should be properly distributed among the three definitions of the special cases. Has this distribution been made? We undertake to say that it has not. In each of the particular definitions, there is a *new* principle which forms the basis of the special definition. “The nominative case is simply the name of a thing.”

The generic, or parent definition of case, speaks of no principle like that which is denominated in the clause,

“Is simply the name of a thing!”

The generic definition says that,

“Case is a *change* or *difference*!”

Hence the nominative case must be something more than a *mere* name of a thing!

Let us now examine the second clause of Mr. Comly’s definition of the nominative:

“Or a *state* of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb.”

Here we admit that Mr. Comly includes *indirectly* one fact which he has presented in his *generic* definition of case. In the definition of case itself, the author says,

“A difference in the condition of a noun or pronoun.”

And in his definition of the nominative, he says,

“*State of a noun or pronoun.*”

But what state is this to which the author alludes? No state at all! What then? It is something which the peculiar state of Mr. Comly compelled him to *fancy* into being! The reader sees that this *state* is the very point which we have already discussed. And he well knows that in this discussion it is proved by examples, that the noun, and pronoun derive *no state* from the fact that they are the signs of the *subjects* of verbs?

1. “The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun or pronoun when it is the subject of a verb; as, *I am he.*”

2. “THE POSSESSIVE CASE.—The possessive case denotes property or possession; as, *thy book.*”

Now this definition recognises no one principle contained in the definition of case itself. The generic definition gives no intimation of *possession*.

3. “The objective case is a state of a noun or pronoun, when it is the object of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition.”

This definition is founded upon a *state* of a noun, or pronoun—and in this respect, it bears an indirect resemblance to the generic definition of case. The generic definition speaks of a difference in the *condition* of a noun, or pronoun; and from this analogous phraseology, some resemblance in idea may be inferred. But, it will be recollected, that the state upon which this definition of the objective case is founded does not exist! This state is just nothing at all! Does Mr. Comly even attempt to define it? No—he informs the pupil *when* it exists. Ah!—yes—and at what time does it exist? *Never!* For there is nothing to exist! But Mr. Comly *says* that it exists at the very instant the noun or pronoun is the object of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition!

“The objective case is the *state* of a noun or pronoun, *when* it is the object of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition!”

“The objective case is the state of a noun or pronoun.”

But *what* state of a noun, or pronoun? This question is too severe! O, no! says Mr. Comly—I can answer the question with ease! “It is that *particular* state which a noun, or a pronoun derives from the fact that it is the *object* of a transitive verb, participle, or preposition!”

But, Mr. Comly, we have already shown that nouns, and pronouns derive *no fixed*, no *certain*, no *particular* state from the fact

that they are the objects of these parts of speech! Does this state consist in *place*, *position*? No—for the nominative case can occupy the same position which the objective can.

Does this state consist in *length*? No—for the noun is no longer, when in the objective case, than it is when in the nominative!

We ask again.—Can this state consist in the position of the word? No! The nominative case may come *before*, as well as *after* the verb—and so may the objective; as,

<i>nom.</i>	<i>nom.</i>	<i>nom.</i>	<i>ob.</i>
“JOHN is a good PUPIL.”	“THEY teach this PUPIL.”		

<i>ob.</i>	<i>ob.</i>
[“That BOOK she <i>purchased</i> .”]	[That is] (the pen) (WHICH
<i>nom.</i>	

I made.)

In the preceding instances, the objective is placed before as well as after, the verb. The objective, then, in point of position, has nothing different from the nominative!

“Case is a change or difference in the termination or condition of a noun or pronoun.”

This definition is a mere nothing—it does not apply to our nouns, and pronouns, which are in the nominative, and objective case. For instance, *I* and *me*, are not different terminations of the same word—these are two different words! So it is with *she*, and *her*, *he* and *him*. What is meant by *changes* in the termination of words, may be seen from the different endings of “write;” as,

s, th, st. Writes, writeth, writest.

Perhaps, however, it may be said that, Mr. Comly’s definition of case, suits *who*, and *whom*, *thou*, and *thee*.

It may apply also to the nouns, and pronouns, which are in the possessive case, as, *my* hat, *John’s* glove. But his definition applies to no noun which is parsed either in the nominative, or the objective case: for the noun undergoes no change with a view to fit it for either of these cases. For example—

“*John* saw *John*.”

The first *John* is in the nominative case—the second, in the objective.

2. “These *lads* hurt those *lads*.”

The first noun is in the nominative case—the second, in the objective.

But it is the intention of Mr. Comly to secure these nouns by the following phraseology :

“ A difference in the *condition* of a noun or pronoun.”

In this, however, the author is completely defeated—for we have more than once shown that these nouns derive *no* condition from the fact that they are the subjects, or objects of verbs ! The objective noun may be placed *before* the verb which governs it. To support this position, we have already given many instances—but to give the subject all that attention which it deserves, and to aid them who require clear, and frequent illustration, we will adduce a few other examples :

1. This is the book *which* he purchased.
2. *Which* did he purchase ?
3. These are fine pupils—and such *children* all people must admire.
4. It is nothing *which* he desires.
5. It is a fact *which* I know nothing of.

Now, if Mr. Comly cannot derive this difference in the condition of a noun, and pronoun, he cannot sustain his definition of case ! But he may say that this condition is the position itself. If so, his objective case is neither more, nor less than an objective *position* ! Hence case would mean nothing but the place on the paper, in which the noun, or the pronoun stands. But as there is no certain place in which the objective noun stands, in relation to the verb that governs it, there can be no objective position ; hence, when we give Mr. Comly all, yea more than he seems to claim, his *objective case is nothing at all* !

Mr. Comly first gives a definition of case itself—he then proceeds to give definitions of the three different cases, by introducing principles entirely different from those contained in the definition of case itself ! Yes, so far does he depart from his first, or general definition of case, that his particular definitions have nothing in them having a *direct* resemblance to case itself !

But Mr. Comly's definition of case itself is narrow, illiberal, ill constructed, and altogether incompetent ! It speaks of nothing which can be found in the grammatical principles of the English language ! It is founded upon a *difference* in the condition of nouns—but what this condition is, is yet to be made out ! For the author has not thought proper even to attempt to define it !! Mr. Comly's definition speaks of “ a *difference* in the condition of a noun ”—but would it not be well for him to make out *the existence* of the condition itself, before he attempts to show a difference in it ! This prating about the difference in the condition of nouns, is disputing about the division of an estate, where in fact there is no estate for distribution !

In giving a definition of the nominative case, Mr. Comly employs the word, *subject*. But this instructor of little children gives no kind of explanation of what *he* means by the phrase, *nominative case*!

"The nominative case is simply the name of a thing, or the state of a noun, or pronoun, when it is the *subject* of a verb!" as, *John* saw *John*.

Now, the first *John* is in the nominative case. But can the pupil see that the first *John* is any more the subject of the verb than the second?

"*John*, this *John* hurt that *John*."

The first *John* is not the subject of the verb; for it stands independent of the verb—yet the first *John* is in the nominative case! "*Subject of a verb*," is much like the "*difference in a condition*!"

In point of fact there is nothing which is a subject of a verb. Things, perhaps, may be divided into subjects, and objects—but not upon the mere circumstance, or fact of having their names mechanically connected with verbs! As well might it be said that one's ears are subjects, because they are connected with his head, as that nouns are subjects, because they are connected with verbs! But to say that one noun is converted into a subject through the magic of this connection, while the other is degraded to a mere object of the same connection, is queer, indeed! Why, has the noun in the nominative case any closer connection with the verb than the noun in the objective?—

"*John*, this *John* hurt that *John*."

The first *John* has no sort of connection with the verb, *hurt*,—yet it is in the nominative case!

The last *John* has a close connection with this verb; yet it is in the objective case!

How, then, does Mr. Comly support his definition of the nominative case?

The distinction between a subject, and an object, is a very important point—a point which we think Mr. Comly should have understood, before making the above use of the word, *subject*.

"The nominative case is the subject of a verb;" as, *John* is *John*, *John* hurt *John*.

Now, what great difference is there between the two *Johns*,—one following *is*, and the other *hurt*? That which follows *is*, is in the nominative case—that which follows *hurt*, is in the objective!

Has Mr. Murray, or Mr. Comly, or has any other writer upon this science, explained the difference between a *subject*, and an *object*? Not one—nor do we believe that the authors of the vast numbers of English Grammars that have distracted this science, and blinded the public vision, have ever understood the principle upon which a distinction may be made, that will justify the use of the words, *subject*, and *object*, in a system of grammar.

1. "The *subject* of a verb."

2. "The nominative case is the *subject* of a verb."

Absurd as it may appear, they who have written our English Grammars, have used the phraseology,

"Subjects of verbs," and objects of verbs, as though these were points which the learner instinctively comprehends!

We put the following question to all the friends to, and foes of, the British system of English grammar:

Is the *noun itself* the subject of the verb, or is the *person*, or *thing* denoted by the noun, the subject of the verb?

If they tell us that it is the *noun itself*, then, indeed, the *subjective* character of a noun depends entirely upon the noun's *frame-work* relation to the verb! And as the *objective* noun is as closely connected with the verb as the *subjective*, it follows that *all* nouns having a frame-work relation with verbs, are the subjects of verbs—hence, *all* nouns are in the nominative case! "*John* saw *John*," "*John* hurt *himself*."

But, if they tell us, as does Mr. Murray, that the subject is not the noun, but the thing denoted by the noun, then, indeed, all the words, in the same sentence, denoting the same thing, are subjects of verbs. For instance—*John* hurt *himself*.

Here *John*, and *himself*, mean the same person. And, if the word, *John*, is put into the nominative because the real person is the subject, what becomes of the word *himself*? Does not *himself* denote the subject as clearly as does the word *John*? Does not *himself* allude to the same being to whom *John* refers? What, then, becomes of the doctrine that a word is in the nominative case because it refers to the person, or thing that is "*principally spoken of*!?"

MATTER AND THOUGHT GRAMMAR — page 54. Mr. Cardell remarks—

"Nouns stand in different relations to other words; as, Henry conquered *Richard*—*Richard* conquered *Henry*."

The compiler observes, under the same page, that,

"The nominative case denotes the *performer* of an action : and the objective, the object which receives its effects ; as,

"They sent a letter to him."

"He sent an answer to them."

This epistolary correspondence is nearly equal to the *ball*, and *boat* illustration ! "The nominative case denotes the *performer* ;" as, a letter was sent by him to *them* ! A letter was sent to them by *him* ! They were written to by *him* ! He was written to by *them* !

Now, let it be observed, that the compiler's position is, that the one who writes to the other, is the nominative—and that the one who is written to is the *object*.

1. A letter was sent to him by *them* !

2. A letter was written to them by *him* !

Them, and *him*, consequently, are objective pronouns in the nominative case, and governed by the preposition, *by* !

"*Whichever* did the action is the nominative, the other is the objective."—CARDELL.

1. *He* was written to by *them* !

2. *They* were written to by *him* !

As Mr. Cardell says, that the one who does not write, or that does not do the action, is in the objective, it follows that *he*, and *they* are in the objective case to the verbs *was written*, and *were written* ! Hence the old rule should read thus,

The verb must agree with the objective case in number and person !

"*Whichever* did the action is the nominative, the other is the objective."

That is, if the *bull* carried off the *boat*, then, the *bull* is the nominative, and the boat is the object ; as, "the boat was carried off by the *bull* !"

But, if the *boat* carried off the *bull*, then, the *boat* is the nominative, and the bull is the object ; as, the bull was carried off by the *boat* !

So much for Mr. Cardell's attempt to form a Grammar for the English language, according to the laws of *matter and thought*. But this *polyglot* Grammarian will be able to mend the rigging of this boat, launch it *de novo*, and shoot away by *his* compass of *matter and thought* ! We admit that we pay very little respect to Mr. Cardell's *matter and thought* Grammar. But it may not be proper, in this place, to give our reasons for this want of respect. To proceed—

“The objective case expresses the *object* of an action or of a relation ; as, Saul persecuted the Christians in every synagogue.”

The word, *Saul*, is in the nominative case to the verb, *persecuted* ; the word, *Christians*, is in the objective case, governed by *persecuted* ; the word, *synagogue*, is in the objective case, governed by *in*,

Let us now ascertain whether this manner of *caseing* comports with the *definition* of the cases.

The objective case, according to the definition, is that into which the words are put, that are the *names of things* acted upon. If so, the word, *Christians*, is doubtless in the objective, as the example now stands.

Invert the order of these words, and view this matter—“The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul in every Synagogue.”

As the sentence first stands, the word, *Christians*, is truly in the objective case. But, as it here stands, we are told that the same word is not in the objective, but in the nominative case ! Now, does it appear from the definition of the objective case, that a mere change in the collocation of words, is to wrest the same noun from the objective, and put it into the nominative case ? What says the definition ? It asserts as decidedly as words can declare, that the name of the *thing acted upon*, is in the objective case. But we ask whether any one can pretend, when the preceding example reads thus :

“The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul,—”

That the word, *Christians*, is not the *name* of the persons acted upon, equally as much as when the example stands in the following order :

“Saul persecuted the *Christians*.”

Does the new collocation of the words so entirely change the fact affirmed ? If not, the word, *Christians*, is in the objective case just as much when the example reads thus :

“The *Christians* were persecuted by Saul—”

as it is when the assertion is made with the words in this order :

“Saul persecuted the *Christians*.”

But we are told that this point is made logical by calling, *was persecuted*, a *passive verb* ; therefore, let us set aside the error for a moment, and consider the grounds of its justification. The verb, *persecuted*, is the name of an action by which persons harass each other. The word, *passive*, alludes to the state of whatever is acted upon. Now, then, we ask whether the action, performed by Saul, in this scene, was *passive*, or whether the Christians were *passive* ? Was the *action* of Saul, affected ; or were the

Christians affected? How would the Christians themselves answer this question? Would they say that they suffered nothing in this scene,—that Saul's action did not terminate upon them, but upon *itself*? If so, the *name* of his *action* must be *passive*, instead of the word, *Christians*, the name of the persons really acted upon!

If the sentence stands thus:

“The Christians were *persecuted* by Saul.”

The verb, *persecuted*, is a *passive* verb, because it is acted upon!

But if it stands in this manner:

“Saul *persecuted* the Christians.”

Then, the Christians themselves are acted upon, and, consequently, the word, *Christians*, is put into the objective case! Strange reasoning this!

We can perceive no difference between *persecuted*, and an *active verb*. An active verb, says the old theory, “expresses an action that passes” from the actor, and terminates upon some object! Now, the word, *persecuted*, does express an action which did terminate upon the christians.

And we are told that the verb, *persecuted*, in the following arrangement, is in fact an *active* verb: “Saul *persecuted* the Christians.” But does this verb signify any less *passion*, or *suffering*, in this collocation than in the following?

“The Christians were *persecuted* by Saul.”

The truth is, that according to the definition of a passive verb, *persecuted* is a passive verb in one order as much as in the other, since it does express in both, what constitutes a passive verb—and according to the character of an *active* verb, *persecuted* is an active verb in both constructions!

Having taken a cursory view of the ground upon which the word, *Christians*, is wrested from the objective case, we will now proceed to consider the manner in which the noun. *Saul*, is parsed with the words in the following order:

“The Christians were *persecuted* by Saul.”

Here, it is manifest, that *Saul himself* was the actor; and the question now is in what case is the noun, *Saul*?

By the old theory this name is parsed thus;

Saul is a proper noun, third person, singular number, in the *objective case*, governed by the preposition, *by*.

But the word, *Saul*, is not the name of the person acted upon; it is the name of the *actor*; therefore it cannot be in the objective case.

It is pretended, however, that there are *objects of relation*;

hence it is our duty to see whether the noun, *Saul*, can be put into the objective case upon this principle.

The definition first asserts that the objective case is the *name* of the *object of an action*, and then puts in the clause "or of a *relation*."

James sits by John.

For one moment, let us say, that because the real person called *James*, sits near the person denominated *John*, the noun *James*, should be parsed in the objective case. Now, how, on this principle, can we avoid finding *John* in the objective case likewise? Is not *John* as near to *James*, as *James* is to *John*? Must not, consequently both *John* and *James* be equally the objects of this *objective relation*!?

Before the noun, *John*, can be put into the nominative, and the word, *James*, into the objective case, let it appear that *James* is *nearer* to *John*, than *John* is to *James*!

"Let us," says Mr. Murray, "have a *comprehensive objective* case; one that will include all the *objects of action*, as well as those of *relation*."

His objective case not only includes both these; but unfortunately, it extends to the nominative, and possessive case also. If the relation of words, or of things, is a foundation for an objective case, all words which have a relation, are in the objective case; hence, conjunctions, adverbs, verbs, adjectives, and even prepositions themselves must be in the objective case, or they have no relation to other words! But if these parts of speech have no relation to other words, on what, we ask, are the rules founded, that *adverbs* qualify *verbs*; that *adjectives* qualify *nouns*; that *articles* limit *nouns*; that *prepositions* govern *nouns*, &c.? Will it be said that all these parts of speech are in the objective case? This must be done, or the objective case, founded upon *relation*, must be set aside!

But what is the particular use of the objective case? The question is answered by the theory of which this case itself is a fair sample. One of the grounds upon which the objective case is considered advantageous, is *convenience* in grammatical solution; another is the importance, that it can be said, we have no nouns which cannot be cased—but the last, and that most particularly depended upon, is its use by way of *distinction* between the *actor*, and the *object* of the action.

But, is it true that the *name* of the object is always in the objective? or, rather, is it not true that the name of the actor is as often in the objective as 'n the nominative; and is it not true

that the name of the object is as often in the nominative as in the objective ?

AN EXAMPLE.

“The *Christians* were persecuted by *Saul*.”

Will it be said that in this sentence, the *name* of the *object* has the OBJECTIVE case ? and must it not be admitted that *Saul*, the *name* of the *actor*, is parsed in the objective case ?

But the absurdity does not end here : for, in many sentences, the name of the *thing* which neither acts, nor is acted upon, is put into the objective case. “The *Christians* were persecuted by *Saul* in every *synagogue*.”

It is said that the objective case is the *name* of the *object* ; but the word, *Saul*, is the name of the *actor* ; yet it is in the objective ; hence contradiction. The word, *Christians*, which is the *name* of the *persons* acted upon, is in the nominative case instead of the objective ; hence absurdity. But the noun, *synagogue*, is neither the *name* of the *actor*, nor the *name* of an *object* ; yet this noun is said to be in the objective case ;—and here, too, is absurdity !

Can the old theory inform the learner, that the name of the *actor* is in the nominative case, or that the name of the *object* is in the objective, when in truth the name of the *actor* is as often in the objective as in the nominative, and the name of the *object* as often in the nominative as in the objective ! ? And what is still more perplexing, is, that the name of what neither acts, nor is acted upon, is parsed, in two-thirds of the instances, in the objective case ! !

Doctor Bullions defines the objective case as follows,

“The objective case denotes the object of some action or relation ; as, James assists *Thomas*, they live in *Albany*.”

Thomas, and *Albany*, are in the objective case.

What is an *object* of an action ?

We understand that an object of an action, is the thing on which an action terminates ; as,

1. *Thomas* was assisted by James. (*Thomas*.)

2. “*Apples* were eaten by me.” (*Apples*.)

3. The *eye* is affected by the light. (*Eye*.)

Yet, astonishing as it may appear, the nouns, *Thomas*, *apples*, and *eye*, are in the nominative case ! !

“They live in *Albany*.”

As the word, *Albany*, is employed by Mr. Bullions to illustrate the part of his definition of the objective case, which is founded on *relation*, it may be well to inquire what is an object of relation,

"The objective case denotes the object of some action or *relation*."

That is, the objective case denotes an object of some action ; or it denotes an object of some *relation*

"*An object of relation.*"

What does this language mean ?

We are honest—we do not intend to quibble ; we declare that we can not comprehend this language.

Why has not Mr. Bullions explained what he means by *an object of some relation* ? The only way in which we can understand this language, is, that where different things bear a relation to one another, they are objects of relation. No other meaning can we give to this phraseology :

"*The object of a relation.*"

But of all the names of the objects of relation, which one is to be in the objective case ?

"*They live in Albany.*"

They bear a relation to Albany—and Albany bears a relation to them ! Which, then, is the object of this local relation ? Both are objects of this relation ! Why, then, is not *they* as much in the objective case as *Albany* ! ?

"*John is with his uncle.*"

These two persons are together—hence they are both the objects of this common relation. Yet, while *uncle* is parsed in the objective case upon the ground of the relation which the uncle himself bears to John, *John* is parsed, not in the objective case at all, but in the nominative ! It is so—question it who may.

"*John is with his uncle.*"

How much nearer is the uncle to John than John is to the uncle ! ? We fancy that we hear Mr. Bullions himself say, "they are equally near."

Yet John is not the object of the relation which he bears to the uncle ! How, then, can the uncle be the object of the relation which he bears to John ! ?

T. S. Smith Esq. says, we have long enough been taught that—

"Of two or more things equally *related*, but one is the object of the relation ; as, *John* stands by *Robert*."

In an English Grammar by PARDON DAVIS, we find the following under page 37—

"PREPOSITION."

Any word showing the *relative* position of two persons or things, is a preposition ; as, He is *near* Philadelphia. The book is *on* the table.—PARDON DAVIS.

Here it is openly said that all the things bear a relation—and it is most clearly proved to be so by the very examples which are employed to illustrate the doctrine.

1. "*He* is near *Philadelphia*."

2. "*John* is near *Philadelphia*."

Can it be said that *Philadelphia* is in the objective case on the ground of the relation which this city bears to *John*? It must be said, then, that *John* is in the objective case, on the ground of the relation which he bears to this city!

Goold Brown says,—

The objective case is that *form*, or *state* of a noun or pronoun which denotes the object of a verb, participle, or preposition; as, I know the *boy*.—GOOLD BROWN.

"I know the *boy*."

Here *boy* is in the objective case.

The *boy* is known by me.

Here *boy* is in the nominative case! But, has the word, *boy*, changed its form? It is *boy* in the objective; and it is *boy* in the nominative!!

But it may be said that the word, *boy*, has changed its state!!

1. "I know the *boy*."

2. "The *boy* is known by me."

In both instances this noun denotes the person who is known. How, then, has it changed its state?

But let us inquire what is the meaning of the language—

"The *object* of a *verb*, *participle*, or *preposition*."

Has Mr. Brown told us what the object of a verb is!? Has he told us what the object of a preposition is? Has he told us what the object of a participle is? Not a word is said upon these points in his whole book! Let us, then, see if we can devise what an *object* of a *verb* is:

The object of a verb is the word which the *meaning* of the verb suggests to the mind as a proper word to be used with the verb. For instance—the verb, *drinks*, suggests the use of the words, *water*, *milk*, *tea*, *coffee*, *cider*, *wine*, &c.

"Henry drinks *tea* out of a cup."

As we do not drink *cups*, the word which *drinks* suggests, is *tea*. The word, *tea*, then, may be considered the object of *drinks*.

DRINKS.

But the meaning of *drinks* not only suggests a word denoting something which we drink—as *water*, *wine*, but it suggests a word denoting some being that drinks,—as *man*, *boy*, *girl*, *ox*, *horse*.

Let us, then, supply these two suggested words:

Henry drinks *wine*.

The meaning of *drinks* requires both words,—*Henry*, and *wine*. Which then is the object!? Is not the thing after which *D.* reaches with his left hand, as much an object as that after which he reaches with his right hand!?

“John saw the bird fly.”

The word, *saw*, reaches, after *John* as much as it does after *bird*. Which noun, then, is the object of *saw*?

What is the object after which *fly* reaches? Does the meaning of the word, *fly*, suggest *John*, or *bird*, or both? *Fly* reaches toward *bird*. *Bird*, then, is the object of *fly*.

“The bird was seen to fly by John.”

Let us see whether *the* has not an objective case!

1. *The*—*the* what? *The*, but *the* what? *The* surely reaches after some sign, some objective word. “The *bird*.” *Bird*, then, is the objective word of *the*! But *bird* is in the nominative case. *Bird* in the nominative case!? Why, *was* is constantly reaching after *bird*. *Was*—but was what? *What* was? *Bird* was. *Bird*, then, is the objective word of *was*!

2. *Seen* also reaches after some word to sustain itself. *Was seen*. What was *seen*? *Bird* was seen. *Bird*, then, is an object of *seen*.

But *seen* is not perfectly satisfied yet. *Seen* still reaches for some word which denotes the being who saw. The bird was *seen*—hence some being must have *seen* it. *Seen*, then, makes sense with *bird*, and *John*, after which words it constantly reaches!

3. *To*—*to* what? This preposition, like every other branch word, reaches after some super, some basis word to sustain it in the connection in which it stands in this verbal frame-work. *To* *what*? is constantly addressed to the mind. The answer to this standing interrogation, is *fly*. *To fly*. The verb, *fly*, then, is in the objective case after *to*!!

4. *By*—*by* what? *By John*. *John*, then, is the object of *by*.

Let us repeat Mr. Brown’s definition of the objective case:

“The objective case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the object of a verb, participle or preposition; as, I know the *boy*.”

This definition is founded, not upon the object of *action*, and *relation*, but upon the object of a *reference* to, a pointing to, a reaching after. The words in a sentence, which can not stand alone, reach after some other words in the verbal frame-work to sustain them. The *arms* by which these words reach, are the significations, and the branch character of the words. And, as whatever is pursued, referred to, or reached after, becomes an *object*, the words to which the referring words relate, or after

which the reaching words reach, may be called the objects of the referring, of the reaching, words.

"I *know the boy*."

The word, *know*, refers directly to *I*, and *boy*. *I know boy*.

Hence *I*, and *boy*, are the objects to which *know* points—and after which it actually reaches.

The refers, not to *I*, but to *boy*. *The I* does not give the idea—not the true sense. *The boy* expresses the true sense, and connection. The object of *the*, then, is *boy*.

The change, therefore, which Goold Brown has made in the basis of the objective case, is certainly a striking improvement upon Murray!!

"The objective case is that form or state of a noun or pronoun, which denotes the object of a verb, participle, or preposition: as, I know the *boy*."

But will the boy ever know the objective case!?

Mr. Brown remarks in his Preface, that,

He has not laboured to *overthrow* the general system of grammar, received from time immemorial, but to *improve* upon it, in its present application to our tongue.—GOOLD BROWN.

That Mr. Brown has improved upon Mr. Murray's absurdities there can be no doubt!

The objective case expresses the object of an action or of a relation.—MURRAY.

This definition places the nominative case in the objective—and the objective in the nominative. But it does not like that given by Goold Brown, place verbs in the objective case—nor does it like Mr. B.'s, give articles, adjectives, conjunctions, and adverbs the objective case!!

Mr. Bradford Frazee, says,

"Case means the *position* of the name in the *sentence*, with respect to other words." (Page 25.)

Under page 26, he says,

"The nominative case is the NAMING case!"

Under page 27, he says,

"The nominative case does something—the possessive case owns something—the objective case has something done to it!"

Let us illustrate these golden principles:

"The nominative case is the *naming* case."

"*He* is not *thou*."

He is in the nominative case—but is *he* a name? If the word, *he*, is a name, why is not this word a noun?

Thou is in the *naming* case! But Mr. Frazee says that *thou* is not a noun, because it is not a name!

If the nominative case is the *naming* case, why is not every name in the nominative case!?

"He purchased a book of Johnson."

1. *He*, although not a name, is in the *naming* case!

2. But *book*, although a name, is not in the *naming* case, but in the objective!!

And *Johnson*, the name of the person of whom he made the purchase, is not in the nominative, but in the objective case!!

1. "The nominative case does something;" as,
The rock was smitten by *Moses*!

2. "The possessive case owns something;" as,
Henry owns Bradford *Frazee's* Grammar!!

3. "The objective case has something done to it;" as,
The *rock* was smitten by *Moses*!

Yes, yes,—the objective case has something done to it; it has been murdered!

Let us examine the manner in which the nouns, and pronouns, are disposed of in constructions like the following:

"I am the *lad*." "It is *they*." "He is *I*." "He is not *I*."
"This pupil is not John *Foster*." "John *Foster* is not the pupil whom I taught." 1. I am the *lad*."

The pronoun, *I*, is in the nominative case to *am*. The noun, *lad*, is also in the nominative case to *am*! But how very different is that relation which the pronoun, *I*, bears to *am*, from that which the noun, *lad*, bears to this verb! Can we say—The *lad am*? Now, if the nominative case is *any thing*, and *lad* bears a nominative case relation to *am*, why is it that we cannot say—The *lad am*? Has *lad* no relation with *am*? Is it not meant that *lad* is in the nominative case with respect to *am*? If *lad* is not in the nominative case with respect to *am*, in respect to what verb is it in the nominative case!? Is *lad* in the nominative case!? Is *lad* in the nominative case without reference to any verb!? Is this noun in the nominative case independent of all verbs!? Are we told that this noun is in the nominative case after *am*? But does the word, *after*, show the relation of *lad* to *am*—or does it merely point out on which side of *am* this noun stands? Why, the pronoun, *I*, may stand *after* the verb;

"*Am I* not free?" "*I am* the *lad*."

I, and *lad*, are both parsed in the nominative case—and they are both parsed in the nominative case in reference to this one verb, *am*! But how different are the relations which these two nominatives bear to this verb!

It may not be amiss to cite the rule which the British Grammarians apply in instances like the one before us—

The verb *to be*, through all its variations, has the same case after it which it has before it.—MURRAY.

The propriety of the rule is obvious, for both nouns express the same thing.—MURRAY.

Now, according to this doctrine, *I*, and *myself*, as used in the following instance, are both in the same case—" *I hurt myself.*"

The two pronouns, in this sentence, mean the same person; and if identity in thing, or person, throws both nouns into the same case, the word, *myself*, is not in the objective case, as the British Grammarians say, but in the nominative after the verb *hurt*!

Again. ["*I am not*] (the *lad*) (whom you taught.")

As *lad*, and *I*, mean different persons, what is to become of the noun, *lad*? Is it in the nominative case after *am*, upon the ground that it denotes the same person denoted by *I*? Here it is seen, that, while the solution of *myself*, in the first example, distracts Mr. Murray's rule, the solution of *lad*, in the second, saps its very foundation—identity.

In what way will the words in italics be disposed of according to the old school Grammars?

1. "*I am the lad.*" 2. "*I am not the lad.*" 3. "*It is they.*"
4. "*It is not I.*" 5. "*I am the lad whom you taught.*"

How, we ask, is *whom* to be parsed? We ask, because *I*, *lad*, and *whom*, mean the same person! Is *whom* in the nominative case after *am*? If the doctrine of identity is sound, it must be parsed in this way! And if this doctrine is unsound, how are the nouns in italics, in the following sentences, to be parsed?

1. *I am not the lad.* 2. *It is not John.* 3. *This is not the boy* for whom you search. 4. *Truth is not falsehood.* 5. [*Falsehood is not truth*] (except in GRAMMAR!)

Finally, let us exhibit an instance, in which the three cases assemble in the same word:

Yours were punished! "*Hers* were acquitted."

Yours denotes the *subject* of the verb; it denotes the *object* of the action also; and all our Grammars give it as the possessive case of *you*. Yes, within the orthographical boundaries of one short word, we find this triplicate group of cases, floating upon liquid error, ebbing and flowing before the influence of habit and education!

Let no man say, that to introduce the noun, a letter or two must be severed from the pronoun; as, *your* children were punished.

These examples are purely good English, as they now stand: and our system of cases should enable us to parse them without collision or diminution.

Thus, we have traced the cases through alternate succession of error, and mystery, till they have convened in one short word! And here we leave the convention in the shape of a GRAMMATICAL JUBILEE, celebrating the day even in advance of their dissolution, and final departure from the English grammar.

But has the "Rational System" a remedy? None at all! The disease of the old theory is *constitutional*, and is past a cure. Constitutional?! Yes—the disease is constitutional, and consists in the very *want* of a constitution! The Rational System is presented, not as a remedy for the old apparatus, but as a SUBSTITUTE for it. The substitute is built upon a new bottom, constructed upon Rational principles, and composed of new materials. Yes—it has left the old structure groaning under the weight of incurable disease—it has left it to fall into one massive pile of monumental glory to the memory of Murray—it has left it to tumble, and to crush those who have tinkered it into contortions, and themselves into authors! (*Substitute*—p. 146.)

The Rational Grammar is now complete: the THREE BOOKS of which it consists, are now published—and they may be had of the author, at No 15, South Tenth Street.

‘What is the Rational Grammar?’

1. The Rational Grammar is a full Grammatical SYSTEM, founded upon principles entirely Rational, and highly important.

2. The Rational Grammar is a Grammatical system which settles all the points contested among teachers,—resolves all the difficulties of the pupil,—and relieves the mind of all grammatical scruples.

3. It sets aside mere theories,—exposes their unsoundness, demonstrates the little use of attending to them,—and presents to the world, the unerring, and the only way, to the structure of an English sentence.

4. The Rational Grammar urges the mind of the student to invention, and thought—it fixes the technicals, and principles in his mind, by employing his perceptive powers.

5. It undeceives the most accomplished, and instructs the most profound Grammarian.

May we not, then, expect the aid of the teacher, the editor, the clergyman, the lawyer, the statesman, and the philanthropist, in procuring a fair trial of this system? We ask this, because we verily believe that we have a just claim to it. And we expect to get it, because we ask it to benefit those of whom we ask it. We claim nothing on the score of merit—we ask our country to benefit itself by the adoption of the works which have cost one of her native children, a life of labour, and a world of pains.

THE QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED.

1. Is the old theory of English Grammar, as compiled by L. Murray, and *changed*, (not improved,) by others, sound enough to be tolerated?

2. Is the Rational system, by JAMES BROWN, perfectly sound?

3. Will the advantages resulting from the adoption of the Rational system, be sufficiently great to compensate for the inconvenience of adopting it?

THE BOOKS OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM.

BOOK I.

As this Book which is now used in the Public Schools, is not a substitute for the old theory, it may be used without inconvenience with any of the old English Grammars.

The matter presented in Book I., is new, and of great importance to the learner of the old theory.

BOOK II.

This Book which is now used in the Public Schools, is offered as a substitute for the old theory—and, although it employs the old technical terms in parsing, its principles, and definitions are entirely new.

BOOK III.

This Book which has not yet been offered to the Board of Controllers, is not a substitute for the old theory—hence it may be used very conveniently with any of the works on the old plan, without Book I., and without Book II., of the Rational System. About one hundred pages of this Book, are devoted to a discussion of the prepositions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Of Brown's First Book on English Grammar.

Philadelphia June 6th, 1843

About a year ago I examined with great care the FIRST Book of Brown's English Grammar, and became satisfied that this part of the author's theory should be made a standard school book; and, as soon as the resolution of the Board of Control, allowing it to be used in all the public schools of which they have the superintendence, had been passed, I set about introducing it into the New Market Street School. Forty-eight boys in this school, have used Book I., for seven, or eight months. And although I do not consider it a *substitute* for an English Grammar, I feel convinced that as a *Reading*, and as an *Exercise* book on the *constructive* principles of the English Language, it is a most powerful auxiliary both in teaching, and learning the old English Grammar. Ever since I have felt capable of appreciating a sound English Education, I have hailed, with great pleasure, every new *effectual* means for promoting it; and among the many which I have labored to adopt, I have met with none, in which I have felt more satisfaction than in the FIRST Book of Brown's English Grammar. I wish to see *common English* words substituted for the newly formed ones which in my opinion constitute the *only* objection to the work.*

JOHN M. COLEMAN,

Principal of New Market Street Public School.

Philadelphia, October 19th, 1850.

I have read Brown's FIRST Book on the Grammar of the English Language, with great care. It is a new production—indeed almost entirely *original*. It treats of a part of grammatical science on which Mr. Murray, and his simplifiers, are perfectly silent. Yet the principles which the book inculcates seem to be the very *basis* of English Grammar. The author has greatly simplified, and improved the work by a judicious substitution of common English words for the newly formed ones which he originally used in this part of his new system.

If *patience*, *perseverence*, and *complete success* in the formation of a book, entitles one to the patronage of the public, JAMES BROWN is deserving of it.

P. A. CREGAR,

Principal of the S. E. Grammar School.

* The author has recently made this substitution

RECOMMENDATIONS.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 19, 1849.

For the last few years the subject of education has occupied an unusual share of public attention, and a motley crowd of professors has rapidly succeeded each other in their attempts to enlighten us upon the best mode of imparting knowledge to the youthful mind. And though vanity has not unfrequently assisted in swelling the list of competitors for public favour in this department, the ordinary stimulus to this course, we regret to say, has been a sacred thirst for gold. Accordingly, we have had in the shape of primers, spelling-books, and grammars, every thing that uneducated ingenuity, stolid dullness or rapid pretension, could contrive to manufacture, by combining and re-combining the faulty elements of unphilosophical systems; and the doses have been administered in more or less nauseous forms, as the natural ability of the *book-doctor* has been small or large. Sometimes a work, though unsound indeed in its conception and faulty in its execution, has avoided shocking the taste by a certain symmetry of structure (which has made it readable), whilst too often, under the parade of a sounding title-page and professional commendations, the rude and disjointed members of a dozen vicious theories, have been crowded into one mass of confusion, and the unhappy student "perplexed in the extreme," has in vain attempted to traverse, dry-shod, the Serbonian bog which he has been tempted to enter by the Jack-o'-lantern of the grammar-menders and grammar-kings.

An attempt, however, has been made by a man, who has brought profound acquirements, and much originality of thought, to what has been with him, a labour of love, to give an exposition of the true constructive principles of the English language. For more than twenty years, manfully buffeting the tide of ignorance and interest, which has opposed him, Mr. James Brown has at length succeeded in awakening the attention of a sluggish public to the crudities and follies which have disfigured the thousand so-called grammars, with which our schools, public and private, have been flooded; and with patient analysis, yet luminous comprehensiveness, leaving the old Murray theory, but adhering to the true principles of our language, he has given us a system of English Grammar which is really both simple and philosophic.

It is not our purpose, however, now, and we mistrust our ability for the task at any time, to give an exegesis of the more scientific works of Mr. Brown. It is enough to say, that they have been approved by those whose praise is valuable, because discriminating and sincere. Our present object is to direct attention to two elementary works by Mr. Brown, recently published under the title of the "First," and the "Second Round in the Ladder of Education," which we are most happy to learn there is a present design of introducing into our Public Schools. An examination of the ingenious and complete method, which constitutes the First Round, for fixing in the youthful mind, not only the *names*,

RECOMMENDATIONS.

but the *sounds* of the twenty-six letters in the English alphabet and impressing them permanently upon the mind of the child, must demonstrate the superiority of this little work over all books professing to treat of the same subject. In the Second Round, which is principally appropriated to the teaching of the *prefixes*, *syllable-reading*, *word-reading*, and *sentence-reading*, we have been particularly struck with the admirable diagrammatic method adopted to illustrate the meaning of those prepositions which most commonly occur in speech. The explanations both of the *mechanism* and of the *meaning* of the *prefixes* cannot be too highly valued; since, in Mr. Brown's own words, "the great importance of an early acquaintance with these is established from the consideration that a thorough knowledge of them enables the child to determine the general import of nearly *twenty* thousand words." The *trial* readings are particularly useful in exercising what the common modes of instruction seem not to regard—the *MIND* of the pupil.

But in this notice it is impossible to call attention to *all* of the excellences of Mr. Brown's *books*. His system has the rare merit of being both sound, and consistent, and of attaining to its end by the shortest, and clearest road. That these books will supplant the present elementary works of instruction, will soon, we believe, be a fact no less fixed than that the lumbering Conestoga wagon has given place to the rapid and powerful locomotive.

GEORGE W. BIDDLE.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 21st, 1849.

I have used the "First," and the "Second Round in the Ladder of Education" in my school for several months; and I have become fully satisfied that their merits are superlatively great. The author of these books deserves the praise to which the most excellent deeds can entitle one. But his good works do not stop here; he has constructed a new system of English Grammar, which must place every nation that uses the English language under great obligations to him.

MRS. MARY WHITESIDES,

Principal of the Female Seminary, corner of Washington and Wayne streets, Spring Garden.

[From Godey's Lady's Book, November, 1849.]

FIRST AND SECOND ROUND IN THE LADDER OF EDUCATION.—These two extremely valuable books are by the celebrated school-book author, James Brown. He has struck out an entirely new path in teaching, and one that will redound to his credit in future years. It may seem strange that the *philosophy* of language and of sounds, can be taught to a child with the alphabet, but it is so, as a faithful adherence to these books will prove. With them go a picture card called "The Hand Nomascope," and a convenient sheet called "The Alphascope." We are anxious to call the special attention of teachers to this curious and useful series of works.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOOK SECOND.

Philadelphia, January, 1854.

I have read the SECOND BOOK of Mr. BROWN'S RATIONAL SYSTEM of ENGLISH GRAMMAR; and I am glad to find that the author has built on better principles than those on which the old theory is formed. Several months ago, I read the FIRST BOOK of the Rational System of English Grammar; and I was much pleased with it. I found that it contains none of the errors which pervade the common English Grammars. But, as I ascribed its freedom from error to the fact that the FIRST BOOK is not a substitute for the Grammars now in use, I commenced my examination of the SECOND BOOK which is designed as a substitute for the old theory of English Grammar, with great fear that the work would turn out to be a mere re-publication of the old Grammars. I find, however, that Mr. Brown has substituted Rational doctrines for the absurdities which have always been taught as the principles of our language. Instead of saying, as do the old Books of English Grammar, English Grammar is the art of *speaking, and writing* the English Language with propriety, Mr. Brown says, that English *philology* is the science of the English language, and the art of using it with propriety in all respects. He says, too, that English philology is divided into two parts, viz: English *Signification*, and English *Grammar*.

English Signification, says he, the *first* part of English philology, is the science of giving words a *signification*, and the art of using them with *significant* propriety.

English *Grammar*, the *second* part of English philology, is the science of the *construction* of the English language, and the art of using it with *constructive* propriety.

But what says the old theory? English Grammar is the science of the English Language.

While the old theory makes English Grammar the *whole* science of the English Language, the Rational System makes English Grammar the mere *constructive* principles of the English Language.

That English Grammar does not embrace the *whole* science of the English Language, is too clear to require one remark. English Grammar embraces clearly every *constructive* principle of the English Language.

I consider the SECOND BOOK of the Rational System, a sound production, and I most heartily hope that the work will be put into the hands of all school children at once. I consider James Brown the best English Grammarian in the world; in the formation of his Rational System of English Grammar, he has done a good deed for his country; and I verily believe that it is the duty of us all to endeavour to promote its introduction as a partial compensation for the bravery with which this soldier in the war of innovation, has long, and triumphantly fought our battle.

P. A. BROWNE.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

31st March, 1854.

MY DEAR SIR,

It is more than forty years since I opened any book on Grammar, and I therefore feel myself very incompetent to form an opinion on the *comparative* merit of the work you were kind enough to leave on my office-table. Of its *substantive* merit, however, I am able to speak with great confidence, and am inclined to speak with great warmth. I had not supposed the subject capable of being made attractive and impressive; and was much surprised to find that your volume is so characterized by direct, lucid, and forcible reasoning, by purity and simplicity of language, and by manly though modest sincerity of self-conviction, as to rivet my attention and satisfy my judgment from the beginning to the end. You seem to me to have accomplished, by great labour of mind and singleness of aim, an improvement in the art of explaining and teaching the mechanism of our language, which I think deserves all the rewards consequent upon public adoption and patronage.

Very truly and respectfully,

Your friend and servant,

G. M. DALLAS.

James Brown, Esq.

April 6, 1854.

DEAR SIR,

I profess to be something of a grammarian, and therefore I felt anxious to examine your "Class Book of Criticism upon the Old Theory of English Grammar." I have examined it carefully, and to my entire satisfaction, and I consider it the best work of the kind that has ever come under my notice. I have handed it over to my son, who had been instructed upon the old system, and I am convinced that he gained more knowledge from its perusal, as to the nature and structure of language, than months of previous instruction had afforded. I sincerely hope that the Board of Controllers of the First School District will sanction the use of this work as a Reading Book, in the Public Schools.

Very truly,

DAVID PAUL BROWN.

James Brown, Esq.

April 6, 1854.

James Brown's Class Book of Criticism, written with great care and accuracy, is well calculated for a reading book in the higher classes of our Public Schools, both on account of its matter and correct diction.

P. A. CREGAR,

Principal S. E. G. School.

I fully concur in the above opinion of Mr. Cregar.

JOHN JOYCE,

Principal of Weccacoe Boys' Gram. School.

JAMES C. FISHER, M. D.,

Principal of S. W. G. School.

A CIRCULAR TO TEACHERS.

Philadelphia, 1853.

Gentlemen:—The unwelcome task which the *teaching* as well as the learning of the present popular theory of English Grammar, imposes upon the instructor, and the pupil, is *prima facie* evidence of a great deficiency in the system. And the frank admission of all who acquire a knowledge of this theory, that “*they do not understand the grammar of the English language*,” fully establishes the existence of this defect. Under this impression, and wishing to promote the cause of general education to the extent of my power, I have undertaken to supply this deficiency by offering to the public through your agency, the *Rational* system of English Grammar. I offer this work as a *substitute* for the English Grammars *now* used in schools, and, should you wish to introduce a *substitute* for the old theory, I would invite your attention to my *Rational* system in *three books*.

The **FIRST** BOOK teaches the division of a sentence into *sections*, a complete analysis of each section as the *trunk* or *branch* of the sentence, and of words as the *trunk*, and *branch* parts of *sections*. The division of a sentence into sections; and the classification of these sections into *trunk*, and *branch* orders, are parts of English Grammar, which the old theory does not even attempt to teach. A grammarian who is *unable to divide* a sentence into *sections*, cannot read it with ease, and propriety: he is as much bewildered with its sense as is an untaught gazer at the nocturnal heavens with the confusion that seems to exist among the stars which light up this kingdom of night. But as the well taught astronomer sees perfect harmony, and clear method throughout this wonderful machinery of lights, so the skilful sectionizer of a sentence, apprehends the exact import of this verbal structure, with a certainty, and a strength which nothing but a capacity to divide

a sentence into sections, and ascertain their true *sense* relation, can give to the mind. As the reader proceeds, the entire thought of the writer becomes almost *visible* to him; and he breaks it into sections which he classes as *trunks* and *branches* of the same mental assemblage, with as much ease, and accuracy as a well taught botanist would class the component parts of a tree. As soon as a pupil can divide a sentence into sections, and refer each section to its proper order, or class, he should commence the entire process of *CONSTRUING*, which consists in a variety of constructive evolutions that tend to enable him to map off, and connect the different ideas of the writer with as much ease, and correctness as a practised engineer can sketch a *canal*, *dock*, or *harbor* upon paper. As the entire movement of the pupil engaged in the process of *SCANNING*, and *CONSTRUING*, is one in which each step that is taken with *accuracy*, is induced, and directed by the sense itself, it is not only calculated to enable pupils to investigate the mind of another through the medium of his writings, but to enable them to promote the growth of their own minds to almost any extent. There seem to be few objects in art, or nature, well calculated to give a comprehensive view of this process. Perhaps, while a *dissected* map of the United States represents a *sectionized* sentence as clearly as any other thing which can be found, the act of putting its component parts together, represents the process of *Scanning*, and *Construing* with as much precision, and *perspicuity* as any other operation which is common among us. The entire map is the entire sentence—and the division of it into the different States, the division of a sentence into different sections. The process of properly describing, and placing each State, may give some idea of the process of properly *describing*, and *placing* each section of the sentence, and giving the *sense* connection of every word of a section. As in the *dissected* map, a State may be located far from the particular States which actually bound it, so in the *sectionized* sentence, a *sub-section* may be placed far from its own *super-section*, the section with which the *sub* holds a *sense* relation. And as the putting of the component parts of the map together will bring the *misplaced* State next to those which actually bound it, so

the *sense* reading of the *sub*-section will bring it in direct contact with its *super* section.

The FIRST Book, is not only a means of teaching the *sense* relation of *one word* to another word, but an instrument for presenting that *manly, mental, subtle* coincidence, vibrating between the relative sections which compose the sentence. The part called *Construing*, treats of words in their *collective* action, their *collective* bearing, and in their *collective* import—and, while it may be clearly comprehended even by children, it is not unworthy of the close attention of *men*, of *scholars*, of *philosophers*. *Construing* consists of dividing a sentence into *sections*, ascertaining their true *sense* relation, learning their exact *dictions*, and referring the inferior sections to their respective superiors. This exercise urges the pupil to trace out the precise sense connection of the sections, by following the filaments which produce it; and thus fits him to discern the exact meaning of any writer whose language he may read. It prepares the pupil to read with an understanding which renders study easy, delightful, and highly profitable. *Construing* gives the pupil a knowledge of language which qualifies him to acquire the other branches of education with an expedition, ease, and satisfaction, that render study advantageous, and pleasing. Made familiar with *Construing*, the pupil's mind kindles into fervor; and he pursues his study as much for the pleasure of the exercise as for the advantage of knowledge. And, whether his eye is turned to the sign of the type, or his ear directed to the language of the tongue, he seizes the period with animation, moves along the *constructive* fibres which extend from section to section, works his passage through the entire sentence, and comes out with every thing which philosophy can glean, or acuteness discern.

James Brown's Books.— [See Back Cover.]

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Lewisburg, Marshall Co., Tenn., July 3d, 1852.

SIR,—We have examined a system of Grammar by James Brown of Philadelphia, Penn'a.—We are of the opinion that it is decidedly superior to any other system we have seen. We have adopted the work in our schools, but few of the books can be had in our country; and, for the want of them, we have to teach the technicalities by lecture. We have solicited our merchants to send on for the books; and they have done so, but have failed to procure a sufficient quantity to answer our purpose. We, therefore, wish you to send us 300 Book I.; 300 Book II.; one copy Class Book of Criticisms and one of Exegesis.

Yours, &c.

HENRY M'CULLOUGH, and,
BENJAMIN M'CONNEL.

The following recommendation of the "Rational System," was addressed to the Editor of the Baltimore Republican.

Mr. Editor,—I have recently examined a work, entitled "THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR." This work I am now using in my Academy, in preference to all others of the kind. I consider it simple in its construction, and calculated to give even the infant pupil the grammar of the English language; and, at the same time more pleasing and animating than any other production on English grammar. And, although the fact of adopting this Grammar is a sufficient expression of my approbation, yet I can hardly refrain from making a few observations besides the one already made.

From the nature of the subject, this book is emphatically addressed to teachers in the United States. Mr. Murray's English Grammar, originally compiled for the student in the closet only, has, for the want of a correct system, been generally introduced into our schools—and it has now acquired so much power, as to exercise, in many instances, almost complete dominion over reason itself. This I call custom which, says Dr. Gill, "is a tyrant, and ought to be rebelled against." Indeed, his work has been so long in use in one form, or another, that many believe it originally designed by Mr. Murray himself, as a school book; and one too, which *he* thought well calculated to give a full, and clear expression of the genius of the English language. But, if facts can be depended upon, Mr. Murray must have been surprised to see his compilation taken into schools, and placed in the hands of children. This unexpected mark of patronage induced Mr. Murray to attempt the adaptation of his Grammar to the capacities of children. In this, however, he has never succeeded. This learned compiler, believing that the principles which he had accumulated from the writings of different men and which are almost the soul and body of his whole system, are correct, has given great attention to the *manner* of presenting them to the mind of youth.

Mr. Murray arranged, and varied, till, in his judgment, the subject of English grammar was exhausted, and the object which he had in view, fully attained. Teachers, however, still found it laborious, and fatiguing to instruct by Mr. Murray's system: and, if we may judge by their numerous attempts to improve it, we may well conclude that his work is susceptible of much further simplification

Not only teachers, but almost all men of letters, have seen that something has been wrong, which they have labored to rectify. Hence Mr. Murray's system of English Grammar has undergone revision after revision, till, (if we are not much deceived) there are very few learned men who have not attempted to improve it. But unfortunately for themselves, and for the world also, they have all bestowed their labor upon the body of the system, to the complete neglect of its soul. They have engaged their minds to improve the *mode* of presenting erroneous principles. But error never can be simple, though the tale be told in words of topaz; it never can be beautiful, though it be set in diamonds. Let two instances of error suffice, as a sample of the whole system:—"The objective case expresses the object of an action, or of a relation."—*Murray*.

From this definition, who would think of parsing the name of the actor in the objective case? Yet we find the noun, *Saul*, in the following example, in the objective—

"The Christians were persecuted by Saul!"

Does *Saul* express the object of the action? No. This word denotes the agent, the actor himself. How, then, can this noun, by virtue of this definition, be parsed in the objective?

Again:—The common definition of the infinitive mood runs thus: "The infinitive mood expresses being or action, in an unlimited or general manner."

One example will put this definition to the test, and its friends to the blush;—John is to eat an apple.

To eat, is in the infinitive mood. But is it uncertain who is to eat an apple? Is this act general and unlimited?

Again—"John is to be hanged." Is this act general, and unlimited? If so, John is in no more danger than Sally! But enough of this. They who would see more, are desired to read a work by JAMES BROWN, which he has very justly entitled "A Class Book of Criticism; or, an Appeal from the present Popular System of English Grammar, to Common Sense." The reader will here find a full, and an accurate investigation of those principles which have long been sanctioned, not by truth and consistency, but by authority.

Having read this work which is amusing and instructive, the reader will, by perusing the Grammar itself, see that Mr. Brown does not labor to improve the *MODE* of presenting these principles. He will find a plan of grammatical machinery, moved by the power of truth, beautified by consistency, and sustained by the genius, and dignity of our own vernacular tongue. Yes, the "Rational System" proffers to the world a *MENTAL SYSTEM* of English grammar, original, true, copious, simple, and energetic—honourable to this country, and creditable to the author.—The "Rational System" delights the learner, while it taxes his perceptive powers—it lessens the labor and vexation of the teacher, while it enables him to do the work of instruction thoroughly, and deep. The author of this work is now before this enlightened community, and he should, for the good of youth, be noticed—he is now before his native country, and, for the good of that country, should be sustained.

E. BENNETT.

*Principal of the Academy in the basement story of the 3d
Presbyterian Church, N. Eutaw Street, Baltimore.*

The following is from a letter of the Rev. Mr. Findlay, Baltimore.

No man can read the criticisms of Mr. Brown without feeling at once ashamed of his own subjection to authority, and gratified with the author's ingenuity, and correctness. Brown is a philosopher—he has founded his system of Grammar upon the basis of the mind; he has succeeded in redeeming the Grammar of our language from every thing arbitrary. The learner is now treated as a thinking being, instead of, *as Lindley Murray says, or as the rule says*; there is a fitness in the thing itself, which commends itself to the judgment, and taste of the learner. The day is at hand when a complete revolution is to be accomplished, when the bonds of irrational prejudice must be broken off, and the mind of the rising generation, in the first stage of scientific attainment, taught to assert its native dignity, and independence. But what can patience, and genius do in these unobtrusive walks of science, without the aid of the influential in society? Let the system have an investigation, and a fair trial; and, if found to be the system of *truth*, why not adopt it?

An extract from a letter of the late John Sanderson, late Professor of Languages in the Philadelphia High School.

Bitter complaints are made by critics, and philosophers in Great Britain of the insufficiency of their English Grammars. "They are compilations," says the Edinburgh Review, "of silly rules, crowding the memory, and debasing the understanding of the pupil—a jargon of nickname definitions, the learning of which is a mere *ad captandum* ceremony, making a *parrot* of the pupil to delight his grandmother, and to give notoriety to his schoolmaster, and academy." * * * * *

Brown is emphatically a grammarian. He has invaded this province of philosophy, and made it his own by conquest.

JOHN SANDERSON.

Extract of a letter from Prof. Espy to a friend.

PHILADELPHIA, January, 1854.

MY DEAR SIR,—In answer to your question, *What do I think of James Brown's new system of English Grammar?* I reply that I have been acquainted with this gentleman's profound investigations into the very mysteries of our language, for many years; and I am sure that he has done more than any other man to lay open the absurdities, and inconsistencies of Murray, and his host of followers. But this is not all. He has built up a beautiful, and luminous system of his own, founded, as I conceive, on *true principles*, simple in their nature, and coherent in all their parts. He has thus formed English grammar into a science which, from the logical connection of all its parts, furnishes youth with an exercise that is as fine, and as healthful to the mind as any in the whole circle of the sciences.

I have taught English Grammar thirty years, and read all the Grammars of any note; but I have found none, except the *new* system by James Brown, which is not *full of absurdities, and contradictions*. I feel a deep interest in the progress of a sound, rational education; and, if my voice could be heard through the whole length, and breadth of our land, I would say to all teachers, *examine the work carefully for yourselves.*

Yours, truly,

JAMES P. ESPY.

RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
FIRST, AND OF THE SECOND ROUND
IN THE
LADDER OF EDUCATION.
BY JAMES BROWN.

I have examined with much pleasure your school books entitled "The First" and "The Second Round in the Ladder of Education." They are, without exception, the best works of the kind that have ever been published. The enabling of a child to learn the sounds of the letters as well as syllable reading by the aid of the organs of vision, is indeed admirable. But above all, I value the introduction of the prefixes in the "Second Round," which, although they serve as a key to the general meaning of nearly twenty thousand common English words, have hitherto been kept from the child, because the makers of the common primers have devised no means by which the mere child can learn them.

I am persuaded that your whole plan will be approved by persons accustomed to teaching. Your "Second Round" ought to be studied by all adults who are deficient in a knowledge of the meaning of words; and both "Rounds" should be used in all schools and families in which Primary Books are required.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

PETER A. BROWNE.

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 21st, 1849.

I have examined with a high degree of care and interest, two little works by James Brown, designed to render greater aid to both teacher and pupil in the first steps of an English education; the titles are the "First" and the "Second Round in the Ladder of Education," and I feel perfectly convinced that these two Rounds are better calculated to aid the teacher in putting the pupil up this ladder, and the pupil in ascending it, than any other works which have hitherto been employed for the same purpose.

J. H. BROWN, A. M.

Principal of the Zane street Boys' Grammar School.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

November 13th, 1850.

I have examined Mr. J. Brown's small Grammar, (Book I.,) and am of opinion that it is calculated to shed so much light upon grammatical science, that great assistance may be derived from it, by the teacher and the learner.

THOMAS S. SMITH.

I have looked through The First of a series of books by Mr. J. Brown on the subject of English Grammar; and with pleasure I recommend its use in schools.

Its teachings are founded on a severe and just analysis of the nature of language, and the principles of the subject are clearly expressed and happily illustrated.

This work will not only save the pupil much time in learning grammar but it will improve the capacity of the learner for *analyzing* the language even by the theory now in use, and give him much more skill in the art of using it with grammatical propriety than he can acquire from the old books alone.

JOHN D. BLEIGHT.

I consider James Brown's "First Book" on English Grammar an excellent auxiliary in teaching and learning this science

The work, though small, has great simplicity, and much philosophy. I value this work because it is calculated to impart a knowledge of the constructive principles of the English Language, a part of grammar in which the old system is very defective.

NICHOLAS H. MAGUEIR.

Principal of Coates's Street Grammar School.

Philadelphia, November 10th, 1850.

In studying Mr. JAMES BROWN'S FIRST BOOK on the Grammar of the English Language, the pupil makes an excellent preparation for learning the common theory of English Grammar. From the impression which a close examination of the work, has left on my mind, and from that which the witnessing of an application of its principles in the teaching of children, has made on it, I most heartily wish to see the book in general use.

LOUISA BEDFORD,

Principal of the Harrison Grammar School, Female Department.

Philadelphia, November 2nd, 1850.

TO JAMES BROWN, ESQ.,

Dear Sir :—I have examined your FIRST BOOK on the Grammar of the English Language, and have found it replete with *good sense*. The principles which it inculcates, are *new, sound, simple*, and *important*, and I consider a knowledge of them, an invaluable preparation for studying Grammar

Having had some experience in *writing for the Press*, I will add that, many who are deficient in a knowledge of *punctuation*, but who write well in other respects, should have your FIRST BOOK. It would be well for every *compositor*, and *proof-reader* to possess this valuable work.

I am, dear sir, your obt. sert.,

PETER A. BROWNE.

Philadelphia, November 26th, 1850.

I have examined Mr. James Brown's FIRST BOOK on English Grammar, and, from a conviction, that pupils who study it, lay an excellent foundation, for the acquisition of English grammar, I most heartily wish to see the book in all our schools.

A. T. W. WRIGHT,

Principal of the Philadelphia Normal School.

Philadelphia, November 28th, 1850.

TO JAMES BROWN, ESQ.,

Dear Sir :—I have examined the FIRST BOOK of your new system of English Grammar, and I am much pleased with the clear notions it gives of the exact structure of sentences. I feel satisfied that every one who studies it will derive great assistance in the acquirement of a correct knowledge of the constructive philosophy of our language; and, under this impression, I sincerely hope it may be introduced into all our schools, that children

may have the important aid which this little work is so well calculated to afford.

I am, very respectfully yours,

GEO. W. BIDDLE.


ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

AND OF THE
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THE HAND-NOMASCOPE, a card giving a complete view of the names of the letters, Per dozen 30 cts.

THE SECOND ROUND IN THE LADDER OF EDUCATION, 15 cts.

This book comprises a new method of teaching the prefixes and the monosyllabic words in the English language; the whole is illustrated with cuts intended to impress most thoroughly the meaning of words upon the mind of the child.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 25 cts.

[This work is now used in the Public Grammar Schools in the First School District of Pennsylvania.]

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, designed to teach the process of analyzing the English language with sound judgment, and the art of using it with grammatical propriety, 50 cts.

This is offered as a substitute for the old history; and, although, in general, it employs the old technical terms in analyzing, especially in definitions, the definitions are entirely new.

THE THIRD BOOK OF THE RATIONAL SYSTEM OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, designed to enable the learner to become most thoroughly acquainted with the nature, and use of the *prepositions*—it may be read by him either in, or out of school, 30 cts.

A CLASS BOOK OF CRITICISMS ON THE COMMON THEORY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR, AND ON THE WRITINGS OF ITS COMPILERS. Designed for the use of Colleges, private readers, and advanced schools, 62½ cts. Per Vol.

This book sets aside the old grammars—exposes their errors, demonstrates the false use of almost all terms, and presents to the teacher the correct, and only way to the grammar of the English language. It introduces the most accomplished grammarians, and instructs the student profound philosophy and logic in a variety of ways, and shows the compound's public knowledge of composition, the learner's language as positive discussion, and the magazine's confirmation in logic lessons.

Brown's EXERCISES OF THE TRUE WAY OF ANALYZING WORDS, AND CONSTRUCTIONS, said to be of difficult resolution, 25 cts.

BROWN'S SYSTEM OF PARSING FORMS. 25 cts.

PHILADELPHIA, August, 1849.

I deem it proper to say here that John T. Lange has no connection with any of my books, and that the works which he published for a short time, have since been much improved by the author.

JAMES BROWN.